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Abstract 
This thesis explores aspects of the development of automobilism in the North-West 
from its beginnings around 1896 to 1939. An investigation of regional source material 
is used to engage with national and international research on the automobile, and 
more broadly, science and technology studies and the interaction between technology 
and society. In doing so, this investigation shows the complexities surrounding the 
diffusion and technological development of the automobile, focusing on the 
interactions between users, non-users, designers and dealers. Split into three main 
chapters, this thesis starts by exploring motoring culture in the North-West, arguing 
the importance of cultural and social factors in the automobile’s diffusion. It then 
exposes the important role played by commercial prospects and the “imaginaries” 
surrounding the commercial vehicle in the development of automobilism. Finally, it 
argues the importance of considering the role of both the small firm and the agent and 
dealer in the development of automobile technology and automobilism in general. 
Overall this thesis can be used as a case study for the way in which sociotechnological 
systems develop, in this case described as “automobilism”. It also shows how regional 
experiences both in design, use, promotion and resistance shape these systems.  
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Introduction  
This thesis is an exploration of aspects of automobilism in the North-West of England 
from its beginnings around 1896 to 1939. It aims to go beyond filling the “regional gap” 
in the UK’s automobile historiography by exploring new regional evidence either to 
contribute to identified important debates, or by exposing and responding to gaps in 
our historical understanding of automobilism.  
It will attempt to reconcile the growth of the manufacturing industry with the 
emergence of a technology from obscurity to a ubiquitous consumer product, popular 
cultural motif, and powerful class and gender symbol. This is important because of the 
historiographical distance between economic and business studies of the automobile; 
and social, and cultural studies identified here. This is not a study of an industry within 
a region, but of the relationship between a region, its businesses and its people and 
the influence of these factors on the evolution of a consumer product and its use. It 
engages with theories in the field of science and technology studies which seek to 
explain the use and development of technologies through understanding the user, the 
co-construction of technology and the “sociotechnical imaginaries”1 that have guided 
use, design and political planning. Theories developed in the field of science and 
technology studies combined with detailed regional research has been used to 
challenge some long held assumptions about the diffusion of motoring, the 
development of the industry and the technological determinist view of the 
automobile’s adoption.  
This thesis explores a wide variety of aspects of the automobile during this period. It 
takes this wide ranging approach for two reasons. Firstly, based on the literature 
review, there are a number of areas of automobile studies that can benefit from a 
user-centred theoretical approach to the automobile. Secondly the fruitful amount of 
primary source material for the automobile in the North-West covers both a large 
range of areas of automobilism. I wanted to showcase both this source material and 
the way in which it can be used to challenge, or enhance existing research. Due to this 
                                                          
1
 A term first coined by Jasonoff, S. and Kim, S., Containing the Atom: Sociotechnical Imaginaries and 
Nuclear Power in the United States and South Korea, in Minerva, Vol.47 (2009). This term and its 
definition is examined in the literature review. 
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approach it is beyond the scope of this thesis to explore the wide range of topics in an 
exhaustive manner. These aspects, although diverse, are drawn together by the 
theoretical approach which looks at the automobile as a case study for the ways in 
which society and technology interact.   
This thesis is the product of a collaborative doctoral award (CDA) from the Arts and 
Humanities Research Council (AHRC) with the Science and Industry Museum, 
Manchester and Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU). The project started with 
several research questions at the outset which were as follows: 
 What was the extent of Manchester’s motor industry?  
 What was the extent of the rise and decline of the Manchester motor industry 
to 1939?  
 What were its “features” compared with the national context? 
 How were products marketed and delivered? What was the extent of the 
market? Was “northernness”, or Manchester’s renown as an industrial centre 
used as a selling tactic?  
 What part was played by northern elites (wealthy early adopters, agents, 
financiers, the corporation) in the industry? 
 How did the enthusiast clubs fit in, especially in fostering and promoting the 
local motoring market? 
 What part was played by the northern motor shows, especially in the light of 
the (London-based) Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders’ attempts to 
shut the motor shows down?  
 Why did some Manchester companies, notably the coachbuilder Joseph 
Cockshoot & Co., recognise early on the potential of embracing the motor 
business; and what were their methods for transitioning their business 
 Were Manchester companies responding to particular local demand for 
particular products? Was there a different market in “the north” (for example, 
for small delivery vehicles or for commercial vehicles) compared with markets 
elsewhere in the UK? 
 How did motor manufacturers foster relationships with agents and dealers, and 
how innovative were manufacturers in doing so? 
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By exploring the development of motoring and the motor industry in Manchester, the 
project’s aim was to better understand Manchester’s role, and aid the interpretation 
of the road transport collection at the museum. This included the exploration of 
specific and unique archive sources, particularly the Cockshoot collection, the archive 
of a Manchester-based coachbuilder that diversified into the motor industry by 
building motorcar bodies and becoming a motorcar dealer.2 Examination of this 
archive material along with secondary literature led to a change in emphasis for the 
project from an industry focus to an approach that first considers why and how people 
used the automobile. The Cockshoot archive material held at the Museum highlighted 
the important role played by motorcar agents in linking the manufacturers with 
customers by paying particular attention to customers’ needs. This chimed with newer 
automobile research, which emphasises the importance of the developing automobile 
culture in the diffusion of the automobile, and more generally with science and 
technology studies that highlighted the social construction of technology, the 
important role of the user and the way in which visions of the future were influential in 
shaping technological artefacts and social attitudes. 
Initial research highlighted a general lack of depth in regional analysis of the British 
automobile industry. Previous detailed regional studies for the UK have tended to 
focus on Coventry, the industry’s acknowledged centre.3 Yet a study of Manchester 
and the surrounding region is justified due to the 138 manufacturers identified 
(Appendix 1), a demonstrably large motoring interest in Lancashire and the diversity of 
its industry from cars, to commercial vehicles, coachbuilders, motorcycles, cycles, 
dealers and component manufacturers, as well as the large number of motorists, 
motoring clubs and other automobile interest groups. Secondly, a regional case study 
explores sources that are not normally used and thus can help contextualise national 
and international generalisations, whilst demonstrating regional variations. Originally 
this study focused exclusively on Manchester. However, as research progressed it 
                                                          
2
 Science and Industry Museum Archives – Cockshoot collection YMS 0196 and 0197 
3
 For example, Thoms, D., and Donnelly, T., The motor car industry in Coventry since the 1890s (London: 
Croom Helm, 1985), and Beaven, B., The Growth and Significance of the Coventry Car Component 
Industry, 1895-1939 (De Montford University: PhD Thesis, 1994) 
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became clear that Manchester could not be considered in isolation despite its position 
as the centre of the industry in the North-West. It shall be shown how other urban and 
rural areas in the North-West had an important influence on the development of 
motor manufacture and automobile culture.  The interaction between the city and 
other urban and rural environments forms an important part of this study. For 
example, Cheshire and its countryside was a popular weekend touring destination for 
urban automobile users.   
The North-West has been chosen because the project started with archive material at 
the Science and Industry Museum, Manchester. The museum’s collections largely 
originate from the North-West and therefore a focus on the region can best help the 
museum understand and interpret its road transport-related collection.  The period 
1896 to 1939 was chosen at the outset of the project because it encompasses the 
beginning and end of motorcar manufacturing in the region and forms the period in 
which the road transport collection at the Science and Industry Museum largely sits.  
1896 is recognised as one beginning of motor manufacturing, with the passing of the 
Highways and Locomotives Act of that year. By 1939 Crossley Motors, the last 
motorcar manufacturer in the North-West had ceased to produce motorcars and 
instead concentrated on commercial vehicles.  Automobile scholarship often divides 
study by the First World War, focusing either on the pre-1914 period, or more 
frequently on the interwar period. 1939 is used, by British historians, to mark the end 
of the interwar period. It is also an end point used by seminal works of automobile 
history such as O’Connell’s The car in British society: Class, gender and motoring 1896-
1939.  
Structure 
The thesis has been divided into three thematic chapters: Chapter 1, the development 
of motoring culture in the North-West; Chapter 2, Commercial Motoring; and Chapter 
3, the North-West’s motor industry. The thesis has been structured to start with an 
examination of motoring culture, or more specifically the diffusion of the automobile 
from a small number of vehicles in 1896, to several million by 1939. Based on the 
literature review it was identified that understanding how and why the automobile 
diffused is essential to how the industry developed, and equally how the automobile as 
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a technology has been shaped by society. Exploring aspects of this culture informs the 
examination of both commercial motoring in Chapter 2 and the regional motor 
industry in chapter 3.  
Summary of Chapters 
Chapter 1 explores several aspects of the automobile’s diffusion. This chapter 
emphasises the importance of social pressures, popular culture, advertising, resistance 
and the relationship between cycling and carriage culture in the automobile’s 
diffusion.  It explores why cycling and cyclists formed such an important cultural group 
during the early period. It examines why and how two social tiers of motorists 
developed in the pre-1914 period, the chauffeur-driven large automobile owner and 
the more modest owner driver, often a motorcyclist, for the interwar period. It also 
looks at the influence of popular culture and marketing diffusion in the interwar 
period, while challenging the widely held view that the automobile went from a 
product primarily used for pleasure to one of utility. 
Chapter 2 looks at the understudied area of commercial motoring. It challenges the 
treatment of the subject as a sub-category of motoring. The emergence of commercial 
motoring has not really been explained, but has been accepted as a by-product of 
private motoring and the development of technology. This chapter therefore seeks a 
different explanation for commercial motoring. It argues that the commercial or the 
utility, aspect of motoring was central to the acceptance and justification for motoring 
from the beginning. This was largely through the promotion and belief of a core 
sociotechnical imaginary: that the automobile, as a technology, can change society for 
the better, not only through improved personal mobility, but by improving the mobility 
of goods and services for the betterment of all. This imaginary, championed by 
automobile interest groups, manufacturers and motorists, influenced businesses, 
political legislation, and public attitudes.  The power of this sociotechnical imaginary is 
demonstrated throughout the chapter by an examination of the origins of commercial 
motoring, and its persistent experimental use, despite its failure for many years to 
demonstrate clear economic benefits or reliability; its growing dominance in the 
imaginings and actions of city planners; and in the technological replacement of the 
horse and the tram by the automobile.  
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Chapter 3 explores the regional motor industry. It considers how a regional statistical 
analysis can contribute towards our understanding of the national industry, which 
highlights some deficiencies in data use by previous historians. It looks at the 
motivations and origins of the often-neglected small firms whose existence as 
manufacturers was transient yet important. Given the emphasis of previous chapters it 
looks at how the origins of the industry were influenced by the cultural aspects, as well 
as the technological aspects of cycling. It explores the motorcar agent and dealer, a 
forgotten aspect of the industry that served to connect the user and the manufacturer. 
This chapter argues for their importance, both in the prosperity of firms, but also in the 
development of the technology. Finally, this chapter looks at whether there were any 
important regional factors that contributed towards the demise of the industry in the 
North-West. Evidence shows that, other than the relative strength of labour 
organisation in Manchester, there was no specific regional explanation for the decline 
of the regional industry. In many ways its rise and its decline mirror national trends, 
such as entry and exit levels of automobile manufacturers.  
Methods and sources 
This study includes an analysis of: manufacturers of motorcars, motorcycles and 
commercial vehicles; coachbuilders and motor car bodybuilders; garages, dealers and 
agents; and component manufacturers. These businesses count in their hundreds. 
Numerous motoring clubs, regional motoring trade groups and defence organisations, 
as well as trade unions, form part of the evidence of this thesis. This study will not 
provide a full narrative account of the Manchester automobile industry or its many 
automobile manufacturers: many of the more significant firms based in the North-
West have dedicated publications, such as Rolls Royce, Crossley, Ford and Foden.4 
Research by A D George has illuminated the histories of some of Manchester’s smaller 
                                                          
4
 For example, Rolls Royce: M. H. Evans, In The Beginning – the Manchester origins of Rolls-Royce, 
Historical Series No. 4 (Rolls Royce Heritage Trust, Derby, 2004); Crossley: M. Eyre, C. Heaps and A. 
Townsin, Crossley (Oxford Publishing Co: Oxford, 2002); Ford: M. Riley, B. Lilleker and N. Tuckett, The 
English Model T Ford a Century of the Model T in Britain (Titus, Wilson and Son: Kendal, 2011); Foden: P. 
Kennett, The Foden Story (Patrick Stephens: Cambridge, 1978) 
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firms.5 But by exploring local sources, and making conclusions about local society and 
industry, this thesis therefore will interact with regional scholarship.  
Quantitative data has been gleaned from surviving company financial records, 
catalogues for local motor shows, newspapers and trade periodicals including reports 
of annual general meetings, race meets and share prices. There is a disparity in the 
survival of material relating to different firms. Quantitative sources such as these are 
useful for highlighting trends and changing patterns in the Manchester motor industry, 
but often do not adequately explain the reasons and motivations for decisions and 
changes. The methodology of this study therefore has been to seek a large range of 
qualitative sources. A few company archives survive including the Cockshoot 
collection, the Crossley collection and Quicks collection held at the Science and 
Industry Museum, Manchester; the Fodens collection at the Cheshire County Records 
Centre; the Crossley collection at Warwick Modern Records Centre and the Hans 
Renold collection at Manchester Central Library’s Archives.  
While these sources are voluminous they represent only a few of the many significant 
regional firms. For most firms that made up the industry, archival records are either 
sporadic or non-existent.  
Local newspapers have been extensively used, particularly those that are now 
available for digital search, including the Manchester Courier and the Manchester 
Guardian. Other resources, such as motoring periodicals and society magazines, are 
also available as a digital resource and have been widely used. These include the 
Automotor and Horseless Journal, Motor Cycle and magazines like Punch, The 
Bystander, The Graphic and The Tatler. These resources have only recently been made 
available to scholars and have made this research much easier and richer, especially 
given the scarce archive resources. Of course, more traditional methods have also 
been used including manual searches in important motoring periodicals such as The 
Autocar and The Motor, and more specific periodicals such as the Ford Times.  
                                                          
5
 Mainly, A. D. George, “The rise and fall of the Manchester motor industry”, in D. Brumhead and T. 
Wyke eds., Moving Manchester (Lancashire and Cheshire Antiquarian Society, 2004) pp.194-209; A.D. 
George, The Manchester Motor Industry 1900-1938 (Manchester Polytechnic Occasional Paper No.3. 
1989)  
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One of the most valuable quantitative data sources has been the city and suburban 
trade directories. These have provided dates, addresses, names and products of a 
range of relevant companies from Manchester’s cycle, motor, motor component and 
coach building industries. Yet they are brief and although they give the number and 
location of firms, they provide no volume or size statistics. For example, trade 
directories show that Manchester had 5 percent of the nation’s cycle firms in the city. 
Yet the volume produced by these firms amounted to much less than a 5 percent share 
in the market. Trade directories can often be out of date, adapting slowly to new 
industries such as motor manufacturing and often companies are not listed. Therefore, 
this data has been supplemented with data from motoring publications such as The 
Motor and The Autocar who reported on new firms and included adverts for 
businesses.  
 
Terms 
The term “automobile” will be used to describe all forms of road based motorised 
transport covering motorcars, motorcycles and commercial vehicles. “Commercial 
vehicles” will also be used frequently and describes a range of vehicles: haulage lorries 
and vans, buses, taxis, vehicles used for business or advertising, fire engines and 
ambulances. In Chapter 2 covering commercial vehicles, doctor’s use of motoring is 
discussed. While this can’t be described as “commercial”, the use of the automobile by 
professionals such as doctors fits in this chapter because it helps further demonstrate 
how motoring was imagined to serve society, whether that is by doctors, by 
businesses, or by local fire brigades (also discussed along with commercial motoring). 
The “North-West” is used for what was, during the period of study, the counties of 
Lancashire and Cheshire, including the cities of Manchester and Liverpool, and North 
Lancashire towns such as Preston, Blackpool and Barrow. The term “automobilism” 
will be used frequently to describe the motoring movement that developed during the 
course of the period of study.6 This is generally used instead of “motoring” which is 
                                                          
6
 Mom, Atlantic Automobilism p.38 
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more suggestive of the actual act of driving and does not convey the way in which the 
automobile developed such pervasive symbolism and importance in Western society. 
“Automobile technology” is used in this thesis to describe in a general sense the many 
combined technologies that make up the automobile as a complex technological 
artefact, used for a range of purposes. This is similar to the way in which “digital 
technology” is used as an umbrella term for many diverse technologies and uses. 
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Literature review  
Before the mid-1990s the historiography of the automobile had been dominated by 
technical and economic studies that focused on the industry’s development. This has 
been coupled with detailed studies of Britain’s most influential marques and 
prominent motoring personalities. However, more recent studies have considered 
broader aspects, focusing on the cultural impact of the automobile as a consumer 
product. Simultaneously theories are continually developing to explain the way in 
which society and technology interact. New ways of understanding technology and 
specifically the automobile make a re-evaluation of our understanding of the British 
motor industry and its development necessary. Furthermore, while previous studies 
have focused on the national and international level, there is a lack of significant 
regional analysis that has led to national generalisations going untested. A regional 
study can serve to provide new insights and challenge existing theories, due to its 
relatively focused approach and use of new primary sources. The automobile industry 
in the North-West receives relatively little attention in local studies; this study will 
offer an examination of the importance of this industry to the region which is often 
contextualised by its dependence on the textile trade.  
A summary of automobile historiography  
The historiography of the automobile generally follows two streams of scholarship: 
economic and business studies on the one hand; and social and cultural studies on the 
other. Studies in the first field are more numerous and have been influenced by the 
works of a few historians who have dominated the study of the automobile. Saul’s 
article on the industry to 1914 is the most significant work on the pre-First World War 
period.7 His summary and statistical analysis of the industry is cited by nearly all 
subsequent scholars and is the basis for several other studies of the national industry. 
Saul and later Adeney,8 Foreman-Peck, Bowden and McKinley,9 and Church10 use 
statistical analysis, such as entry and exit figures, survival rates and comparative 
                                                          
7
 Saul, S. B., “The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914”, Business History, Vol.5 (1962) pp.22-44 
8
 Adeney, M., The Motor Makers. The Turbulent History of Britain’s Car Industry (London: Fontana, 1989) 
9
 Foreman-Peck, J., Bowden, S., and McKinlay, A., The British Motor Industry (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995) 
10
 Church, R., The rise and decline of the British motor industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1994) 
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production figures which have provided scholars with evidence to make several 
national conclusions and identify trends within the industry. Harrison examined the 
public flotation and financing of both cycle and motor companies.11 Church explored 
the marketing approaches of firms.12 Nicholson extended the analysis to include 
motoring pre-history, in one of few studies to explore the earliest years of motoring up 
to 1896, when other analysis often begins.13 Other economic studies such as Miller and 
Church explore the performance of the automobile industry in the interwar years 
compared with other important industries.14 Georgano, Wood, Baldwin and Clausager 
provide a general overview of the UK’s motor industry’s first hundred years.15 
The strength of these studies lies in their understanding of the automobile 
manufacturing industry and the economic and technological factors that defined the 
success and failure of firms. Despite this, their focus on financing and production 
decisions of firms has led to several conclusions that have only been challenged 
recently. For example, while they explain the diffusion of the car in the interwar period 
largely by looking at price and consumer income,16 this is symptomatic of a general 
acceptance that the automobile would be in demand if it could be afforded.   They also 
emphasise the role of technological and managerial developments in the success of 
motor manufacturers due to their economic focus instead of looking at more 
intangible societal aspects such as relationships with customers and popular public 
perception. This will be considered when we explore some of the key challenges 
recently presented by the second stream of automobile historiography.  
Important advances in the social historiography of the automobile have come in the 
past two decades and have changed the way in which the automobile is viewed: from 
a transportation device, comparable in technological terms to others, to a consumer 
                                                          
11
 Harrison, A. E., “Joint-Stock Company Flotation in the Cycle, Motor-Vehicle and Related Industries 
1882-1914”, Business History, Vol.23 (1981) pp.165-190 
12
 Church, R., “Markets and marketing in the British motor industry before 1914, with some French 
comparisons” in Journal of Transport History, Vol.3 (March 1982) pp. 1-20 
13
 Nicholson, T. R., The Birth of the British Motor Car, 1769-1897 (London: Macmillan, 1982) 
14
 Miller M., and Church, R. “Motor Manufacturing” in Buxton, N., and Aldcroft, D. eds. British Industry 
Between the Wars (London: Scolar, 1975)  
15
 Georgano, N., Baldwin, N., Clausager, A., and Wood. J., Britain’s Motor Industry the First Hundred 
Years (Sparkford: G. T. Foulis & Company, 1995) 
16
 For example, Church, The rise and decline of the British motor industry pp.15-16; Foreman-Peck, 
Bowden and McKinley (1995) pp.67-76 
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product and cultural phenomenon. These works have challenged the dominance of 
technological and economic arguments for the diffusion of the automobile and have 
instead explored the importance of car culture in explaining the automobile’s 
emergence and growth. O’Connell is foremost as a social study of the automobile in 
Britain to 1939; in particular his work highlighted the important role that the motorcar 
played as a class, status and gender symbol.17 His work has provided a springboard for 
numerous other studies which explore aspects of gender and class including, variously, 
Law’s study of charabancs and class tourism; Potter’s study motorcycling culture; and 
Horner’s exploration of “modest motoring”.18 Both O’Connell and Horner challenge the 
theory of price and income based diffusion of the automobile previously accepted by 
scholars.19 Mom challenges the view that petrol power became dominant because it 
was technologically superior;20 for example he explores cultural factors such as how 
electric cars were more viewed as “feminine” in a market where most buyers were 
male, and how “speed” and “adventure” were important in aspects of consumer 
decisions.21  Jeremiah explores the development of visual and literary culture 
surrounding the car, providing a consumer perspective by examining artistic 
representations.22 In America, McShane’s study of the emergence of the automobile 
highlights it as an urban cultural phenomenon explaining its rise through its 
relationship to urban display, rising suburban culture and utopian traffic planning 
visions.23 The car as integral to a modern suburban vision is also captured in Law’s 
study of suburban London where, like O’Connell’s analysis, the car was an important 
status symbol, in which the choice of automobile was important as well as the access it 
gave to exclusive destinations such as the roadhouse; but Law also emphasises the 
                                                          
17
 O’Connell, S., The Car in British Society, Class, Gender and Motoring, 1986-1939 (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998) 
18
 Law M. J., “Charabancs and social class in 1930s Britain”, in the Journal of Transport History Vol. 36:1 
(2015) pp.41-57; Potter, C. T., An Exploration of Social and Cultural Aspects of Motorcycling During the 
Interwar Period (University of Northumbria: PhD thesis, 2007); Horner, C., “’Modest Motoring’ and the 
Emergence of Automobility in the United Kingdom” in Transfers: Interdisciplinary Journal of Mobility 
Studies, Vol.2 (2012) pp.56-82 
19
 Horner, “Modest Motoring” highlights the owner driver as distinctively modest compared to the 
chauffeur driven motorcar owner. 
20
 Mom, G., The Electric Vehicle (Baltimore: John Hopkins, 2004) This view is traditionally held, for 
example, by Foreman-Peck, Bowden and McKinley (1995) p.17-18  
21
 Mom, The Electric Vehicle pp.276-284 
22
 Jeremiah, D., Representations of British motoring (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007) 
23
 McShane, C., Down the asphalt path: the automobile and the American city (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1994) 
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concept of symbolic “modernity” that car ownership represented on an individual 
level.24  
However, foremost in the rise of recent automobile scholarship is the impressive work 
of Mom.25 The work’s scope is enormous, benefiting from Mom’s ability to combine 
multilingual historiographies and primary sources in his attempt to explain the 
emergence, and then the persistence, of the car in the North Atlantic region: the USA 
and Northern-European countries France, Germany, Holland and the UK. In this 
exploration of “Atlantic automobilism” Mom challenges what he coins the “Toy-to-
Tool” thesis inherent in previous automobile scholarship: namely the acceptance that 
the automobile started as a toy of the aristocratic elite before becoming a utility 
vehicle for transport. This paradigm explains the rise of the automobile through both 
technological advances, and increasing incomes that made automobiles more 
affordable, comfortable and reliable than previously. The assumption is made that the 
automobile, superior to other forms of transport, was sure to be adopted if it could be 
afforded. This is most evident in UK economic history which seeks to explain why 
American automobile consumption was more advanced than other western countries. 
Debate surrounds how UK industries’ methods of production resulted in more limited 
price reductions and therefore limited potential market. In this analysis it is assumed 
that demand was there as prices dropped and incomes rose.26 Mom argues that this 
paradigm has defined the previous study of the automobile and his work sets out to 
counter its dominance by establishing the importance of the tripartite adventures of 
automobilism “touring, tinkering and racing”. He does so by using literature, film and 
song which explore motoring culture during its different periods between 1895 and 
1940. In using such sources Mom explains the emergence and persistence of 
automobilism through a study of motives and emotions surrounding use.27  
This focus on the user also draws from the developing field of design theory and the 
field of science and technology studies (STS). The first stream of automobile 
                                                          
24
 Law, M. J., The Experience of Suburban Modernity: How Private Transport Changed Interwar London 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014) 
25
 Mom, G., Atlantic Automobilism. Emergence and Persistence of the Car 1895-1940 (New York: 
Berghahn, 2015) 
26
 Church, The rise and decline of the British motor industry pp.34-45 highlights these debates 
27
 Mom, Atlantic Automobilism p.40 
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scholarship focused on technical innovation led by designers and manufacturers as an 
element of business competition; although they recognised that innovation was 
designed to improve the user experience, the users as a group are passive, their 
thoughts and actions perceived by designers.28 However research in STS has 
demonstrated how users of technology have been an active and important part in the 
design process as the practice and functions of use have influenced design.29 This field 
highlights for Bijker “both the social shaping of technology and the technical shaping of 
society.”30 This started with the social construction of technology (SCOT) approach 
which recognised the users’ role in shaping technological innovation by particular 
“user groups”.31 This emphasis on the user has increased and more recent studies 
explore how users continually shape technologies and not just in helping to form a 
stable technology, the focus of the SCOT approach. Automobile case studies in this 
field include Kline and Pinch’s study of farmers adapting the Ford Model T for many 
kinds of new user functions.32 Kline, and also Wyatt consider the importance in the 
social construction of technology of non-users and resisters challenging the 
assumption that non-users are inevitable future users, and highlighting how resistance 
influences both the use and construction of technology;33 this will be demonstrated in 
our historical case study of automobile resistance in the North-West. Mom has 
formulated a model for the “co-construction of technology” to highlight the 
relationship both between the user and the designer and the way in which the 
functions and properties of the automobile interact and shape each other (Figure 1).34 
The automobile also offers an excellent case study for the way in which users influence 
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the design decisions of manufacturers. This has been demonstrated by Mom, who 
highlighted the way in which distinctive European and American car cultures have 
involved the respective development of different technical properties such as the 
manual and automatic gearbox.35  
 
Figure 1 – Mom’s diagram to explain the co-construction of technology - Mom (2008) 
p.173 
Further to the co-construction of technology, Jasanoff and Kim introduced the concept 
of “sociotechnical imaginaries” as “collectively imagined forms of social life and social 
order reflected in the design and fulfilment of nation-specific scientific and/or 
technological projects”.36  This definition has since been refined and extended to 
include not just national states but “organized groups, such as corporations, social 
movements, and professional societies”.37  This theory allows for the consideration, 
not just of users, non-users and designers shaping technology, but how imaginaries 
inspire and influence policy makers, potential users and politics; and can be used to 
understand the social weight that gathered behind the automobile that defined the 
emergence of Atlantic automobilism. In this particular case study we will focus on the 
way in which sociotechnical imaginaries often surrounded the utility of the 
automobile, an aspect that has been used to explain the growth of the automobile in 
the interwar period.38 However the sociotechnical imaginaries were integral to the 
early acceptance of the automobile, by both policy makers and individuals and as a 
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theoretical tool sociotechnical imaginaries can be used to explain the development of 
commercial motoring, not as a by-product of the private vehicle but as a central pillar 
of automobilism and the imaginaries that surround it (see chapter 2).  
The field of science and technology studies provides further key theoretical 
contributions. More generally, the field as a whole has challenged the “technological 
determinism” paradigm, which separates technological artefacts as outside of society, 
and suggests that technological change determines social change.39 Technological 
determinism has often led automobile scholars to focus too heavily on the automobile 
as shaping society rather than as an artefact of co-construction. However as Wyatt 
highlights the concept of technological determinism, although effectively discredited 
by science and technology scholarship still has an important role by a wide range of 
influential actors, we see this for example, in this thesis’ exploration of the persistence 
of the horse and cart (I could also look at this section and modify conclusion based on 
this).40   
Generally, the first stream of automobile scholarship predates the second stream. It is 
argued therefore that the automobile industry and its development need to be re-
examined based on the more recent scholarship, both automobile and STS, an example 
of which is the influence and interconnectedness of the cycle industry on the 
emergence of motoring. Numerous studies such as Saul, Thoms and Donnelly, and 
Millward suggest a technical inevitability about the move of companies from cycling to 
motoring manufacturing, with economic factors such as the end of the cycle boom in 
the late nineteenth century serving to hasten the move.41 Yet Mom argues the 
importance of the cultural link between cycling and motoring. The established “bicycle 
craze” created a ready culture and experience that allowed the automobile to flourish, 
despite its negative aspects such as unreliability, noise, cost and smell. These cultural 
links in the UK are explored by Reid who argues that cycling had a much wider 
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influence on motoring than manufacturers, or technical characteristics in common.42 
This regional case study, therefore considers, not just the origin industries, in an 
explanation of why motor manufacture began, but the influence of cultural aspects, 
such as local cycling and motor clubs, journals, trade organisations and attitudes. By 
considering the cultural experience we can better understand the decisions and 
organisation of motoring manufacturers, who, especially in the early years of 
motoring, were motorists and cyclists as well as engineers and designers. 
By refocusing on how the user has shaped innovation we can better understand trends 
in the automobile industry. This can be seen most clearly in the decisions of 
manufacturers to enter the automobile industry from the cycle industry and the 
number of “user-designers” experimenting at the turn of the twentieth century, in the 
activities of regional automobile clubs in the Edwardian period; and in the continual 
development of specialisations of commercial vehicle manufacturers in the 1930s. 
These developments demonstrate the importance of user culture in the design and 
development of the manufacturing industry.  
Technological innovation, replacement and preferences 
Exploring the diffusion of the automobile also involves the replacement, co-existence 
or substitution of technology, most notably in this period the horse, but also the 
electric tram. Studies of the replacement of horse transport by Tarr and McShane for 
America, and Turvey and Thompson for the UK emphasise economic aspects of this 
replacement, by showing how businesses generally viewed horses as items of 
technology that, if not economical, were replaced.43 In the urban environment this is 
demonstrated by the persistence of the horse throughout the interwar period in the 
UK where narrow roads, complex intersections and heavy congestion still led to the 
horse being economically favoured by hauliers. This important debate about 
commercial motoring and the persistence of the horse is largely absent from the 
historiography. Commercial motor advocates aggressively promoted the commercial 
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automobile as progressive and a symbol of modernity, often arguing that if only horses 
and trams were removed from the city streets then the congestion problems would be 
solved. In contrast, Pooley and Turnbull focus on commuter transport, such as trams, 
buses and private automobiles;44  while Moran, O’Connell and Schmucki concentrate 
on pedestrians. Pooley and Turnbull’s exploration of urban traffic congestion 
emphasises the “battles between conflicting cultures of transport”, which led to the 
favouring of automobile technology over cheaper more convenient public transport 
technology. They identify this as part of a “cultural turn” towards automobile 
technology. This “cultural turn” in the interwar period is also recognised by O’Connell 
in his exploration of attitudes towards pedestrian safety, as well as by Moran, who 
looks at the changing influence of public and press opinion in favour of the motorist, at 
the expense of the pedestrian, and by Schmucki whose analysis of how pedestrian 
voices were lost, against the push for mass motorisation in the post Second World War 
period.45  This thesis, in turn, explores technological replacement or favouritism by 
highlighting the sociotechnical imaginaries that surrounded the automobile in the 
urban environment, furthering the argument that imaginaries of progress and 
modernity were an important influence on town planning and the actions of 
authorities over the issues of public transport, and solutions to the traffic problem. 
Considerations were not always economic when it came to technological substitution. 
Carriage trade research is also useful in examining the transition from horse to 
automobile. Georgano provides an overview of the transitional period in the UK.46 
However, Georgano’s focus is on motorcar body building, thus the work neglects the 
rest of the coachbuilding industry which included wagonbuilders, cartbuilders, 
wheelwrights and carriage component manufacturers. However, recent international 
scholarship by Kinney for the USA, and Tjong Tjing Tai for the Netherlands, has sought 
to widen our understanding of the adaption of the trade as a whole to the 
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automobile.47 They highlight a number of issues: the great disparity in the speed of 
coachbuilders to transition; and the contradiction that coachbuilders were, on the one 
hand, seen as natural builders of the new horseless-carriage through their 
woodworking skills, yet, on the other hand, unsuited to the new demands of 
metalworking and mechanical engineering. They also highlight how the emergence of 
the automobile affected high-class coachbuilders much more quickly than 
wagonbuilders.48 We can add to this by an exploration of the Cockshoot archives which 
emphasises the dilemmas of adaptation, the importance of observing changes 
elsewhere, customer’s habits and the contradictions highlighted by both Kinney and 
Tjong Tjing Tai.  
 
Furthermore, evidence of Cockshoot as motorcar agents highlights a much-neglected 
area of the manufacturer-user automobile diffusion debate: the salesperson or 
dealership. While O’Connell and Horner explore the second-hand market for cars, in 
the interwar and Edwardian period respectively, the sale of new cars has not been 
adequately investigated which has led to the relationship between manufacturer and 
dealer being largely ignored. Some exceptions include Church and his study of the 
Austin Motor Company. Church compared the strategies of different firms, and 
explored the influence of dealers in relation to business strategy.49 Other studies such 
as Riley, Lilleker and Tuckett highlight the importance of the relationship between 
dealers and Ford, yet fail to explore the relationship beyond its impact on individual 
manufacturers.50 Dealers were often the first point of contact for customers and 
important aspects such how these relationships were managed and their influence on 
sales have been unexplored despite research on the history of individual dealers such 
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as Brooks’ studies of Manchester firms Cockshoot and Quicks.51 Pinch has identified 
salespeople and marketing as “the true ‘missing masses’ of technology studies” 
highlighting their role as mediators between users and manufacturers.52 Research on 
car sales has also come from other areas of study. Aspray acknowledged the lack of 
research on car buying and the buyer experience in his exploration of the history of 
American car buying.53 Aspray highlighted that even from its inception technical 
superiority of one car over another was notoriously hard to understand. He identified a 
range of about 50 or so other influencing factors on the buyers’ decision; For example, 
he emphasised the importance of business integrity and quality service, provided by 
the agents in the place of the manufacturer. The study of the automobile and the 
archive material available in the North-West provide an opportunity to examine the 
role of the agent in automobile culture and the way in which sales and dealers have 
prompted technological innovation. 
Other historiographical gaps 
There is not scope in this thesis to explore all aspects of the automobile but being 
aware of historiographical gaps is useful in understanding what other contributions 
can be made. The historiography of the automobile is dominated by the study of 
motorcar use and manufacture at the expense of other aspects of its history such as 
the component industry, sales and the related cycle, commercial vehicle and 
motorcycle industries and users.  
Beaven highlighted the comparatively under researched car component industry, 
challenging conclusions of previous scholars, who often restricted analysis of the 
component industry to a few individual companies.54 However, Beaven limited his 
analysis to Coventry, thus the industry in other areas has been little explored. Writing 
is confined therefore to company histories such as Whitehead’s history of Gardner and 
Sons, (engine manufacturers) and Tripp’s history of Hans Renold Co. (chain 
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manufacturers), both of which lack contextual analysis.55 Since Beaven there has been 
little further contribution to this field.  
The Proceedings of the International Cycling History Conferences (ICHC) have since 
1990 provided insights into aspects of the cycle industry, yet there are few studies that 
focus on cycling links to the motor industry. This is perhaps surprising considering the 
importance automobile historians have placed on the cycle industry in the origins of 
the motor industry. Clayton, a regular contributor to the ICHC, is the only local study of 
the cycle industry.56 He provides a history of some of the important Manchester cycle 
firms and offers an insightful view of the Manchester cycle clubs and the level of 
interest in cycling in Manchester. However, Clayton fails to link the cycle culture to the 
industry in Manchester, an approach that led Clayton to conclude: “lacking major cycle 
makers at the end of the century, the region consequently spawned relatively few local 
motorcar companies.”57 While Manchester certainly lacked major cycle makers, this 
thesis shows it spawned dozens of motor vehicle companies, which had a prior or 
parallel relationship with the local cycle trade. As we have seen earlier in our analysis 
of Mom and Reid, the multiple links between automobile and cycle culture have only 
recently between identified and explored and this thesis expands upon this.  
Dominated by the motorcar, the motorcycle receives relatively little attention. This is 
surprising as motorcyclists formed the larger part of the motoring population in the UK 
until the 1920s.58 However, there are several studies dedicated to remedying this. 
Koerner looks to explore the motor industry in the interwar period from a 
motorcycling perspective.59 Marr explores the geography of the industry,60 while 
Potter’s thesis contributes with an exploration of developing motorcycle culture in the 
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interwar period, particularly by exploring the activities and membership of motorcycle 
clubs and concludes that riding skill was more important than social class.61 Potter also 
highlights the range and diversity of socio-economic factors that were involved in 
motorcycle diffusion. However, the focus of this scholarship is on the interwar period, 
leaving sparse analysis of the pre-1914 period when motorcycling was more popular 
than the motorcar. This thesis looks to remedy this, by exploring in Chapter 1 
motorcycling culture, both its origins and its developing organisation through the 
Edwardian motoring clubs. 
An even bigger gap is presented by the commercial motor vehicle. Mom described the 
state of research into the use and production of trucks, or commercial motors, as a 
“black hole in our knowledge”.62 Since then there has still been relatively little new 
research in the field. Recent research tends to focus on the interwar period and the 
rural environment. For example, O’Connell contributes towards our understanding of 
the relationship between farmers, their vehicles and the countryside.63 Law has 
explored motor coaches and charabancs and their contribution to social convergence 
in the interwar period, allowing the working-classes greater mobility.64 Jeremiah also 
explores the increase in rural traffic, highlighting the way in which the bus was 
becoming central to rural travel and noting the increasing mobility of small 
businesses.65 Apart from Mom’s research on electric vehicles and their commercial 
use, there is very little focus on commercial motoring in the urban environment or on 
the origins of commercial motoring in the pre-1914 period. This is possibly due to 
certain themes identified by scholarship. Research has shown how the First World War 
exposed large numbers to motoring and prompted the mass production of vehicles for 
war use, which were sold for commercial purposes after the war.66 However, the focus 
on the war as the turning point for commercial motoring largely ignores the very long 
and slow period of experimentation and development from 1896 to 1914; the number 
of failures both in manufacturing, and in commercial usage, were large, but there were 
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also several successful uses for the commercial vehicle. Studying the inception of 
commercial motoring is important, not only to fill the “blackhole” in automobile 
studies but in understanding more about the technological and social change during 
the period, which eventually led to the commercial motoring boom of the 1920s and 
sealed the demise of the horse-drawn vehicle, but also the social acceptance of the 
motor vehicle on city streets.   
 
Other areas of automobile literature 
In addition to national and international automobile scholarship are regional 
automobile studies, which largely focus on Coventry as the centre of the industry. 
Thoms and Donnelly offer a useful comparative study of the development of the 
industry in Coventry, setting it in a national context from its beginning until 1980.67 
Beaven complements this by adding an in-depth analysis of Coventry’s car component 
industry.68 Both studies highlight and emphasise themes inherent in national 
automobile histories. One of the most important conclusions was that Coventry 
became the centre of the motor industry because the cycle industry was also 
concentrated in the region.69 Manchester and the North-West’s lack of a cycle industry 
and focus on heavier industries had led to its prominence in the motor industry being 
dismissed. Yet investigation of primary sources has revealed some issues with these 
explanations. There is evidence of a small but significant cycle industry, again largely 
ignored with the exception of Clayton, although he neglects a large proportion of the 
Manchester cycle industry.70 There is also evidence that Manchester’s motor industry 
was stimulated and not retarded by its traditional heavy industries and that 
Manchester firms had more diverse origins than  those in the Midlands where the 
automobile industry did predominantly develop from the cycle industry. This suggests 
therefore that an alternative regional study will be useful in challenging the 
conclusions made by scholars who focus on Coventry as a case study. Also, the lack of 
comparative depth in regional studies has led to some errors in information in national 
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studies. Chapter 3 will highlight how data and analysis made by Saul in the 1960s and 
used by subsequent automobile historians does not factor in countless small-scale 
automobile manufacturers. 
Many studies exist that focus on individual marques prominent in the industry. Often 
marques that survived longer have received much more attention than firms that 
failed earlier, creating disparity. For example, there are a myriad of publications on 
Rolls-Royce, Manchester based until 1907, spawned by enthusiasts, owners clubs and 
the company’s dedicated archive service, the Rolls-Royce Heritage Trust.  Platforms for 
Rolls-Royce research include the Roycean, “annual journal for those with a serious 
interest in all aspects of the illustrious Rolls-Royce car company”; The Rolls-Royce 
Heritage Trust Historical Series, a collection of numerous works on the firm; and the 
Rolls-Royce Motor Journal series. Such publications inevitably have a narrow focus. 
However, the usefulness of such works as a compilation of years of primary research 
cannot be understated. Works such as Evans offers a detailed examination of the 
formative years of Rolls-Royce.71 Other Manchester firms covered less numerously 
than Rolls-Royce include similar detailed publications, such as Crossley by Eyre, Heaps 
and Townsin; and Riley, Lilleker and Tuckett’s The English Model T Ford, both of which 
originated with their owner organisations, respectively the Crossley Register and the 
Model T Ford Register of Great Britain. Smaller publications such as Lord Montagu’s 
study of Crossley also exist.72  
The skew towards these marques can inevitably lead to a a lack of emphasis on 
relatively significant manufacturers such as Belsize, Manchester’s largest native pre-
First World War motor manufacturer. Likewise, Willys Overland Crossley, Manchester’s 
second largest interwar manufacturer, only receives a mention in conjunction with its 
parent firm in Eyre, Heaps and Townsin. As well as being wary of the isolated 
conclusions of single marque research, it is important to consider their influence on 
other scholarship. For example Clarke’s chapter in Bennett’s study of the 1900 
Thousand Mile Trial examines early motoring in Manchester, but with the focused goal 
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of explaining how Fredrick Royce might have been influenced by this, despite Royce 
not becoming involved in the motor industry until 1903, three years after the subject 
of the publication.73 The larger proportion of firms either have no dedicated 
publications or are covered by short articles in magazines such as The Automobile, 
which provide small authoritative marque histories. For example Worthington-
Williams’ article on Marshall and Co. and Belsize,74 Wyatt on Century and Eagle,75 
Worthington-Williams on Bell and CWS,76 while George, and Norris and Lomax provide 
a short history of several firms.77 A larger study of Manchester firms can serve to 
readdress the balance and bias found in marque histories that deal with the city’s 
motor companies and set their examination in a national context. 
Plowden is still an important authority for the political aspects of the automobile’s 
development, especially before 1939. Particularly useful is Plowden’s research into 
protective tariffs and the horse-power tax in the interwar era, significant for 
Manchester-based American manufacturers Ford and Willys Overland Crossley.78 
Tolliday studies the relationship between labour and motor manufacturers from 1896-
1939, when other writers often focus on labour relations post-World War Two. Tolliday 
notes some regional and company differences during his study.79 Despite this Tolliday 
does not adequately examine the reasons for these regional differences and the 
influence of counter-union organisations such as the Engineers Employers Federation 
(EEF). These authors have engaged with and enriched debate in the field of automobile 
historiography through these different perspectives. By engaging with class, gender, 
local politics and labour relations in this regional case study we can build our 
understanding of the motor car industry during this period.  
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Other scholarship explores the infrastructure of motoring, including roads, filling 
stations and service stations that went side-by-side with the growth of the 
automobile’s popularity. Jeremiah investigates the proliferation of filling stations and 
petrol pumps, which served the growing number of motorists. These filling stations 
became a regular part of town and village life during the Edwardian and interwar 
periods which led to a coherent design philosophy that was in line with the 
automobile’s image as “progressive” and “modern”.80  Law explores the building of 
arterial roads and the subsequent rise of the suburban roadhouse in the interwar 
period. Law’s highlights how the new roads built to accommodate motoring became a 
symbol of modernity and freedoms.81 Law also shows how the car as a middleclass 
status symbol of modernity can also be seen in the popularity of the suburban 
roadhouse in the interwar period. They were not just functional but popular 
destinations in themselves.82 Reid also highlights how campaigning for road 
improvement amongst motorists was linked with earlier cyclist campaigns for better 
roads.83 As the automobile grew into the interwar period and post-Second World War 
to further ubiquity the use of the automobile and it infrastructure began to define 
town and city geography. For example, Kidd in his study of Manchester’s changing 
geography highlights how railway and tram transport defined residential development 
up to the Edwardian period, however the increasing use of the automobile led to a 
much more widely distributed suburban belt.84  This is an aspect that will be explored 
briefly in relation to Manchester in Chapter 2.   
 
Regional industrial historiography 
This regional case study must also link with the region’s historiography. This is 
inevitable as those involved in the cycle and motor industries in Manchester had their 
origins in, and interacted with, the city’s other industries, and the residents and 
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workers of the region. The main focus of scholarship is on Manchester and 
Lancashire’s dominant textile manufacturing industry, the history of which is covered 
in works such as Farnie, Timmins, Fowler and Wyke.85 These works often track the 
subsequent birth and development of Manchester’s chemical, engineering and metal 
industries that supported the growing textile industry. This can leave little room for 
analysis of other industries that worked independently from the textile trade. Timmins’ 
Made in Lancashire is one of the most important works that explores the full extent of 
Lancashire’s manufacturing industries. Timmins noted the increasing diversity of 
Manchester’s manufacturing in the late Victorian and early Edwardian period, relative 
to the slacking growth of the cotton industry.86 Timmins explored many different 
influences on industrial growth, such as local infrastructure, financing and labour skills 
to explain this.  
Manchester’s supposed lack of relevant industries e.g. coachworks, cycle industry and 
other light engineering is accepted too easily outside of regional studies. Lee suggests 
that the motor industry sprung up in Coventry, Birmingham and the South East 
because of the diversity of engineering skills in these areas.87 Saul concurs, arguing 
that the Midlands was better suited to the manufacture of cars due to the 
concentration of light industries that most naturally led to motor manufacture.88 Yet 
work by historians such as Timmins and Wyke, collective volumes such as “Business in 
the North West”, industrial archaeology studies like McNeil and Nevell and national 
statistical research by Hume suggest that Lancashire’s diversity was masked by the 
relative size of the textile industry.89 Important aspects of the city’s industry, growing 
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especially during the latter half of the 19th and early 20th century included locomotive 
manufacture, general engineering, electrical engineering, coach building, cycle 
manufacturing, household goods and foodstuffs and the automobile industry.  
Despite the work by the scholars mentioned above these varied industries receive little 
individual focus. There are a few publications on individual industries such as Mutch’s 
study of brewing in the North-West, and Brown’s study of toy manufacturing in the 
region.90 There are also a few studies of individual company histories varying from 
brief to detailed and which draw upon company archives. The briefer narratives are 
often celebratory histories that were commissioned for anniversaries. These are 
particularly weak through lack of analysis and the often-inexcusable application of 
hindsight. There are many examples of this, but they include Whitehead’s history of 
Gardners of Patricroft 1868-1968 where the author states “The Gardners knew that 
the future lay in the internal combustion engine” without an explanation of how they 
knew this and little evidence to support the statement.91 Similarly in Cockshoot and 
Co.’s centenary publication the decision of the coachmaking firm to embrace the 
motor industry is reduced to a few lines, despite its significance.92 
Studies of Lancashire’s transport history are numerous, yet suffer, like its industrial 
histories, from a bias towards certain aspects, especially the canals and railways. 
Examples include Farnie, 93 and Makepeace.94 This domination is challenged by 
Brumhead and Wyke whose work provides a useful collection of essays on other 
significant aspects of transport in the city such as cycling, motoring and Manchester’s 
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airfields.95 It also notes the interlinked nature of Manchester’s transport history, for 
example the Ship Canal’s reliance on its train links, which in turn was of critical 
importance to businesses deciding to use Trafford Park as a base, and was particularly 
relevant to Ford’s decision to move there in 1911.96  
The display of material culture at the Science and Industry Museum reflects the 
dominant emphasis on textile manufacturing and its role in locomotive and aero 
manufacturing. The road transport collection is displayed in the “Air and Space” 
gallery, the name highlighting the emphasis of display, as road vehicles are visually 
much more inconspicuous. The display of material cultural is also influenced by older 
historiographical trends. Thus, motorcars and economic and technological 
interpretations dominate the road transport display. Missing are commercial vehicles, 
or any engagement with the driver, driving experience, resistance to or sale of the 
automobile. 
Wider context of thesis 
Automobilism helps define how the present and future of personal mobility 
technology is directed and imagined. The automobile is at the centre of the imaged 
future. In Mitchell et. al. study Reinventing the Automobile: Personal Urban Mobility 
for the 21st Century, the automobile is imagined as electric and autonomous, and 
importantly, that these two technological changes to the automobile, will solve the 
problems that the current and past automobile has created: namely pollution, 
congestion and collisions.97 This is reflected in the current socio-technical imaginaries 
and subsequent legislative and business emphasis on this direction for automobile 
technology. Ultimately this thesis is viewed in this context, and the historical 
similarities between the beginning of the automobile and today are drawn in the 
conclusion, pulling together some of the findings of this thesis.  
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Chapter 1 - The development of motoring culture in the North-West 
1.1 - Introduction 
This chapter explores the development of automobile ownership in the North-West, 
looking at who owned automobiles and how and why they used them.  Exploring the 
diffusion of the automobile is important because it can help us understand why the 
automobile, as a form of mobility, a consumable and a symbol, became so ubiquitous 
and enduring and how as a technological artefact it developed. 
Because of the significance of the automobile in the twentieth century, its diffusion 
has been the subject of much research. This started with the study of economic and 
political factors in the development of automobile consumerism, including the 
exploration of manufacturing costs, changing incomes and developing legislation.1  
Since the 1990s “diffusion” research has come to the fore to better explain the 
emergence and persistence of the car in Western Society.  
The emergence of automobile research has underlined the importance of existing 
modes of mobility, such as the carriage and the bicycle; not just in technical 
development, but in cultural adoption. Thus the theoretical framework has moved 
from technological determinism, with the “upgrading” of mobile technology simply 
happening as the automobile became quicker, cheaper and more comfortable, to 
social determinism with the automobile instead adopted because it appealed as an 
“adventure machine” and as a status symbol.2 Indeed Mom argued that tinkering, and 
the unreliability of the early automobile, was an important aspect of its emergence, 
along with racing and touring, and the ability of the automobile to provide the user 
with the thrills of speed, and spatial exploration.3 Recent studies of the automobile 
challenge the theory of technological determinism, and case studies have been used to 
contribute to building a theoretical framework that argues that we can only 
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understand the development and diffusion of technologies by focusing on the users 
and use of a technology.4   
The emphasis on cultural arguments for diffusion has challenged the view that the 
automobile gradually filtered down the social scale, starting as a plaything of the 
aristocratic elite, before becoming a utility vehicle of the middle-classes in the interwar 
era, the coined “toy-to-tool” thesis.5 Recent research has questioned trickle down 
diffusion based on income and price.  A pre-1914 middle-class motoring movement 
has been identified as a significant concurrent development to aristocratic adoption.6 
Similarly working-class motorists have been identified during the interwar period, 
before the diffusion amongst middle-class groups.7 Both these groups were reliant on 
the relative low cost of the secondhand market. This chapter will provide significant 
new evidence for the uneven diffusion of motoring, focusing particularly on the 
motorcycle and the middle-classes in the Edwardian period, two areas which are 
particularly understudied in automobile research. 
Studies that look more broadly at consumerism, middle-class culture, tourism and 
everyday mobility have shown how the “adventure” of automobilism continued from 
the period of emergence with aspects such as countryside touring, and the motor in 
holidaying, prominent in examinations of use throughout the period of this study.8 
Similarly the argument of utility was continually used to justify the ownership and 
legitimacy of the automobile rather than necessarily reflecting a fundamental change 
in the functionality of the automobile.9 There is also a focus on ownership as part of 
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the middle-class ideal, or as an important marker of middle-class status.10 This status 
could be changed depending on the type of vehicle owned, as often the cheapest 
vehicles were avoided.11 
This chapter therefore uses the theoretical framework that has developed around the 
consumption of technology to examine aspects of automobile diffusion. New evidence 
provided by this regional case study can be used to critically examine these 
contributions to our understanding of the automobile, as well as highlight evidence 
that complicates or expands on previous work.   
The first section will explore the relationship between cycling and motoring, and 
carriage ownership and motoring, as well as the impact of non-users and “resistance” 
to the introduction of the automobile. Examining new evidence will show that the 
relationship between the cyclist and the automobile was complex. Evidence shows 
that cycling infrastructure, such as clubs, periodicals and cycle shops; and practices of 
touring and racing provided a basis for automobile culture, and exposure to motoring. 
Yet, an examination of cyclist’s attitudes highlights the social pressures, misgivings and 
jealousies relating to the new technology. Evidence shows how “resistance” helped to 
regulate and control the user and the use of the early automobile. Examining carriage 
users and the automobile show how early automobile adoption was not a 
technological replacement for the carriage but served as an addition to the upper-class 
stable.  
The second section, “The development of the Edwardian ‘modest motorist’”, argues 
that a clear two-tier system of motoring developed before 1914, as motoring became 
an acceptable activity in the middle-class suburban environment. This argument builds 
upon research that examines middle-class automobile ownership and culture in the 
interwar period and highlights the origins of many aspects, such as a second-hand 
market, spectator interest and motorcycling clubs.12   
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The third and final section, “The car, popular culture and middle-class consumption”, 
uses a case study of the Manchester-produced Model T Ford to show how the 
automobile’s rise to a ubiquitous consumer product brought the car firmly into popular 
culture. Ford developed a popular reputation as cheap and therefore undesirable 
during the interwar period that was in part due to aspects of patriotic consumerism. 
Analysis will show how Ford tackled these popular associations in marketing 
campaigns and by adapting technology specifically for the British market, however 
these strategies were relatively ineffective as their private automobile sales dropped 
dramatically in the early 1920s.  This study of consumerism offers an example of the 
powerful role that consumer culture played in the design and strategies of 
manufacturers.  
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1.2 - The origins of motoring culture 
Cycling culture and the adoption of motoring 
Historically the link between cycling and motoring has been identified as economically 
and technologically motivated. However, the impact of cycling culture on automobile 
ownership has started to be explored by scholars. For example, Mom argued: 
there can be no doubt that the “bicycle craze” functioned in creating a set of people, a 
group culture, and individual experience as a basis for the fledgling automobile 
culture.13  
We see this broadly in the similar habits of touring, tinkering and racing and also in the 
close connections between prominent individuals, firms and campaigns.14 However, an 
examination of the grassroots take-up of motoring can build on this research. The 
evidence shows a complex relationship between the cyclist and motoring, with sources 
describing their enthusiasm, a sense of kindred spirit, and the joy of speed, but also 
their envy, the negative impact of motoring on cyclists in terms of new dangers on the 
road, and the lack of exercise that motoring entailed. While motoring was the ambition 
of the interested cyclist, it was also scorned by some, who felt that the trade and the 
press were pushing the motorcycle onto cyclists.  
The main sources for this section are journalists and cyclists writing for two local 
newspapers. The Manchester Guardian’s “Cycling Notes” column started in 1893 and 
continued, with decreasing frequency after 1904, until 1912, and the Manchester 
Courier’s “Cycling” and later “Cycles and Cycling” section which appeared infrequently 
in the 1890s and 1900s. The identity of the journalists is not known, so we do not know 
their background, or even whether the journalists were the same throughout the two 
decades of publication. These columns kept cyclists up to date with race results, cycle 
gossip and shared touring routes around the nearby countryside. The “Cycling Notes” 
column’s regular nature allows us to track the journalist’s gradual exposure to 
motoring.  
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Cycling culture has made a big mark on Manchester in the surviving cycling clubs, 
active Velodrome and notable sports personalities like Chris Boardman (Manchester 
Wheelers), Adam Yates (Bury Clarion) and Jason Kenny. In the late Victorian period 
cycling was probably even more popular than it is today. One of the most popular 
forms was weekend touring with friends or family. Suddenly it became possible to 
leave the city’s suburbs and go many miles and back in an afternoon. This weekend 
exodus was observed by the Manchester Guardian’s “Cycling Notes” journalist in May 
1896. In one hour around 1500 riders left Manchester on the Chester and Wilmslow 
Road. 82.3 percent of the riders were in social groups or attached to clubs.15 Cycling 
was a social activity and clubs included picnics and games at set destinations.16 By 
1899 Manchester had 49 cycling clubs, representing Manchester and its suburbs, the 
third highest number nationally after London and Birmingham.17 Cycling during this 
period was an upper and middle-class activity, largely dominated by men. For example, 
in the observations made by the Manchester Guardian in 1896, only 5.2 percent of 
riders were female.18 It was not until the interwar period that cycling became firmly 
associated as a working-class activity.19 It is this largely male, middle-class group that 
was also particularly susceptible to the arrival of the automobile, although not all could 
afford it.  
From 1896 cyclists were gradually exposed to automobiles through friends and club 
mates. The Manchester Wheelers tested out a very early motorcycle in 1896.20 In 1899 
a prominent member of the Anfield Bicycle Club who turned up with a motor tricycle 
“was an object of much envy.”21 This “motor envy” was often created by the novelty 
value of early automobiles, but it also manifested itself in the relative protection from 
the elements that a high driving position provided in slushy winter conditions:  
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Motor cars were to be seen, and drivers were envied by many a cyclist as he laboured 
through the mud.22  
I should have envied the two men on a motor quadricycle whom I met on the Holmes 
Chapel road on Tuesday. Indeed as it was, I am a little sorry that I was not one of 
them.23   
The journalist continued to be exposed to motoring through conversations with friends 
who had bought a machine and being taking a ride as a passenger. In a column in 
November 1898 the author notes: 
at first a cyclist who mounts a motor cycle is fascinated and enthusiastic... the pastime 
soon palls. A friend of mine who was motor-bitten now tells me he has learnt all there 
is to on his machine, and is bored by having no work to do.24 
The author uses the phrase “motor-bitten” to describe his friend indicating an 
addictive quality to the experience. This addictiveness can be seen a year later when 
he acknowledges the pastime is not such a fad: 
my most regular riding chum has lately gone in for motoring, I have so far had only one 
ride – about forty miles – on a motor car; and then I was simply a passenger, not a 
driver. But the sport was so exciting that I have a positive longing for more.25 
The experience of this cyclist is evidence of how cycling began to merge with motoring, 
through indirect and then direct exposure as more and more club mates and “riding 
chums” had a go on a motorcycle or motorcar. This exposure manifested itself officially 
in the creation of motoring sections of cycling clubs, such as the Manchester Wheelers’ 
Motoring Section which began in 1899 and held joint runs for several years afterwards, 
such as a run to Over Peover in 1904 attended by 37 bicycles, three motorcars and two 
motor bicycles.26 Moreover for some club cyclists the motorcycle began replacing the 
bicycle. The “Cycling Notes” journalist remarked in 1903 of the retiring Manchester 
Wheelers president:  
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The retired president… an arch-renegade indeed, as he told me that not once last year 
did he ride an ordinary bicycle, and – worse and worse – does not even possess one 
now.27  
This drift of friends towards motoring was a continual aspect of this period and was 
noted by the Manchester Courier columnist in 1909: 
The cyclists drift away into motoring – presently it will be flying – and your old 
companion of twenty years rushes past you unrecognisable in a cloud of dust.28 
Cost was also a serious consideration, however, for many cyclists who could not afford 
a motor vehicle outright, ownership was still a social ambition, and many started 
saving for the more affordable motorcycle. This trend was part of the pressure put on 
cyclists through their social groups, the “Cycling Notes” journalist commenting that: 
“Some of my friends regard me as unenterprising because I have not yet begun to save 
up for a motor bicycle.”29 However, there was also evidence of more negative attitudes 
to the motor bicycle: 
Mr G.P. Watson, the captain of the flourishing Cheadle C.C. tells me that the members 
of his club rather scorn the idea of motorbicycling… Among my own acquaintances – 
fairly extensive – I frequently hear motor bicycles discussed, but outside the trade I do 
not know a single rider of one.30 
Both journalists were referring to their friends’ experiences and thoughts in several 
instances. For some motor bicycling was to be scorned as an almost partisan attitude 
developed, while for others not having the ambition for motorcycling was 
“unenterprising”.  Both views highlight the intensities of social pressure among cyclists. 
The divisions among cyclists can also be seen in national cycling publications such as 
the Cycling Touring Club Gazette which featured a motorcycling column. Some cycling 
correspondents to the Gazette did not like its sympathetic approach to motoring, with 
one correspondent resenting the new powers of the motorist: “one cannot, it seems 
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be both a motorist and a cyclist at heart... two at least of our company have given up 
cycling – because of the motorist.”31 
The thrill of speed was an important aspect of the cycling experience. However, the 
automobile saw an end to the bicycle’s position as the fastest vehicle on the road. This 
was viewed with mixed feelings by the cycling journalists. One view was that the 
coming of the automobile may give cyclists immunity from prosecution as the police 
gained a better perspective on pace.32 This attitude is reflected in a Punch cartoon of 
the era seen in Figure 2. However, another opinion voiced was that the cyclist, no 
longer the fastest road user, would face new dangers from higher speed motorcars. 
There was therefore a sense of wariness which also included fears of an increase in 
traffic, and the Manchester Guardian journalist urged cyclists to consider these issues 
amongst the “enthusiasm of the moment”.33  
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Figure 2 - cartoon illustrating the relationship between new technologies, speed and 
the police - Punch 22/10/1902  
However, speed, the excitement of speed and the noise of the engine was clearly a 
draw for cyclists, as evidenced by the spectacle of racing at Fallowfield in 1900: 
Despite the din – perhaps even to some extent on account of it – the motor tricycle 
events were highly exciting. It is true that they were processions rather than races. But 
although Jarrott led from start to finish in both instances, he did so at a pace, and took 
the bends in a fashion that was electrifying.34 
The Manchester Courier journalist later discusses the dangers of speed by quoting an 
old cycling friend who became a motorist:  
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The instinct for “showing off” the fierce wild joy of rapidly whizzing past everything, 
leads many motorists to rush past cyclists and pedestrians at top speed.35 
In both these instances we see the almost addictive quality of the experience of speed 
and can understand both the appeal and the reaction against it. Analysis of Kenneth 
Grahame’s Wind in the Willows written in 1906 highlights this addiction to speed 
through the actions of Toad, and the way in which his friends try to counter the 
“addictive” and destructive influence of the car.36 In doing so Wind in the Willows 
articulates the anxieties of rural communities who reacted, sometimes violently 
against this speed that was such a joy to the user, something which cyclists 
understood.  
The influence of the automobile was also felt through changing fashions showing 
interchangeability between cycle and motor culture:  
The example of motor cyclists and autocar drivers is bringing that distressing 
instrument the cyclorn into vogue again. It went out of fashion some years ago, one 
hoped forever, but “motorists” felt the need of a more distinctive warning and one of 
greater sonority than the ordinary cyclist’s bell, and hence the revival. The worst 
feature of it is that cyclists also are taking to the horn again.37 
Cyclists who used the cyclorn, or pneumatic horn, were viewed by other cyclists as 
“rowdy cads awheel”.38 Similarly respectable cyclists reacted against the caddish 
motorist and their influence on their fellow cyclist. This highlights the different 
subcultures of cycling and demonstrates the complexity of bicycle culture. These 
different subcultures had a variable attitude to the automobile. 
The variable attitude of the columnists shows an uneasy relationship with the motor 
vehicle. Both regarded themselves as cycling purists, and one argument of resistance 
against the pressure to motorise was the obvious argument “I want exercise”.39 The 
journalists also viewed reliability as a serious problem. The Manchester Guardian 
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journalist thought his friends would struggle, as many had poor mechanical knowledge 
and thus the thought of tinkering, or rather his ride being interrupted by mechanical 
problems, was not a desirable aspect of the automobile adventure. This attitude was 
also mirrored by the Manchester Courier journalist who looked on the reliability of the 
motorcycle humorously: 
I have so far met only one of those instruments on the road [motorcycle]. I saw it at 
Alderley Edge a few Saturdays ago, and the sight made me smile for the man in charge 
was not driving it – oh, dear no – but walking alongside of it. As it is – what with tyre 
troubles, men going forth without enough oil in their lamps, and the vagaries of the 
weather – the humours of cycling would fill a good long chapter. But should motor 
bicycles become only half as common on the road as many folk… say they will, why 
then those humours will surely increase sufficiently to fill a volume, if not a regular 
bookcase.40 
However, while cycling offered physical exercise the temptation of the motor was 
clear. When talking about a particularly difficult hill climb the cyclist remarked: 
but the next mile or two will make the rider wish that he had an auxiliary motor.41 
The auxiliary nature of the motor can be experienced in the development of 
motorcycle technology where pedals persisted on motor bicycles for many years. This 
need for automated help has manifested itself today in the development of relatively 
light weight and unobtrusive electric motors designed to assist the cyclist with difficult 
terrain. 
It was not just through touring that motor vehicles were introduced to cyclists, but at 
racing events too. In Manchester the most popular venue was the Fallowfield Track. 
Cycle racing was very popular, with large crowds recorded over several years during 
the period, and slowly motoring was introduced. One such example was a Manchester 
Wheelers race meeting at the Fallowfield Track in 1900 which included a combination 
of cycle and motorcycle races, watched by a large crowd of 12,000 people.42 Other 
cycling clubs were also including motor racing in their annual competitions, including 
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the Manchester Athletic Club’s 1901 two-mile race. The club restricted entry to 1¾ 
horse-power entries, so as not to exclude those who could only afford the most basic 
of motorcycle engines.43 The popularity of cycling as a spectator sport also provided 
the foundations for the popularity of spectating motor racing in the North-West at 
places such as Blackpool and Southport, which drew large crowds. 
The cycling columns provide a unique insight into the relationship between cycling and 
motoring that extends our knowledge of cycling and early motoring culture. In our 
examination we have confirmed the importance of cycling culture and society in the 
formation of motoring as a popular hobby. Through clubs, races, touring and friends, 
cyclists of Manchester were exposed gradually to the experiences of motoring which 
provoked a range of reactions, from envy and excitement to humour and scorn. We 
see in this the pulls of social pressure; not to save up for an automobile was 
unenterprising, and if you did not get into motoring then you were in danger of being 
left behind by the increased speed of the automobile, both in the literal and in the 
social sense. We also see how cyclists and cycling clubs, as owner-drivers, favoured 
motorcycles or motor tricycles which saw a boom in club activities and suburban 
motoring culture, which will be more thoroughly investigated later.    
From carriages to motorcars 
The nomenclature of motoring in the UK highlights the different cultural and 
technological influences on the development of the automobile. There was the 
“horseless carriage”, or “motor car”, clearly influenced by the carriage users and 
maker; and the “motor bicycle” or “motorcycle” describing attempts to motorise the 
bicycle. The uses and users of the motorcycle and the motorcar can be classified as 
two distinct sub-cultures of the automobile. Motorcyclists have been identified as the 
larger group of motorists before 1914, although there are important regional 
variations.44 For example, Potter highlighted how in 1932 there were 54 motorcycle 
clubs in the North-West, compared to 61 in the South-East of England while only 18 
clubs in Wales, and just 16 in the South-West of England, suggesting regional 
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differences in the popularity of motorcycling.45  Generally motorcycling was more 
popular in the UK until motorcar registrations overtook motorcycle registrations in the 
1920s, as compared, for example, to the USA or France where motorcars were much 
more dominant.46 The historiography of motoring in the UK has not reflected this 
emphasis on motorcycle use, perhaps because the motorcar became much more 
dominant in the interwar period and beyond, a much more popular era of study. This 
has been demonstrated by Potter who looked to address this imbalance through a 
study of motorcycling culture in the interwar years.47 Yet this still leaves the pre-1914 
period relatively unexamined, in an era where motoring subcultures began to clearly 
distinguish themselves.  We have highlighted above how the cyclists were crucial in the 
adoption and development of the motor bicycle. What remains is an examination of 
the development of motorcar use, which will explore how the motorcar developed as 
distinct from the motorcycle during the early years of motoring.  
Mom distinguishes motorcycle culture as “less elitist”.48 The motorcyclist was an 
owner-driver, whilst the early motorcar owner could often afford staff, mirroring 
carriage ownership, with a chauffeur. This more elitist use and purchase of the early 
automobile can be examined through the customer records and actions of local 
coachbuilder Joseph Cockshoot and Co., separate in many ways from the development 
in motorcycle ownership. A special letter addressed to shareholders on 23 December 
1902 announced the decision that J. Cockshoot and Co. was creating a Motor 
Department, with the purchase of new premises to support the operation. The letter 
includes several reasons as to why this step was being taken: 
It has been evident for some time past that customers of the firm have been 
purchasing motor cars in addition to their carriages, and it requires no great amount of 
argument to show that if that be the case their carriages, used alternatively with 
motor cars, will last much longer than if they used carriages solely. 49 
The letter suggests that ownership of an automobile without a carriage was unlikely. 
Indeed, the carriage and the motorcar could easily serve separate functions. Many 
                                                          
45
 Potter, An Exploration of Social and Cultural Aspects of Motorcycling pp.70-71 
46
 Mom, Atlantic Automobilism p.294 
47
 Potter, An Exploration of Social and Cultural Aspects of Motorcycling 
48
 Mom, Atlantic Automobilism p.83 
49
 Science and Industry Museum Archive - YMS 0196/3/6 
 
48 
 
coach-owners had several different carriages for different uses, with two and four 
wheelers, gigs, broughams, carrying a variety of different passengers and cargoes. 
Similarly, there were open top carriages for summer and closed cabs for winter.50 This 
dual ownership of motorcar and horse-drawn carriage emphasises the pleasure and 
purpose of automobile ownership. Carriages therefore might still be used to provide 
practical transportation, to the railway station, the church or to visit friends. Indeed, as 
late as 1907 Rolls-Royce proudly advertised in The Autocar that: “A private owner of a 
R.R. writes: ‘may say my car is a perfect dream. It is so reliable that I have done away 
with my carriages and horses.’’’51 The implication was that carriage owners were not 
replacing entirely with motor cars.  
 
Elite automobile ownership included the continuation of practices from carriage 
ownership, which included “stabling” facilities. Cockshoot offered customers facilities 
to “stable” vehicles at the firm’s Deansgate garage, which included sleeping quarters 
and a billiard table for chauffeurs.52 Similarly Cockshoot continued to paint customer’s 
crests on the sides of vehicles: 28 of the first 55 bodies photographed by the firm had a 
crest emblazoned on the side, and many of these were also pictured with chauffeurs at 
the wheel. The use of crests is inherited from coach ownership and the surviving 
Cockshoot book of customer heraldry shows hundreds of examples (see Figures 3 and 
4).  
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Figure 3 - The Crest of John Carlisle, who bought a motor car body from Cockshoot in 
1905. The crest is most notable for his “HUMILIATE” motto YMS 0196/5/1/9 
 
Figure 4 - The Crest of the Ashworth family used on several carriages and cars bought 
from Cockshoot. The motto translates “Love Conquers All” - YMS 0196/5/1/9 
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While the Manchester Guardian cyclist’s friends were busy saving for their 
motorcycles, carriage owners were able to purchase automobiles as an “addition” to 
their stables. This signified an important class divide in the Victorian and Edwardian 
era between the ownership of a motorcar and a motorcycle. This class divide in 
ownership complicates the often-simplistic view of early automobilism as an activity 
for the elite.53 In the next section we will see how the club culture of early 
automobilism, and the access to the second-hand market further defined the 
distinction between these two sub-cultures. 
Non-users or “resisters” 
Recent research has identified the importance of the non-user in shaping the 
development of technology.54 This includes challenges to the assumption that non-
users inevitably want to become users of new technologies.55 We have already seen 
how traditional automobile scholarship views diffusion as based on economics, which 
makes such assumptions for the demand of users. Why then were people opposed to 
motoring and who were they? Kline defines three actors in the resistance to 
technologies, those who oppose introduction into a community, those not purchasing 
and those not using technology in the proscribed manner.56 In exploring non-users and 
resistance to the motorcar we can better understand how technological innovation 
and use adapted. 
In our earlier analysis we looked at the complex relationship between cyclists and the 
adoption of motor technology. While the motorcar offered a ready extension and 
social group for the new technology, resistance and experimentation followed by 
rejection is evidenced through the writings of the Manchester Guardian journalist who 
did not want to save for a motorcycle, unlike his friends, but resisted as the technology 
had not developed to suit his needs. The first of these he identifies as better reliability 
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which was quickly being improved by designers and manufacturers, and the other as 
exercise, which cycle technology alone could realise.    
For Manchester’s suburban cyclists, and then motorists, the Cheshire countryside was 
a popular destination. This generated a high volume of traffic at the weekends which 
caused friction with local residents and police. Altrincham was a particularly hostile 
place for both cyclists and motorists and there is evidence of much friction with the 
police. The “Cycling Notes” columnist noted that:  
 
nowhere in Cheshire are the police and magistrates more hostile to cyclists than in 
Altrincham.57  
 
However other towns on main roads were also hostile: 
 
There appears to be an anti-cycling movement in the neighbourhood of Styal… the 
main road through which has been all the summer the scene of numerous 
prosecutions, both just and unjust, on charges of furious riding.58  
 
This rural enmity served to connect motorists and cyclists, as the following stanzas of 
an anonymous poem from 1901 suggests: 
 
A Cheshire Motorist’s Story 
 
We that live here in Cheshire, 
Have been severely tried 
By magistrates’ high pressure, 
And by police belied. 
 
It matters not if riding  
On bicycle or car, 
You would see bobby hiding 
Before you had gone far.59 
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The rural opposition experienced by motorists was nothing new, as cyclists had faced 
the same hostility for several years. Police actively sought prosecutions and locals 
called for a tax on cyclists, who were viewed as a rural nuisance.60 The attitude of rural 
residents in Cheshire mirrors that of the popular London touring counties of Surrey 
and West-Sussex who were known for their hostility to both the bicycle and the car, 
the Automobile Association remarking that these counties were also those prosecuting 
cyclists in the early days of cycling.61 This shows how cycling and motoring were linked 
through urban ownership and rural use as London owners went to the home counties, 
while Lancashire town and city owners turned to the Cheshire countryside.62 
 
Evidence from the North-West and elsewhere supports the argument that class 
antagonism was the main reason for resistance: the invasion of the upper and middle-
classes into social street space, endangering with speed, both in the rural and urban 
environments.63 Research shows how  Cheshire was the scene of official resistance to 
the “invasion” of the bicycle and automobile through police activity and regular 
prosecutions. For example, there were 183 successful motoring convictions in Cheshire 
in 1905.64 Cheshire was also the scene of other incidents which confirm the class, rural-
urban conflict. The Manchester Automobile Club (MAC) conducted many club runs in 
the Cheshire countryside. One such run involved the following incident: 
The only mishap at present recorded in connection with the run was the murder, wilful 
or otherwise, of a duck by Mr Fred Hammond. It was one of a number which impeded 
his progress, and it was highly amusing to witness the owner holding the duck which 
she said was a pet of the family, in front of her by the neck, when she afterwards 
appeared and demanded compensation. This was at once given in a novel way by an 
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impromptu auction, at which the duck fetched 2s. 6d., to the evident satisfaction of 
the owner.65  
Told from the motorist’s perspective these episodes have a strong bias, in which the 
voice of the rural resident can only be inferred. The motorists’ perspective however is 
telling, and the slaughter of livestock or a “pet” is made light of. Indeed, it is 
acceptable that this “murder” could have been “wilful” because of the high number of 
animals on the road. It is also the regard of the motorists that the owner was satisfied 
with monetary compensation. Thus, we see clearly how both class and rural 
antagonism were part of resistance which included incidents such as that described by 
the aristocratic motorist Leopold Canning on a test run of an Eagle motor tricycle in 
1901 in the Cheshire countryside: 
We were coming up to a farmhouse where a knot of men stood with some horses and 
carts by the side of the road. They were all big, hulking ruffians, and as we approached 
them a burly fellow stepped on to the road and picked up a big stone. This he hurled at 
us with all his might as we went by, but thanks to our forty miles an hour it just missed 
us. If it had struck either the machine or ourselves it would have done considerable 
damage, and had there not been so many of them we should have stopped for a little 
talk with them, but six were too many for us two to handle. In France I always carry a 
revolver with me, and there I would probably have fired at the man for his pains.66 
Notable here apart from the violent attitudes of both motorist and non-motorists is 
the extreme speed at which Canning suggests travelling, three times over the speed 
limit of the day. The link between speed, violence, motoring and class confrontation 
evident here, and forms part of the appeal of motoring.67 The reaction against speed, 
both anarchic, and official had an influence on legislative debates of the day which 
were driven by the complaints of rural councils, including the numbering of cars and 
the reduction of speed limits.68 This came to a head during the early 1900s both 
leading up to and following the introduction of the Motorcar Act of 1903. This included 
heated debate in the West Riding of Yorkshire where speed, such as that travelled at 
by Leopold Canning was hotly objected to as the “insolence and arrogance of those 
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who drove those powerful motorcars.”69 Meanwhile Rochdale council, following the 
1903 Motor Act, called for further powers for local authorities to regulate motor 
traffic.70 
Resistance to the motorcar was also evident in urban non-users. However, the reasons 
for resistance were similar, with the automobile’s invasion of the urban space. A 
motorcyclist on an evening ride out of town in 1906 recounts a breakdown and an 
encounter with a local resident: 
He informed me that it was a private right of way, and that I must clear out at once, 
that the whole avenue was being disturbed with the noise of the explosions, and that 
his children could not get to sleep.71 
Figure 5 shows a drawing of an automobile in Manchester in 1906 by Roger Oldham 
which was accompanied by a poem as part of an alphabetical series called A 
Manchester Alphabet: 
M for Motor Car 
The face and pace of Manchester 
Have many changes seen, 
From the grass of Angel Meadow 
And the blades of Ardwick Green’ 
From the Pack Horse and the Pillion 
And “the ancient Seven Stars,” 
To the modern mammoth Midland 
And the monstrous Motor Cars.72 
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Figure 5 – “M is For Motorcar” Artwork by Roger Oldham 1906 – Manchester Art 
Gallery - 1963.25/M 
 Prominent in this work is the disruption caused to the other road users. This includes 
pedestrians outside a pub, a horse and cart, and the unreliability and noise and visual 
disruption are also shown with the rear wheel falling off and steam, or smoke billowing 
out. The potential violence of the motorcar is captured in the poem with the 
description of “monstrous”. The “monstrous motor car” is followed by the next 
drawing, Figure 6, which shows a newly registered motorcar being noted by a 
policeman, as the new technology started to be controlled and users regulated.  
In response to resistance users began to restrain their driving attitudes. This included 
motoring publicity ventures such as the Thousand Mile Trial of 1900, which passed 
through both Cheshire and Manchester. The organisers writing to competitors urged: 
“we earnestly beg the drivers of vehicles not to exceed the legal limit of speed and to 
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show the greatest consideration to the drivers of restless horses and other users of the 
road.”73 While local clubs also urged members to set a good example:  
In view of the approaching motor-car legislation and of the present state of public 
opinion the committee of the Manchester Automobile Club has issued to their 
members a circular appealing to them to see that the speed of their cars is reduced to 
a really low limit in meeting or overtaking traffic, in passing through populous places or 
villages… on dusty days, for this reason alone, speed should be lowered… if 
consideration is not used, especially at the present time, legislation that will spoil the 
pastime and injure the trade is sure to result.74 
This is a clear example of how non-users influence legislative change, user’s attitudes 
and ultimately the manufacturing and design of automobiles. Automobile clubs and 
manufacturers combined through specialist trials to attempt to engineer solutions to 
many of the annoyances of motoring including sideslip and dust raising. For example, 
the Royal Automobile Club’s dust trials of 1908 highlighted that low bodied cars with 
few obtrusive features created a smaller dust cloud.75 
                                                          
73
 Bennett, E., Thousand Mile Trial (East Sussex: Elizabeth Bennett, 2000) p.33 
74
 Manchester Courier 4/7/1903 
75
 Brighton Gazette 22/4/1908 
 
57 
 
 
Figure 6 – “N for Motorcar Number”; Artwork by Roger Oldham 1906 – Manchester 
Art Gallery - 1963.25/N76 
Kline and Pinch’s study of automobile opposition in rural America argues that: 
the anticar feelings were obviously intense, but also transient, and disappeared for the 
most part when manufacturers introduced cars that were economical and met the 
criticism of the ‘anti's’.77  
In examining the anti-motoring feeling in the UK and the North-West we see an 
evolution of the anti-car attitude. While resistance became less violent, by the 
interwar period the automobile had adapted into a vehicle that had the utility of use 
that made it desirable for rural residents, especially by farmers.78 The anti-car 
movement evolved to concern itself with the preservation of the countryside. As the 
automobile became a more common sight and roads improved, dust and unfamiliarity 
became less of an issue, while the menace of litter, noise and the scars of motoring 
infrastructure such as roads and garages became the concern of organised non-user 
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resistance, along with the growing pedestrian concern for safety.79 We see therefore 
how new technologies such as the automobile were developed as part of a complex 
relationship of social groups, as both the user and the non-user shaped both 
technological change to increase reliability, decrease dust, improve roads, affect 
legislation and adjust the habits of motorists by defining what was, and what was not, 
acceptable behaviour that brought motorists to account.   
Conclusion 
Mom argued that: 
the car’s early role was very flexible, and as a “collective symbol” its functions and its 
properties were quite diverse.80 
The diversity of early automobilism has been demonstrated in this section in the 
examination of the differing influences of bicycle and carriage culture, and the differing 
attitudes of early motorists and non-motorists. This diversity and flexibility will also be 
demonstrated in Chapter 2 where the visions for the automobile among many 
businesses and businessmen differed, for example, from those looking to the 
automobile as a touring, or adventure machine. While technological influences have 
been noted by several economic historians, the cultural influence, of the carriage, or 
the bicycle, have only just begun to be explored in automobile historiography. By 
exploring cultural influences, we can complicate the view that bicycle manufacturers 
became motorcycle or motorcar manufacturers because of technological closeness;81 
but also because their customers were exploring different methods of touring, or 
racing. Explaining why so many began to manufacture motor vehicles so early on will 
be explored in Chapter 3. In the next section we will extend the analysis of the early 
development of automobilism by exploring the “modest motorist” which developed 
alongside the more elite automobile culture.  
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1.3 - The development of the Edwardian “modest motorist” 
Motoring in the North-West gained momentum during the Edwardian period. By 1912 
there were an estimated 30,000 motorists in a twenty-five-mile radius of Manchester, 
a suggested 150,000 who were interested, and 2,000 motorists were registered in the 
Manchester registration district during 1912.82 Automobile diffusion was increasing, 
but compared to the two million cars registered by the end of the interwar period, the 
overall number of vehicles was still modest. This difference has led scholars to 
conclude that the period before 1914 is typified by the ownership of the aristocratic 
elite.83 Economic arguments are used to justify this difference; that production 
techniques and scale of production, coupled with distribution networks lowered the 
price and thus was affordable for those lower down the social scale, whose incomes 
were rising, during the interwar period.84 However, these conclusions are often driven 
by a focus on motorcar production, and motorcycles and their users during this period 
are relatively unexplored, despite being the more numerous types of vehicle and user; 
motorcycle registrations were higher compared with motorcar registrations in UK until 
1925.85  
Horner highlights the rise and promotion of “modest motoring” during this period. The 
modest motorist was middle-class, self-driven, owner repairing and thus distinctive 
from the chauffeured upper-class or the racing driver.86 This movement was significant 
for the emergence of middle-class motoring which was well established in the interwar 
period. Research on the interwar period highlights the important role of motorcycle 
clubs as uniting those with common interests, motorcycling forming part of a growing 
trend for sporting activities during the period, as racing also developed into a popular 
spectator sport.87 Potter goes on to identify regional variation in the pursuit. In 1932 
there were for example 54 motorcycle clubs in the North-West, significantly more than 
in areas such as Wales, the South-West and the North-East.88 This section will look at 
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further evidence for the Edwardian “modest motorist” and look at the Edwardian 
origins of club and middle-class leisure culture. This section will argue that there 
developed during this period two distinctive ends to the motoring spectrum. Culturally 
there was a difference between the motorcycles, linked more with the bicycle, than 
the chauffeur driven large car, linked more to upper-class carriage culture.89 Mom also 
notes widely differing diffusion patterns of the motorcycle and the car in different 
countries, which cannot be explained solely using economic arguments.90 This section 
will argue therefore that the diffusion of motoring was not necessarily based solely on 
an income-to-price scale but was dependent on the developing culture of the more 
“modest motorist”. Part of this is linked to the rise in the number of local motoring 
clubs and local membership, whose numbers boomed and became an important part 
of middle-class suburban culture; and part is down to the establishment of motoring 
facilities that made it easier for more modest motorists to enjoy touring the 
countryside with reasonable ease. Rather than focus on the more exclusive and well 
researched national organisations like the RAC, this section will explore the local, 
middle-class motor clubs that sprang up during this period.91 This section will also 
explore the spectator, as we see the growth of regular racing competitions.  
What businesses were catering for the “modest motorist”? In chapter 3 we will explore 
the rise of numerous small-scale cycle shop producers that served the numerous local 
cyclists and cycle clubs that were also beginning to get acquainted with the automobile 
at the turn of the century. We have already noted the influence of “motor envy” felt by 
those cyclists whose club mates had “gone in for motoring”. This “motor envy” was 
accentuated by the fact that motoring might be out of the reach of some cyclists who 
could not afford a motorcar or motorcycle. What then, was the “modest motoring” 
scene in the North-West? As the industry matured the second-hand market, the 
growing motorcycle market and the cyclecar market from about 1910, started to cater 
for this more modest motorist who could not afford a “proper” motorcar, let alone a 
chauffeur or a mechanic. One of the most important aspects in this cultural divergence 
was the growing motor club scene, which was also participated in by those involved in 
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the local motor industry, a factor identified by the cycling journalists. Motoring was 
becoming much more popular, and less of a novelty, and much more acceptable as a 
middle-class pastime, both in terms of cost, and respectability.  
Establishing motoring as a normal middle-class pastime 
Simultaneous to the growing popularity of motoring amongst the upper and middle-
classes, and the growth of clubs was the growth of motoring infrastructure, in terms of 
road improvement, signage, garages and petrol supplies. In Manchester and Salford 
what started as one or two garages (such as the pioneering Manchester Motor 
Corporation, Manchester’s first garage founded in 1899) expanded and many cycle 
repair shops and agencies were listed in the local trade directories with “(and 
motorcycles)” added. By 1909 there was a total of 15 motor car garages listed.92 There 
were also established insurance companies offering standard motor insurance, and 
accessory businesses offering motor paraphernalia.93 Motoring had entered the high 
street with shops and repair facilities not just in the city centre but also in the suburbs, 
thus closer to the homes of motorists. For example, by 1909 there were 11 automobile 
dealers or garages on Manchester’s main shopping street, Deansgate, with several 
more listed on adjacent shopping streets such as King Street and Bridge Street.94  
These changes were accompanied by a growing level of motoring journalism. 
Dedicated motoring columns in the regional papers became both more common and 
more detailed during the Edwardian period. These often merged with the cycling 
columns to form joint coverage, before motoring was covered alone. For regional 
papers this started with borrowing “motoring notes” from national sources, before 
adding a regional section, which then developed into a full regional motoring column. 
The most typical and largest in the North-West was probably the Manchester Courier’s 
“Motors and Motoring” column, which started weekly from May 1903 because of the 
“great and increasing interest taken in automobilism”.95  This column was used by 
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several regional newspapers and was written by London based journalist J. P. 
Holland.96 This was later complemented between 1907 and 1908 by a “Local Motor 
Notes” column and then “Northern Motor Notes” between 1908 and 1913 written by 
local journalist and motorist J. T. Ward. The national column was dropped by 1913 and 
the remaining column became larger, written solely for the local audience, who got 
their national motoring news from subscriptions to the increasing number of national 
motoring publications.97 There were also columns in other northern papers such as the 
Preston Herald, the Liverpool Daily Post, the Manchester Guardian and the Bolton 
Evening News. Over time these developed regular features, such as the Manchester 
Courier’s “Local Road Information” section, noting road repairs and changes and 
included safety advice such as lights at night or the protection of obstacles.98  This 
reflected the growth of motoring and mirrored the rise of local clubs, whose doings 
featured prominently in these columns. Motoring columns were often accompanied by 
adverts from local agents and manufacturers, especially around the time of the 
national show in the autumn and the Manchester show in the winter. The growing 
motoring sub-cultures are also identified through national publications, particularly 
The Motor Cycle first published in 1903, and The Commercial Motor published in 1905. 
The Manchester Courier column also included car reviews and tests, including small 
local manufacturers. This mirrored the cycling columns we explored earlier with the 
journalist reporting on his personal experience of a weekend ride, exploring the local 
area and countryside. A good example is J. T. Ward’s test run of a Robertson cyclecar, 
made in Sale in 1914:  
Another hour and we were threading our way through a maze of motor traffic in 
Altrincham, and duly arrived back at the home of the Robertson cycle car in Sale. The 
weather was perfect during the whole of the run... the scenery was picturesque all the 
way through, and the little car pulled us well; so what more could be wished for to 
complete a very enjoyable and long-to-be-remembered little spin through rural 
Cheshire?99 
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The establishment of firms and networks of agencies and repairers, publications and 
regular journalism took motoring from a spectacle and novelty, as it was in the 
embryonic period, to a normalised middle-class leisure activity. The young aristocratic 
motorists of that era still had racing, although some started turning towards aviation 
as the new “adventure machine”.100 This is evidenced by examples, such as Charles 
Rolls, who took to flying as well as motoring, becoming Britain’s first flight fatality in 
1910; or Maurice Egerton of Tatton who called himself “aviator” in the 1911 census; or 
the Macclesfield gentleman, Gerald Higginbotham, a committee member of the MAC 
and racing driver, who became a pioneering aviator.101 For the local middle-class man 
however motoring was becoming an affordable adventure as well as becoming part of 
regular family and social life. For example, Mr John Westworth, vice-captain of St. 
Helens Motor Club, was also a prominent member of the St. Helens Sketching Club, St. 
Helens Camera Club and a member of the St. Helens Cycle Club, members of which 
turned out at his funeral in the town in 1914.102 Like sketching or photography, 
motoring was becoming associated with the middle-class suburb with these normal 
leisure activities becoming entwined. Motor club participation was also part of a 
growing trend of middle-class sporting consumption, which could be compared to golf, 
itself almost exclusively middle-class due to the cost of fees and equipment.103  In 1925 
a member of the Liverpool Motor Club was taken to court for “congregating outside 
his own parish in concourse with other people on Sunday for the purpose of sport and 
pastime”. The club had been doing a hill climb on a Sunday and had thus disturbed 
church services.  The defence argued that if prosecution was made, then other middle-
class pastimes such as golf, cricket and tennis should also be stopped; there was no 
prosecution.104 Motoring entered the suburban environment in an official capacity 
through its motoring clubs, which thanks to the establishment of regular local 
motoring journalism make them an excellent source for motoring activities during this 
period.  
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The North-West’s motoring clubs 
National clubs such as the Self-Propelled Traffic Association, the Automobile Club of 
Great Britain and Ireland and the Auto Cycling Club were prominent in the promotion 
of motoring, from lobbying national government to providing an environment for 
social and sporting activities such as trials, tests and clubhouses.105 A variety of 
regional clubs formed often affiliated to these national organisations. We have already 
seen how cycling clubs modified their organisations to include motoring sections. 
However, there is little evidence that cycling and motorcycling continued to operate in 
this dual nature for long. What we see broadly in the analysis of regional clubs is the 
creation of a few early clubs, which catered for an eclectic mix of motorists, mirroring 
the closeness of automobile interests during the embryonic period. We see this 
especially in the membership and machines of the Manchester Automobile Club 
formed in 1899. However, the club environment was adapting to the development of 
the different motoring subcultures in the UK during the Edwardian period as many 
local motorcycle clubs were distinct from the more elite early regional automobile 
clubs.  
The first regional motor club in the country was the Liverpool Self-Propelled Traffic 
Association formed in 1896; this club will be discussed more fully in Chapter 2 because 
of its close ties to commercial motoring. Social clubs dedicated to motoring gradually 
followed the LSPTA. The main sources for identifying these clubs are motoring 
periodicals, yet there is enough evidence to suggest that while promoting the activity 
of motoring there were also a large number of members involved in the trade, and 
who used clubs both as a chance to advertise, test and market their products, and to 
seek financial support from an inevitably well-off membership pool and thus promote 
local manufacturing. This is evidence of the important interaction with designers and 
users, a theme that continued through to the interwar period, with the formation of 
clubs relating to specific marques.106  
Between 1899 and 1902 five regional automobile clubs formed. The first was the 
Manchester Automobile Club (MAC, 1899), followed by the Manchester Motor Club 
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(MMC, 1900), the North-East Lancashire Automobile Club (NELAC, 1902), Liverpool 
Motor-Cycle Club (LMCC, 1902) and the Burnley Automobile Club (BAC, 1902). These 
clubs effectively covered the whole of the North-West and soon developed substantial 
membership numbers. For example, by the end of the 1902 season the LMCC had 
nearly 40 members,107 BAC around 40,108 NELAC 31 members,109 the MAC over 100,110 
and the LSPTA around 100.111 Although there are no figures for the number of 
motorists before registrations were introduced, these numbers must have represented 
a significant proportion of the North-West’s motorists. These clubs held regular runs 
between April and October every year, with some clubs holding the occasional winter 
run or lecture series, for example the LMCC captain’s paper entitled “The Rise and 
Progress of the Motor-Bicycle”.112  The LSPTA and MAC had club rooms where 
members could smoke, talk and host lecture series. Like the LSPTA, organisers of the 
heavy traffic trials and the Liverpool Cycle and Motor Show, there is evidence of these 
clubs promoting motoring interests. The MAC’s committee organised the Manchester 
exhibition of the 1900 One Thousand Mile Trial.113 The MAC also provided legal 
protection for members, the chairman W. E. Rowcliffe often defending motorists in 
court from prosecution.114 
The broad aims of these clubs can be seen in the formation note of the MMC: 
Within the last few weeks a Manchester Motor Club has been organised. Its objects 
are to secure stabling for motors in the centre of Manchester, to arrange for the 
supply of petrol, and to appoint official repairers in various localities; to arrange 
periodical club runs, tours, and social meetings at which papers may be read and 
discussions held on questions of interest to motor owners; to watch the interests of 
members, and to promote, if it seems desirable, motor races and trials.115 
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Interesting to note here is the range of different goals that the club established, which 
included the establishment of “official” repair and fuel supply. This was crucial, and 
members of clubs, if they were involved in the trade, began offering fuel at their places 
of business. For example, Frank Jackson of the MAC and a cycle manufacturer, stocked 
petrol in Altrincham;116 and Dan Simpson, of the MAC and commercial vehicle 
manufacturer, provided fuel at his firm’s works in Cornbrook.117  
These examples demonstrate the varied activities of the club. However, the MAC, 
especially, was frequented by motorists who were also involved, or would become 
involved, in the motor trade. Although a full membership list does not exist from the 
early period, records of the club runs note several members. A meet at the estate of 
“Ivyholme” in Macclesfield lists the names of 28 members, of whom 12 were known to 
be involved in the manufacturing or sale of motor cars.118 Most obvious however is the 
influence of Marshall and Co., a Manchester-based motor manufacturer. The secretary 
of the MAC was James Hoyle-Smith, engineer and Managing Director of Marshall and 
Co. When Marshall’s agencies expanded in 1902 they included Newton and Co. in 
Manchester.119 John Newton, owner of Newton and Co. was also a member of the 
MAC. Future directors were early members of the Manchester Automobile Club, 
including G. Higginbotham120, G. P. Dawson121, former owner J.J. Mann and prominent 
shareholder D. Q. Henriques. It is possible therefore that Hoyle-Smith found financial 
backing from his friends at the club, as well as the groups’ business associates. 
Figure 7 shows the relatively eclectic nature of motor vehicles which participated in 
the early clubs, with motorcycles, tricycles and light and large motorcars evident. This 
also demonstrates how by 1902 the motorcar had yet to become standardised. 
However, membership of the early clubs was often restrictive in terms of cost. Even 
the cheapest motor in the early years cost around £100, about 10 times the cost of a 
bicycle, and thus was a significant cost for the middle-classes whose income typically 
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went from £100 per annum upwards.122 Similarly, the subscription cost of the MAC 
was half a guinea, while the Manchester Wheelers subscription was a tenth less at half 
a crown. We can understand from this why many cyclists were either saving up, or 
simply talking about motorcycling during this early period rather than actively doing it. 
This was to change in the Edwardian period with the wide spread emergence of 
modest motorists who were able to purchase cheaper, often second-hand motorcycles 
and club membership fees were much more reasonable, as discussed next.  
 
 
Figure 7 - A MAC meeting at a member’s home in Macclesfield - Autocar 2/8/1902 
“Modest” Motor Clubs 
Supporting the “modest motorists” were the clubs which evolved into an almost two-
tiered system. Old motoring clubs like the MAC were affiliated with the ACGB&I. Clubs 
such as the MAC largely involved expensive cars and gentlemen or trade membership. 
Its 1907 Reliability run, which became an annual event, was contested exclusively by 
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motorcars, many of which were expensive powerful cars, like the 80-100 horsepower 
De La Buire owned by the winner J. Higginson Junior. Others were cars entered by local 
traders, such as the Belsize driven by Managing director J. Hoyle Smith, or the Eagle 
driven by Ralph Jackson.123 
However more modest clubs began to spring up in the Edwardian period, starting with 
the Manchester Motor Club, which also had a large trade contingent, but largely 
motorcycling in emphasis. Clubs began to cover smaller communities and most in the 
North-West were based in suburban areas or tied to towns. There was the Denton 
Motor Club, the Oldham Motor Club, Stockport Motor Club, the Manchester Clarion 
Motor Cycle Club, Manchester Hundred Motor Club, Bolton and District Motor Cycling 
Club, the Bury Motor Club, Rochdale and District Motor Cycle Club, Preston Motor 
Club, Macclesfield Motor Club, Chester Motor Club, Manx Automobile Club, Blackpool 
Motor Club, St Helens Motor Club and the Hyde Motor Club, to name only those 
identified in newspaper and periodical searches. This rise of local clubs mirrors the 
cycle club boom of the late Victorian period of which there were 49 in the Manchester 
area.124  Many of these clubs formed part of the North-Western Automobile 
Association (NWAA) which federated the many Lancashire, Cheshire and North-Welsh 
clubs and hosted inter-club contests,125 an example of this was the inter-club team 
reliability trial which in 1914 was attended by 14 regional motor clubs. Most 
competitors were on motorcycles or motorcycles and sidecars, as seen in Figure 8. 
Several of the motorcycles used were locally manufactured. At this event there were 
for example 8 Bradburys, 6 of which came from the Oldham Motor Club, where 
Bradbury was based, and 1 DOT motorcycle, based in Manchester.126 
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Figure 8 - The Oldham Motor Club team at the NWAA Reliability Trials 1914 - Source 
Manchester Courier 1/7/1914 
These clubs catered for a wide range of motorists and vehicles. During competitions 
there were a considerable number of prize categories for events including motorcycles 
of one, two and three-cylinder engines, and tricycles.127 Emphasis was on the small 
vehicle, although these clubs still had a minority of car-owning members. The MMC for 
example had around 300 members in 1908, of which 180 were motorcyclists and 120 
car owners, who paid higher subscription fees.128  
These clubs not only organised reliability runs, social runs, and hill climbs but also 
more inclusive gymkhanas, involving family fun and games. Gymkhanas had a class 
connotation, with origins in the upper-class sport of polo and continued well into the 
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interwar period.129 The Manchester Hundred Motor Club gymkhana in June 1914 
involved around 200 people, with the journalist noting: 
the fair sex was well represented, and their many-coloured costumes blended 
admirably in the afternoon sunshine.130  
Events included balloon bursting from sidecars, ring tilting, motorcycle and sidecar 
musical chairs, as well as non-motoring events such as hat trimming, pea-guessing, 
balloon racing and bun-biting.131 Other gymkhana events included a tug of war for 
motorcyclists versus car owners, a symbolic example of the divide between the two 
classes of ownership.132 A Preston and District Motor Cycle Club gymkhana also 
featured a breakdown competition,133 presumably so the motorcyclists could show the 
speed in which they were able to repair a fault in a vehicle, turning “tinkering” into a 
competition of prowess. For club gymkhanas, members were encouraged to bring their 
family and friends along for the festivities.134  
 
Figure 9 - Ring tilting at the Manchester Hundred Motor Club Gymkhana 1914 - 
Source: Manchester Courier 17/6/1914 
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Motor traders and clubs 
Motor traders were often owners and keen motorists who used motoring clubs for 
dual purposes. This continued during this period and was particularly beneficial for the 
local motor agents and garages, as the number of clubs expanded to include many of 
the towns surrounding Manchester. There is much evidence of trade participation, as 
the following analysis shall show. For example, 21-year-old John Nabb worked in his 
father’s cycle and motor repair business and was brought up in the business.135 He was 
a member of the Bury Motor Club, and died from injuries sustained in a crash on one 
of the club’s hill climbing competitions.136  
While those involved in the trade obviously enjoyed motoring, there were also 
particular advantages to being members of clubs and entering vehicles for sale in club 
competitions. Many local retailers advertised successes in the local press; while 
success could also be used to impress fellow club members and spectators. The agents 
Newton and Bennett, members of the MAC and MMC, ran their S.C.A.T. cars in 
numerous local club events and advertised their local successes in the Manchester 
Guardian, including 3 first places in its class in two MAC events and one MMC.137 
Figure 10 shows how agents as far afield as Exeter were using an MMC reliability trial 
result in their advertising.  
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Figure 10 - Success in regional club events were also used further afield – Western 
Times 28/6/1907  
However, trade members often created friction, especially if the trade competition 
entries were extraordinarily successful. Correspondence in the Motor Cycle shows how 
a competitor, who signed his letter as “AN ALSO RAN”, doubted that Rex Co. machines, 
run by the local agent, and who won the Bolton Motor Club’s hill-climb and an MMC 
hill-climb on 16 May 1908, were standard models available for purchase.138 A similar 
complaint was made of C. E. Kettle in the Motor Cycle in 1907. Kettle was the manager 
of Triumph’s Manchester depot and a committee member of the MMC. A writer to the 
Motor Cycle complained how two Triumphs were used in an MMC hill climb that had 
different engine dimensions from those for sale, and these won, although the writer 
Herbert Brady was a rival motor trader in Manchester.139  
J.T. Ward summed up the friction between private and trade interests: 
Members of a motoring club, too, greatly resent too vast a proportion of the motor 
trade element in the list of officials, no matter how good sportsmen those trade 
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officials may be. The officials of a motoring club and its committee should at least have 
a majority of private owner drivers, and all should be practical and enthusiastic 
motorists.140  
Clearly trade membership was an issue for local clubs. 
Trade presence within clubs was combated by restricting competition trade entries or 
having trade-only categories. For example, in 1905 the MMC had a hill climb for all, 
and a hill climb for non-trade members, an action taken because of the large number 
of trade members.141 Similarly in Stockport the Stockport Motor Club’s 1905 reliability 
trial had prizes for the first trade member, H. Hollingdrake of the coachbuilders and 
motorcar agents in Stockport, and for the first non-trade member.142  
Motoring clubs and the war 
Motoring clubs were interrupted by the outbreak of war in 1914. The Manchester 
Hundred Motor Club started revolver practices for its members.143 Motorists such as 
S.P. Dawson and H. Pilkington, secretaries of the Manchester Hundred and Stockport 
Motor Club respectively were enlisted to help the war effort.144  The Manchester 
Motor Club urged members to join the Manchester Athletes’ Volunteer Force, 
commanded by H. Reed the vice-president of the MMC, and motorcycle 
manufacturer.145 This force also included the MAC and the Manchester Wheelers. 
Similarly, the Liverpool motor clubs formed a corps with the object of providing 
training to owners of motor vehicles, with activities such as map reading, ambulance 
drills and rifle practice.146 
The war took its toll on members. For example, as early as October 1914, sub-captain 
of the MMC George Ward was captured on the front after signing up as a motor 
transport driver.147 J. T. Ward noted in 1915 that: 
                                                          
140
 Manchester Courier 13/8/1913 
141
 Manchester Courier 12/4/1905 
142
 Manchester Courier 17/6/1908 
143
 Manchester Courier 16/8/1914 
144
 Manchester Courier 16/8/1914 
145
 Manchester Courier 2/12/1914 
146
 Manchester Courier 2/12/1914 
147
 Manchester Courier 7/10/1914 
 
74 
 
So many of our club enthusiasts are at the front… each motoring body in Manchester 
is seriously depleted, while those who have not joined the colours are too busy to 
devote time to their favourite pastime.148  
Apart from wartime activities, the number of members and events declined, especially 
as motoring became viewed as a wartime extravagance. This is demonstrated by a 
Punch cartoon from 1917 entitled “Doing their bit” showing fat motorists driving 
through a working-class area with an “Eat less bread” slogan attached to the vehicle.149  
Despite the impact of the war it seems as though membership of clubs was in decline 
before 1914. The membership of the MMC was 300 in 1908. However by 1913 
membership had dropped below 200. 150 The turnout at events was poor, so much so 
that J.T Ward mused:   
One wonders whether motoring or automobile clubs are no longer wanted, or have 
outlived their spheres of usefulness.151   
Assessing this decline is difficult, although it is possible that the Edwardian period 
marked the beginning of family motoring, which has been identified as the “backbone” 
of interwar automobilism, and with it a more mixed use of the motor vehicle for 
pleasure, utility and business.152 Motoring clubs offered motorists a social network 
that included the family, but were largely dominated by men and serious competition, 
which is how clubs continued after the war. Membership was also insular, with current 
members being involved in the appointment of new members:  
All are balloted for, and one black ball excludes. As a rule, all members elected must be 
personally known to three members of the committee. The social and sporting side of 
the club is its mainstay, and the secret of its success.153  
While the sporting side might have appealed, it would not suit families who wanted to 
do their own excursions. Similarly the membership fees might put off some, for 
example in 1907 annual motorcycle membership of the MMC cost 5s and car 
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membership 10s.154 On top of this, motoring had become an established pastime and 
motoring clubs’ role was narrowing, as they did not have to be so active in promoting 
motoring facilities or signs for roads, especially with the rise of national organisations 
such as the Automobile Association (AA). This decline is like that of cycling clubs a 
decade earlier, as family groups and pairs of riders became a much more common 
sight than a group cycle.155 We will see in the next section how the family, including 
children, and the countryside were dominant in marketing campaigns and also in the 
motoring experiences of several North-West families, who documented their 
excursions on film.   
Aspects of price and class 
In 1912 the MAC and the MMC were “referred to respectively as the House of Lords 
and the House of Commons”; the MAC was made up of car owners, while the MMC 
was a mix, although motorcyclists were predominant.156 This reference shows how 
motorcycle and motorcar ownership was regarded as separated, by both price and the 
class of the owner.  The separation in price between the high-class motorcar and the 
motorcycle and small car was considerable, and was an issue highlighted during this 
period by regional journalists and private commentators.   
In 1907 the “Motoring” columnist of the Manchester Guardian noted: 
the many profit-demanding hands through which several makes of cars pass before 
they finally reach their actual owners 
referring in part to how:  
the art of the coachbuilder beautifies the car, but his prices are in some cases 
exorbitant.157   
He then goes on to call for:  
a modest motor-car serving the middle-class man to as great an extent as the bicycle 
does the working-classes.158  
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Furthermore, at the 1907 Manchester Motor Show it was noted that:  
The show is indeed for the rich. In a few instances prices are a trifle lower than those 
of last year, but in others they are higher. And from the point of view of the man of 
moderate means the vexing part of it all is that most of the large makers are so busy 
meeting the demand for cars of from 20 to 40 h.p. as to scorn the modest 6 to 10 h.p. 
car.159 
As well as a price difference, there was also a difference in attitude of the non-
motoring public towards the small and large car owner described by a correspondent 
to the Manchester Guardian: 
A big book is a big evil, says the Greek proverb, and I have often been reminded of that 
when watching the attitude of a town crowd “assisting” at the break-down of a big and 
of a small car respectively. The owner of the latter, very often his own chauffeur and 
having practical acquaintance with the mechanism of his carriage, is eyed with 
sympathetic and admiring interest as he is busily setting things to rights, while the 
proprietor of the bigger concern as he sits and fidgets in his carriage, and his chauffeur 
and mechanic are fumbling among the machinery, is regarded with a curiosity that is 
anything but admiring and sympathetic.160  
The attitude of the non-motoring public to different tiers of motoring shows how the 
non-motorist was more sympathetic towards the modest motorist. This is probably 
because the motorcycle and light car was culturally and technically linked with the 
bicycle, rather than the carriage, and as Mom argues, was thus an expression of 
adventurous practice.161 The bicycle was becoming more universally used, as the 1907 
note above expressed: motoring was becoming an object of aspiration. Thus, we see 
an example of how modest motoring contributed towards an acclimatisation of the 
non-motoring public.162 We also see the possible origins of the working-class motorist 
in the interwar period, as identified by O’Connell, as working in the industry and 
extremely adept at self-maintenance.163 
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Motorcyclists were often keen to separate themselves from upper-class motoring 
extravagance. During the war a “modest motor-cyclist” in 1916 responded to the 
Liverpool Daily Post’s accusation of motoring as an upper-class spending extravagance.  
I took a particular account of my expenses last year with my motor-bicycle and side-
car, which gave pleasure and outings to myself, my wife, and the two children.... The 
sum total of my year’s expenses were £5 18s 6d, which covered petrol, oil, tyres, 
repairs, renewals, and, in fact, every running expense.... We went on our holidays on 
the outfit and made many week-end excursions into the country... and was my solitary 
deliberate recreation.164  
We also see the separation in cartoons in Punch such as the one in Figure 11 which 
shows the friction between the chauffeur driven big car and the small owner-driven 
cyclecar. 
 
 
Figure 11 - Punch cartoon 28/1/1912  
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Extravagant motoring could cost over £1,000 for a vehicle, while an old motorcycle 
could be picked up second-hand for £10 or less. O’Connell highlights the unexplored 
second-hand market for cars in the interwar period, demonstrating that it was a 
significant market which even extended car ownership to the working-classes, 
particularly those who had in some way been involved in the motor trade.165 However 
the price of second-hand vehicles put them well in the range of the middle-class whose 
income typically went from £100 per annum upwards.166 In Manchester this second-
hand market becomes apparent fairly early on in the classified adverts of newspapers, 
such as the Manchester Evening News, Manchester Guardian and Manchester Courier 
and in trade periodicals such as The Autocar or The Motor Cycle. Both businesses and 
individuals began advertising second-hand. For example, the Road Carrying Company 
ran the following in the Manchester Guardian in 1906: “Several Second-hand 2, 3, and 
4 Cylinder CARS FOR SALE, at exceptionally low prices.”167 Businesses with large 
depreciating stocks used the auction option to sell many of their surplus second-hand 
stock. For example, Cockshoot used auctioneers to sell “100 second-hand carriages, 
several motor-cars” in a 1906 auction.168 Other outlets were the auction by the 
Manchester Motor Garage auctioning cars, vans and accessories, probably in an 
attempt to get rid of old stock,169 and similarly a garage in Southport’s auction included 
six assorted motor vehicles.170 There are many other examples of this during this 
period, including William Lea of Liverpool’s auction of 1908 which sought to attract 
attendance by having no reserves on the motor stock.171 Private adverts appeared, for 
example, T. W. Grace of Didsbury advertised his old 3 cylinder Belsize because he had 
ordered a larger car.172 Quite a lot of these included prices, for example a one year old 
3.5 horsepower motorcycle for sale in 1909 for £40.173  
Model changes, quick improvements in technology and the social pressure involved in 
owning the “new” model, allowed for more modest motorists to pick up only slightly 
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outdated models very cheap second-hand. In the 1913 Motor Cycle there are several 
second-hand vehicles advertised; the older the vehicle, the cheaper it was. For 
example, a 1906 to 1908 motorcycle could be picked up for between £10 and 15, while 
a second-hand motorcycle that was only one year old would cost between £40 and 
£60.174  
The ability to pick up a bargain had always been possible and was not confined to the 
interwar period, or indeed the Edwardian period. Worthington-Williams noted:  “There 
have always been small and relatively cheap cars in either the tricar or voiturette class, 
and historians have somewhat misled the public into thinking that motoring in the 
early days was only the prerogative of the rich.”175 The adoption of certain 
technologies during this period can be attributed to increased sociability and comfort. 
Worthington-Williams highlights the developing technology of the early tricars and 
forecars, with the passenger at the front of the vehicle, being replaced from 1903 by 
the motorcycle and sidecar which, with the passenger beside the vehicle, allowed 
them to converse better,176  a good example of use dictating design. In the 
Netherlands technical questions sent to motoring journals were largely around 
creating a connection to sidecars, so couples could go out together.177 
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Figure 12 - Motor Cycle – 7/7/1910 p.655 – Shows the social and family aspect of 
motorcycling. 
 
As analysis of the suburban clubs has shown, social activities both with friends and 
family, women and children were an important part of the motoring experience. The 
quote used earlier from a 1916 motorcyclist emphasises that the motorcycle and 
sidecar:  
gave pleasure and outings to myself, my wife, and the two children…We went on our 
holidays on the outfit and made many week-end excursions into the country.178  
The family aspect is also seen in Figure 12 which shows two families on a motorcycle 
outing on the Manchester-Chester road in 1910. The sidecars and even the space in 
front of one of the riders is used to carry wives and children, while sidecars used in 
club competitions might be manned by the owner’s friend. With the emphasis on 
family, or a romantic trip, and other social aspects of motoring, came the aspiration for 
the comforts of the motorcar. However even Ford could not quite bridge the price gap 
between the motorcycle and the car, despite advertising as such in 1914 shown in 
Figure 13.  
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Figure 13 - Ford advert – Manchester Guardian 3/4/1914 
Racing and spectating  
While the North-West Federation and individual clubs organised hill climbs and 
reliability runs, perhaps the most famous race in the North-West that still endures to 
this day is the Isle of Man TT race. As a national and international competition, the 
region’s motor and motorcycle clubs fielded members. In 1909 the Manchester Motor 
Club sent four members including Harry Reed, the designer of the DOT motorcycle, 
and the holder of the Twin Cycle Trophy from 1908.179 As well as providing regular 
competition for keen motorists, big races were often attended by big crowds. We have 
seen earlier in the chapter how racing was at first added to local cycle racing events, 
which was enjoyed locally by thousands of spectators. However, during the first 
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decade of the 20th century motor racing became a significant spectator sport. By 1914 
a one-day excursion to the T.T. was offered by the North Cheshire Herald, including 
transport from Manchester and back for 9s 9d.180 The T.T. became part of the holiday 
experience and was used to attract holiday makers to the area.  
Apart from the Isle of Man, the other popular spectator competition was Southport 
which hosted several speed trials from 1903 through to the interwar period.  Figure 14 
shows the size of the crowd by the side of the course, enjoying the closeness and the 
speed in demonstration. Like the earlier Thousand Mile Trial the event had the impact 
of education:   
The trials have done much to educate the public as to the tremendous power, yet 
simplicity and controllability, of motor cars, and the effect will, no doubt, be beneficial 
to the trade generally in the North of England, for visitors were attracted from all the 
northern counties.181  
During the interwar years the spectators at SouthportQ regularly numbered over 
5,000.182 
 
Figure 14 - The Southport Speed Trials, including a view of the large crowd - Autocar 
10/10/1903 
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Conclusion  
A study of local automobile diffusion in the Edwardian period has shown that 
ownership did not necessarily slowly slide down the social scale from upper to middle-
class ownership. The second hand market and the popularity of motorcycling during 
the Edwardian period meant that the differences in price, and the running costs of 
vehicles varied massively. While a Rolls-Royce, with custom coachwork and a chauffeur 
and mechanic might represent a significant portion of early motorists, so was the 
under £50 motorcycle with sidecar, driven by a more modest motorist. Therefore we 
can identify two distinct classes of owners. This is also reflected in the rise of local 
suburban motoring clubs which offered an enviroment for these different groups of 
motorists. We also see how motorcycle and motorcar owners were separated socially 
with different membership prices, different public perceptions, different racing 
categories and featuring different teams at club gymkhanas. 
Motoring began to fit with other defining activities of Edwardian middle-class life such 
as photography, art and military drills during the war. These clubs were numerous and 
had a significant membership number. Our understanding of the defining features of 
middle-class suburban life is perhaps best represented visually in the 1912 cartoon in 
Figure 15, where children are playing at motoring, cycling, cricket and picnics in 
combined chaos in a Northern suburb.  The rise of clubs was also linked with the 
increasing numbers of agents and motor garages that catered for the growing market 
of motoring. And the motor car was also having a wider impact on the non-motoring 
public as diffusion increased. This included the influence of the motor car in the 
democratic process and the increasing popularity of motoring as a spectator sport. 
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Figure 15 - Punch 17/7/1912 
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1.4 - The car, popular culture and middle-class consumption  
Economic and business historians note three general stages of motor car diffusion: the 
upper-classes in the pre-first world war period; the middle-classes in the interwar 
period; and the final stage towards “mass motoring” after the Second World War.183 
The growth of the middle-classes and middle-class income during the interwar period 
supported the significant increase in motor manufacturing and consumption during 
this period. Average annual income of the middle-classes rose from £340 in 1913 to 
£445 in 1928 and car ownership increased steadily from just over 100,000 in 1918 to 
over two million by 1939, while motor car prices dropped from the middle of the 
1920s.184 For example the Austin Seven price fell from £259 in 1924 to £130 in 1936.185 
Ownership of motor vehicles became a mark of middle-class prosperity and analysis of 
spending shows that after housing and clothing, motoring was the next biggest 
expense for a middle-class family.186 Cost, marketing, design and production line 
techniques have been central aspects to the analysis of manufacturing success and the 
demand for motorcars during this period as scholars seek to explain its diffusion. For 
example, the success of Morris, Austin and Ford is often attributed to their ability to 
produce and sell cars cheaper and on a larger scale than other manufacturers.187 While 
clearly these aspects were important in explaining the diffusion of the motor car, 
analysis has been enriched by an ever increasing variety of factors identified among 
social historians, looking more closely at who was purchasing cars, why they were 
doing so and how they were using them.   
It has been seen that the standout analysis of the diffusion of motoring, and its 
historiography, has been made recently by Mom. Mom argues strongly against what 
he defines as the “toy-to-tool” thesis: that the interwar era was a period when the 
“toy” of the pre-war period naturally evolved into a consumer “tool”, which is 
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prevalent in many narrative histories for this period.188 Instead, Mom argues that 
utility was emphasised as part of the culture of motoring;  used as an alibi for pleasure 
motoring and used as a marketing tool by car supporters, which we see especially 
amongst motoring lobbyists for the removal of the “luxury” horsepower tax.189 We 
certainly see arguments of utility used as a common theme in the campaign 
throughout the period to reduce or change the horse-power tax.190 As Plowden 
highlights, however, this theme was sometimes contradicted by its proponents. For 
example, Stenson Cooke, the Secretary of the Automobile Association, argued in 1924 
against a government report that private cars were mainly used for pleasure, while 
arguing in 1920 that most motorists only used their vehicles one or two times a week 
which, as Plowden comments, rather damages the claim made that the car was not 
just a weekend toy.191 This debate about how vehicles were used during this period is 
an important one, as it affects how we understand the substantial diffusion of the car. 
O’Connell’s analysis of car culture and the growing diffusion of the car in the UK draws 
attention to the car as a powerful symbol, both of leisure and of class. For example 
“The car offered owners the chance to express their status and their distinction from 
less wealthy groups”, and offered the middle-classes an opportunity to escape the 
“collective gaze” and being identified with the working-class seaside holiday, an aspect 
of important cultural distinction identified by John Urry.192 The car also offered users 
the geographical freedom to access exclusive destinations such as roadside inns, golf 
clubs and country parks.193 Several historians have noted the ability of the automobile 
to act as a cocoon, protecting its occupants both literally and figuratively from the 
outside world.194 As we shall see in the following analysis the romantic, the escape and 
the rural were especially emphasised in various marketing campaigns and in the cine 
film recordings of the North-West’s motorists in the 1920s and 1930s.  
This section will set the decline of Manchester as a motor manufacturing centre 
against the increasing diffusion of the motor car and the increasing variety of use and 
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users. The aim is to explore the aspects of car culture that are more intangible than 
price or technological developments. We will explore the reputation of cars and the 
nuances of popular associations, which was particularly noticeable for the Manchester-
built Model T Ford as it rose to ubiquity. It became entrenched in popular stereotypes 
such as “cheap” or “American”. There will then be a brief review of the marketing and 
advertising of a few different Manchester manufacturers, which will be used to 
examine how manufacturers attempted to appeal to users and what the ideal user was 
supposed to be doing. It has been found that both the countryside and exclusive social 
environments were used frequently which adds more legitimacy to O’Connell’s 
argument that the car’s diffusion can only be explained if we consider it as a status 
symbol, and to Jeremiah’s argument that the countryside was a central factor in the 
sale of motorcars during this period.195 Finally this section will end with a brief 
exploration of sources from local users, including the emergence of the automobile 
and automobile touring in the North-West’s homemade cine films housed at the 
North-West Film Archive, and small personal reminiscences on travel by car. It is 
recognised that these sources only capture a very small part of motoring. For example, 
holidays to the seaside might only be undertaken a few times a year, whilst the car 
might be used for a range of uses, more mundane, that we are unaware of. Therefore, 
a brief exploration of the use of the car during this period and comparisons to other 
studies will be important to begin with.  
Utility or pleasure? 
While today commuting to work by car is one of the dominant forms of automobile 
use, in the first half of the twentieth century it was fairly rare, although research shows 
an increase in car commuting towards the end of the period.196 Although their sample 
size was small, a study by Pooley, Turnbull and Adams showed that in the 1920s only 
5.2 percent of commuting journeys were made by car and 3.9 percent by motorcycle. 
This had increased overall by 2.3 percent by the 1930s with 9.1 percent by car and 2.3 
percent by motorcycle, despite car ownership per household being over 20 percent by 
1938. Pooley, Turnbull and Adams also noted that this was less in cities where public 
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transport was better. After interviewing participants, they concluded that car owners 
largely chose to use their cars for pleasure. For example, one Manchester respondent 
remarked, “It would not have occurred to you to use it for work”.197 Ironically, even 
Ford sales representatives in Manchester could not get a company car and they walked 
door to door, without being able to show customers their product. This changed in the 
1920s at regional dealers Quicks, when a sales representative took it upon himself to 
purchase a Ford for his rounds.198 Despite this, commuting was an aspect of motoring 
that was recognised by manufacturers from the beginning, with the sale of cars to 
doctors being popular. For example, an article in The Autocar in 1900 featured a 
special doctors’ Landau build by Manchester firm Marshall and Co.199 Commuting was 
part of the commercial opportunities for motoring which will be covered in more detail 
in the next chapter. However, in the 1930s urban car use was becoming an issue. In 
Manchester motorists complained of the lack of cheap parking facilities and the 
council began to consider municipal carparks, although a survey of private garage 
facilities showed that only 1,248 cars were garaged during weekdays in the city 
centre.200 
Benson argues that the growth of motor vehicle ownership was central to the rise of 
independent family tourism; in 1981 70 percent of tourists used a car for their holiday 
travel, a phenomenon that can trace its roots to the pre-Second World War period.201 
This independent travel was important in the North-West and elsewhere in the UK, 
and it separated the car user from the non-car user, who was limited to train, or 
omnibus travel to popular locations. Observations of tourism in Lancashire by John 
Walton for example show how from the late 19th century whole towns or factories 
would holiday together in the same place.202 We shall see this separation both in 
marketing approaches during the interwar period and in the evidence from home 
recordings of a few of the North-West motor users. Despite this Benson also notes the 
continuity that some car owners experienced, going to the same locations that they 
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had before they owned a car.203 This is evident in holiday traffic censuses looking at 
travel in North Wales, Llandudno being a traditional holiday spot for families in the 
North-West: 
For the rest, the holiday weekend was chiefly remarkable on the coast of North Wales 
for the number of visiting motorcars, which came in steady streams along all the main 
roads. At Llandudno cars were parked without a break across the whole length of the 
bay, from the Little Orme to the pierhead, while according to an official traffic census 
taken at Pwllheli 10,400 private cars have reached the town in the last three days, in 
addition to 1,200 motor-buses and bicycles.204 
Automobile scholars note certain trends during the interwar period, one of which is 
the steady growth of commercial motor vehicle sales, especially towards the later end 
of the 1920s onwards with an average annual growth rate of 10 percent between 
1924-1938, which was greater than the average annual growth of private motors.205 
However this could be slightly misleading, as smaller commercial vehicles sold to 
individuals could often have multipurpose uses. For example, the Model T was sold in 
the 1920s with detachable bodywork to facilitate a multi-purpose vehicle. Brooks 
pointed out how, “during the week a van or pick-up type body was bolted on; this 
being removed at weekends and an open tourer body substituted.”206 Businesses also 
offered convertible bodies for the Ford van, such as “Magnet Convertible Bodies” in 
Figure 16 where a van owner can take his family on “a glorious weekend in the 
country”. Such convertible bodies were widespread, with several companies offering 
“pleasure body and delivery van” combinations.207 Willys-Overland-Crossley also 
marketed the Whippet “Commerce saloon” in a similar way, an advert stating “Killing 
two birds with one stone. From pleasure car to business vehicle in 55 secs.” The car 
was marketed to small businessmen such as butchers, dairymen, farmers and 
commercial travellers with the back seats being removable for both the working week 
and the weekend tour.208 Similarly inventors, such as motor engineer William Ridings, 
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of Urmston were looking to patent convertible caravans. Dubbed the “Garavan” in The 
Autocar, the caravan was designed as a workshop and garage, easily convertible into a 
holiday caravan for the family.209  O’Connell’s analysis of rural ownership also 
highlights the potential ambiguity of vehicle usage with the ideal farmer’s car “capable 
of absorbing the punishment entailed in taking a load to market, possibly with the 
assistance of a trailer, and of taking the family on their annual holiday.”210  
 
Figure 16 – Convertible body adverts appeared throughout the 1920s including this 
example in The Ford Times August 1926 p.684 
Analysis shows that there were minimal changes in commuting habits during this 
period, suggesting that there was no firm shift in the car from a “toy” to a “tool”, best 
demonstrated when we look at the number of cars in Manchester on a weekday: 1,248 
in 1930 compared to over 10,000 motor vehicles at Llandudno during a bank holiday 
weekend in 1933.211 Nor is it always easy to separate private and commercial vehicles. 
There are too many multifaceted uses and complexities of ownership.  Indeed, as Mom 
has highlighted the interwar period was one of “multiple-use automobilism... consisted 
for a quarter in pure pleasure, another quarter in pure business, while the remaining 
was an inextricable mix of pleasure, utility and business use.”212 
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Reputation and popular culture 
Aspray identified over fifty information issues considered when a car was bought, 
highlighting the complexity of the decision-making process. These include technology, 
features and aspects of makes and models, issues with dealers and manufacturers, 
financial considerations, a general understanding of cars and a range of subjective 
measures including manufacturers’ bias and reputation.213  As manufacturers looked to 
appeal to increasingly growing markets, popular opinion could become an important 
factor in the decision-making process. For example, O’Connell highlighted the 
relatively poor sales of the highly popularised £100 car, the Morris Minor, released in 
1931, arguing that nobody wanted the cheapest car.214 This exposes the 
impressionable nature of the automobile purchase, contradictory of the emphasis put 
on price, used to explain the success of Ford from 1911 and Morris from 1921.215 But 
despite the relative cheapness and quality of the Model T, its share in the UK industry 
fell dramatically from 22 percent in 1921 to 2 percent in 1925. Automobile historians 
argue that this was largely due to the horsepower tax and relatively high petrol prices, 
which were unfavourable for Model T owners, alongside the problems of a car 
designed for the American market and the slashing in price of Morris cars to 
compete.216 The gap in price between the Morris Cowley and the Model T closed 
significantly. In 1921 there was a price difference of about £200, but by 1924 the 
difference was around £100. While Morris sales rocketed, Ford had to make do with 
increased commercial vehicle orders, to offset rapidly declining private car sales.217 
This was perhaps due to the more favourable taxation on Ford commercial vehicles.218 
However Morris and Ford had been competing for years, going back to the Oxford’s 
introduction in 1913. How then can we explain the popularity of the Model T as a 
commercial vehicle and its undesirability as a private motor car? While price 
competition and running costs are undoubtedly important, a broader look at cultural 
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aspects of consumption can help us understand sales performance in these turbulent 
years. 
 
Figure 17 - Satirical cartoon featuring the Ford production line at the Wembley 
exhibition Punch 24/6/1924 p.678 
Ford’s reputation as “cheap” became widespread in the interwar period. They were 
the butt of numerous jokes in society magazines such as Punch. There are numerous 
examples including:  
It is said that the Ford motor works are now turning out a car every six and a-half 
seconds. We suppose it is the painting that accounts for most of this time.219  
and 
Tramps in America do have Ford cars.220 
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Included in these two jokes is the idea of a lower-class of motorist, and the association 
of cheapness with quick production line technology, as seen in the first joke and the 
satirical cartoon in Figure 17. Indeed, so popular were these references that a writer in 
The Bystander commented:  
 If a music-hall comedian is short of a laugh, he has only to mention the magic word 
[Ford] and a gust of merriment sweeps through the theatre.221  
The archetypal luxury car was the Rolls-Royce, while Ford was at the opposite end of 
the motoring social scale. Indeed, the comparison of both was used frequently as a 
cultural reference during this period. For example:  
To-day our girls have Rolls Royce dresses and Ford manners.222  
Or this advert: 
Pianos. Rolls Royce quality at Ford prices.223  
As cars and makes became more popular, they became cultural references. This must 
have had an increased impact on social opinions during the interwar period as the 
sight of cars on the country’s roads became increasingly common. 
Part of this popular perception can be traced to early attitudes towards American 
automobiles.  The reputation of Ford was affected by the intensity of patriotic 
campaigning by British manufacturers. Jeremiah highlights a 1924 Morris campaign 
that attacked its foreign rivals “If for Any Reason You Do Not Buy a Morris – At Any 
Rate Buy a British Car”.224 This led Ford to reply with the marketing campaigns of 1924 
to 1926 that emphasised its British manufacture and drew attention to the 
preconceptions of the public, as we will see later. The impact of patriotic consumerism 
is hard to judge but several automobile historians highlight it as an important aspect of 
the period. For example, Jeremiah argued that  
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such was the intensity of the patriotic culture that contemporary advertisements 
implied that the ownership of a foreign car would cause social embarrassment.225  
This conclusion certainly tallies with the popular use of Ford in 1920s jokes. It is also an 
aspect of automobile culture that has endured to this day. However, prejudice against 
the American car was not new, and was a product of early imports into the UK from 
around the early 1900s when there were still relatively few British manufacturers.226 
This prejudice often manifested itself in national traits being transferred to the cars 
produced in different countries; this was particularly pronounced when it came to 
American and European attitudes towards both motoring and motorcar design.227 The 
Autocar in 1922 highlighted these national traits,  
Great Britain with its intense practicality; America with its mind fastened on cheap 
stampings.  
In this analysis also were French, Italian and German stereotypes.228 One aspect of this 
national association was the difference between the British emphasis on comfort and 
quietness, against the American focus on convenience and features such as the high 
ride height more suitable for American driving conditions.  
This national prejudice affected different types of vehicles in different ways and might 
go some way to explaining the difference in the performance of Ford’s commercial and 
private Model T during the 1920s.229 A high ride height was probably much more 
valued than comfort and quietness in a one-ton truck. Ford sought to tackle this with a 
marketing campaign in the 1920s which coincided with them changing to producing, 
rather than importing, vehicle components. In 1923 they advertised the Ford as right-
hand drive and with lower seating, adaptations made for the British market.230 In 1924 
they advertised the Model T as “British”: 
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made by British labour from British materials in the Ford Works, Trafford Park, 
Manchester, for the British market with lowered chassis, deeper cushioning, English 
body in “Empire Grey” and a choice of other colours.231  
Meanwhile Quicks, Ford’s main dealership in Manchester, were finding success selling 
fleets of Model Ts to businesses such as United Cattle Products, bakeries and other 
small businesses, to whom social standing or a perceived uncomfortable ride was not 
an issue.232  
 
Figure 18 - Image of Ford display at the British Industries Fair in Birmingham 1926 - 
The Ford Times April 1926 p.315 
Patriotic consumerism goes beyond the automobile. For example during the 1930s 
there was a “why buy foreign butter?” campaign and Cadbury’s announced it only 
used milk from British farms.233 This widespread aspect of interwar consumerism, 
Benson argued, increased consumers’ consciousness of their national identity and 
contributed towards the results of a 1939 survey which showed that 46 percent of 
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consumers attempted to discover the origin of their purchases.234 Linked with the 
“buy-British” marketing was the popular use of the British countryside in 1920s car and 
motoring marketing. Both O’Connell and Jeremiah highlight the “See Britain First” 
campaign launched by Shell in 1925, which featured the motorcar in several 
identifiable and famous British locations like Ullswater or Durham Cathedral.235 The 
American car then was the invader.  
While national identity was a factor for the consumer when buying a car, there is little 
evidence that regional identification had much impact, although a few Manchester 
based manufacturers did look to harness the city’s industrial reputation. For example, 
one of Willys Overland Crossley’s most successful models was its “Manchester” 
commercial vehicle range built from 1928-1932. Ties to the city were emphasised in 
advertising: “You can always rely upon Manchester power to get you anywhere” and 
the appeal of “Money-making Manchester”.236 Crossley also used the title 
“Mancunian” for a bus model in the 1930s, although this might have been because it 
was built to meet the specifications of the Manchester Corporation.237 The 
identification with the local was not unique to Willys Overland Crossley or Crossley 
Motors. Another American firm, Vauxhall, owned by General Motors, produced the 
“Bedford” truck, their production base being in Luton, Bedfordshire. The “Bedford” 
was a name that continued to be used for several decades. It seems however, that the 
local name was used by manufacturers of American reputation as an attempt to 
anglicise their product, rather than necessarily promoting any regional sense of 
identity, in what were models that both firms were trying to sell to a national market. 
Anglicising their product was to be a continued theme for Ford in the period. In the 
1930s for example they produced the Ford Tudor, identifying themselves with 
historical British themes that were popular during the period.238  By using national or 
local names they were setting themselves in the British psyche, not as invaders, but as 
natives.  
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The irrationality and impulsiveness of car buying and ownership is an aspect of 
scholarship that has remained unexamined. Mom highlighted how people bought cars 
when they could not afford them, then could not sell them because of a sense of pride, 
demonstrated by how “depression-proof” car ownership was during the 1930s 
depression.239 While in Manchester, Ford sales representatives emphasised the 
impression that a car could make:  
[The salesman Wayne] Antrobus was able to persuade a good many to buy vans by 
pointing out that people respected success and that the more money you had the 
more friends you had. On the grounds that this made sound business sense even if 
there was only the appurtenance of affluence, he managed to sell a small truck to one 
Salford merchant who at that time was hard pressed to keep his family in food and 
clothes.240 
By exploring the increasing use of motoring and the motorcar in popular culture we 
can to some extent gauge the impact of aspects of social pressure and popular 
references. We have seen the popularity of Ford jokes and the association of Fords as 
cheap and therefore low quality. We have also highlighted the increasing emphasis in 
consumer culture on the origins of products, which certainly included the automobile, 
both in its use and its purchase. This would have had an impact both on Ford, and on 
Willys Overland Crossley, both of whom imported many components from America in 
the early 1920s before changing to native supply or in-house manufacturing, whether 
through consumer pressure or through the McKenna duties, or a combination of both.  
Marketing and advertising 
Examining marketing material during and after the war shows the wide variety in 
marketing strategies from 1914 to the late 1920s, varying by manufacturer and by the 
advertising publications. For this study, we will look at a few different types of 
manufacturers’ material, from Ford at the lower end of the market, and then Belsize 
and Crossley selling models that were more expensive. By doing this we can see if Ford 
or Belsize, marketing their cars to the middle-classes were more utilitarian in their 
marketing during this period or pursued other strategies.  
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One of the most striking aspects of Belsize adverts during the early 1920s was the 
depiction of social aspects of motoring. As well as this, the British countryside featured 
prominently, from beach scenes to country estates and neoclassical architecture 
amidst the trees. Jeremiah argues that the inclusion of the countryside in marketing 
was central to the selling of cars during the interwar period.241 Indeed country touring 
is a well-established theme and aspect of early automobile culture, as we have 
established. A Belsize advert, as seen in Figure 10, from The Tatler in 1919 shows two 
women in bathing costumes by the seaside, stepping out of a Belsize. Underneath the 
image, customers are encouraged to  
Write for Pleasure Car List and a copy of “Home Roads,” a booklet of interest to all 
lovers of the countryside.  
The continuation of rural touring was anticipated during the war, as shown in Belsize’s 
“after-war” car advert from 1917, which featured a quiet country road with a small car 
passing through a hamlet, surrounded by hills and a river with a waterfall.242 In this 
advert the smallness of the car both drew attention to the surroundings and was 
probably a necessity because the firm had not yet finished an after-war prototype. 
Going back further, Belsize advertised in 1913 that a Belsize would secure “a place in 
the sun” for the coming season.243 There were also similarities in Belsize’s depiction of 
the car in the social scene, most notable in society magazines such as The Tatler or The 
Bystander. An example in 1924 shows the car pulling up at a well-attended social 
occasion, driver and passengers in fine dress.244 Similar images were used before the 
war, with passengers climbing into cars outside large estates.245   
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Figure 19 - The Tatler No. 941 9/7/1919 vii 
Ford adverts used a much starker style. Early 1920s Ford adverts showed the car and 
the price; the adverts are notable for the lack of background and the lack of people. 
Despite this there are still several examples of Ford’s attempt to market country 
touring from the middle of the 1920s as they changed their approach. An advert from 
1925 showed a Cathedral and country scene, with a car full of people, with the rather 
elaborate text so unlike earlier adverts:  
The broad highway suddenly became theirs – when and where they liked – wind and 
sunshine – or sure shelter from the silver arrows of rain.246  
Adverts showed a family in the countryside with a young child enjoying the country 
experience feeding chickens; other adverts show children playing with toy boats, while 
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others showed country tearooms in the background or scenes such as the country inn. 
The accompanying text shows how Ford during the latter half of the decade was 
looking to combat prejudice explicitly:  
Yes, it’s a Ford. Not much like your old ideas of the Ford is it? And wouldn’t it be as 
well to get rid of pre-conceived notions about the Ford altogether?247  
As we have seen earlier, Ford marketing tried to promote the Ford as British, and part 
of this was to set it in the British countryside. The Lincoln, Ford’s attempt to reach the 
upper-class market, was marketed with social scenes, such as the car passing through a 
triumphal arch. However, despite this new marketing initiative sales of passenger 
Model Ts continued to decline, with only 3,909 sold in 1926, compared to over 16,000 
in 1920, while the Lincoln never did particularly well.248 It is therefore hard to judge 
the impact of Ford’s change in marketing approach.  
Crossley were selling cars that were bigger and much more expensive than both 
Belsize and Ford, however their marketing approaches differed very little.  An advert 
for the Crossley 14 in 1926 shows the car in motion, speed lines flying from the wheels 
as a car full of passengers ascends a steep hill, with the sea, and a hillside cottage in 
the background.249 Also an advert for the 20.9 horsepower Crossley, like the Belsize 
advert in Figure 19 featured women exploring the countryside, stopping at the 
roadside, to inspect a swan on a pond.250  In a 1917 advert a woman driver is featured, 
although she is accompanied by a member of the armed forces. In the background of 
this advert is a steam locomotive. Again, speed is emphasised in this image, and the 
inclusion of the train shows a separation from communal travel in the rural 
environment.251 Analysis of all the Crossley adverts in The Graphic in the 1920s shows 
the dominance of the countryside scene. Figure 20 shows that more than half featured 
country scenes, while 28 percent featured just the car, contrasting with just 3 percent 
urban and 4 percent society illustrations.  
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Figure 20 - Data taken from adverts issued in The Graphic 1920-1929. See Appendix 2 
for data chart. 
Overall in the marketing material of Belsize, Ford and Crossley we see an emphasis on 
the car both as a social status symbol and a consumer item used for leisure, to explore 
the countryside with both family and friends. This emphasis underscores Mom’s 
conclusion for purchasing motives during this period  
whatever the actual use, purchasing motives were decisively influenced by the 
expectations of pleasure during the evening spin, the weekend trip, and, most of all, 
the holiday tour with the family.252  
This is perhaps why we see a lessening of plain advertising that noted the features and 
technical specifications of the car during this period. The marketing focus also tallies 
with the ownership motivation of the Salford businessman described by Ford sales 
representative Antrobus in the 1920s; the expectation and social gain of the 
consumption of the automobile was perhaps greater than the practical use that the 
vehicle brought and thus perhaps automobile consumption during this period was 
more hedonistic than utilitarian as Mom suggests.253 We see this middle-class family 
ideal represented not just in the marketing above, but also in the home videos that we 
will explore next. 
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Home cine films  
The collection of films kept at the North West Film Archive offers a unique insight into 
the motoring habits of a few of the North-West’s motorists. At the archive there are 
the cine films of four families who recorded holiday films involving motoring. These 
families were very wealthy, evident from the combination of motoring and cine 
recording in the interwar period and the small sample size that survives of families 
who did both. There are for example the videos of the Behren family, prominent textile 
merchants, who lived in an affluent property in West Didsbury, Manchester. There was 
also the Parkinson family, of the successful chemists Parkinson Ltd of Burnley. The 
films show these families’ travels and holidays by motorcar around the North-West, 
the rest of the country, and abroad, with motorcars being shipped to Scandinavia, Italy 
and Belgium. Dominant in these videos are shots of the countryside and scenery, as 
well as shots of family and friends enjoying the rural or seaside environment. Overseas 
motor touring features quite heavily in the films, probably because of the relative 
wealth of the families. O’Connell highlights that the massive deposits deterred many 
motorists from motoring abroad, for example £700 was needed on a car valued at 
£1,000. O’Connell estimated that only 2 percent of motorists were taking cars abroad, 
although there was a significant increase in foreign motor touring in the interwar 
period from 7,026 in 1924 to 17,784 in 1931.254 
Several films also feature family members interacting with their vehicles. With children 
having a go at starting the car, women sitting with the baggage, and the car at the 
beach with several other cars, as well as a picnic out of the back. There is footage of 
the Parkinson family all getting together to try and turn their car around on a country 
track in Norway, and a male member of the Behrens family inspecting under the 
bonnet, then shaking his fist good naturedly at the camera.255 That these tinkering 
occasions have been captured on film alongside shots of the family show that the 
experience of tinkering, as well as touring, was an important part of the automobile 
adventure for the middle-classes during the interwar period.    
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Remarkable among most of these cine films is the recording of the actual journey, with 
the camera mounted on the car, capturing the drive itself, as well as the points where 
the motorists have disembarked, an activity like the use of the action camera by those 
today aiming to capture the experience of speed and the scenery they are passing 
through. While many families tried this at some point the biggest proponents were the 
Rigby family of Preston.  They record their motoring holiday to the Lake District in the 
1930s largely by filming from inside the moving car as they go past lakes, through 
villages and over bridges. The film is notable for the speed with which the clips change 
from one place to another, emphasising the quickness with which the motorcar can go 
from one site of interest to the next in a well edited sequence. This is emphasised by 
the number of sideways shots, with the film flickering and jerking and the trees blurrily 
passed by the motion of the vehicle.256 While most of the films show a single family, 
isolated from other holiday makers in their locations of stopping, a few episodes show 
others. For example, the Hart family’s collection of film from 1930-1933 show the 
family on the beach, the car parked on the sands, with at least 10 other cars dotted on 
the sands, with other families. Unfortunately, the beach is not easy to identify, 
although it is possible that this part of beach was only easily accessible for car users, 
thus distancing themselves from the “collective gaze” of non-motoring holiday makers.  
The seasonality of touring is in evidence in the videos, although there are a few that 
include motoring in the winter months, for example skating on a frozen lake. The cine 
films show the families living and capturing the ideal that is depicted in the marketing 
that we explored earlier in this section, and evidence of the importance of the car in 
family tourism and mobility. In these cine films the motorcar is never pictured in the 
urban environment, but always in the countryside or outside the home. In some of the 
cine films, the motorcar had become a part of middle-class or upper-class sporting 
experiences. For example, the Parkinson family are filmed on an otter hunt, drinking 
and smoking at the side of motor vehicles while a dead otter is held up to the camera; 
the same family are also filmed driving to do some ice-skating and curling.257 The car 
had also formed a role in the different eras of family life. For example, one the Hart 
family’s cine films is entitled “Hart Family before Baby Bill”, in which the motorcar 
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features not just in holidays, but also as part of a family wedding.258  The car had 
become an ordinary part of middle-class life, a trend we identified as beginning in the 
Edwardian period among suburban modest motorists.  
Conclusion 
The First World War exposed many more people to motoring, and the interwar period 
saw motor vehicle diffusion increase substantially. Thus, the motorcar became a 
ubiquitous consumer product. With this larger awareness came the rise of the use of 
motoring and marques in popular culture, as demonstrated in our analysis of the 
Model T during the 1920s. Associated with these negative cultural references of Ford 
as “cheap” and therefore undesirable was a trend for patriotic consumerism. This was 
seized by rival native manufacturers, such as Morris, who looked to encourage these 
popular associations through their marketing campaigns. While price competition, 
both over the selling price and the maintenance cost, was important, reputation 
adversely affected the sales of the Model T as a private vehicle. Firms like Austin 
garnered wide appeal with the launch of the Seven, “a car for the man, who, at 
present, can only afford a motorcycle and sidecar and yet has the ambition to become 
a motorist”. In comparison the Model T seemed to have appealed increasingly to the 
commercial market especially since the American motor qualities mattered much less 
to the “motorcycle and sidecar” owner, who could afford either an Austin Seven or a 
Model T. This American vs. British paradigm also affected the fortunes of Crossley 
Motors, who were unsuccessful with their attempt to introduce American methods 
and manufacturer with their Anglo-American partnership project Willys Overland 
Crossley. Perhaps the Anglo-American nature of the project led to an identity crisis, 
with Crossley Motors’ reputation for class and quality muddied by the American cheap 
mass production values. Another important aspect of interwar culture was the ability 
for manufacturers to engage with the growing popularity of touring and motoring 
tourism. We see in the films at the North West Film Archive that this played an 
important role in family activities during this period, as incomes and leisure time 
increased. This is reflected in the marketing material we have examined from the 
1920s. 
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This short analysis has demonstrated some of the complexities of interwar motoring. 
Thus, to understand why manufacturers were successful or not we need to look 
beyond price, technology and production techniques. This section has used just a few 
North-Western examples of the reputation of motoring firms, uses and users. Further 
studies of interwar motoring would allow us to build upon our understanding of 
interwar culture, and how, in turn, motor manufacturers were influenced by this 
culture in their decision-making process, either through the creation of new models, or 
the adaptation of existing ones. 
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1.5 - Chapter 1 conclusion 
This chapter has explored the diffusion of the private automobile over different 
periods. Its aim has been to challenge some of the popular assumptions made about 
the diffusion of motoring. The first section showed how the relationship between 
cyclists and the automobile was more complicated than previous research suggests. In 
the second section we explored automobile clubs and the growth of the “modest 
motorist” and the use of the motorcycle, demonstrating that a pyramid model of 
diffusion based on price and income does not necessarily apply. We also saw in this 
section how the automobile quickly became a normal aspect of the leisure time of the 
suburban middle-class. In the final section we demonstrated how the Ford Model T’s 
comparatively poor performance during the interwar period was due, not only to price 
competition, but to popular perceptions of the company. We also explored how the 
car was used, challenging the view that there was a fundamental shift in the 
automobile’s purpose from pleasure to utility during the interwar period.   
Engaging in the diffusion debate has also demonstrated the social construction of the 
automobile. Important to the debate surrounding the early automobile was the 
conflict between urban users, and rural non-users particularly over the disruption of 
dust and the violence of speed. These conflicts influenced early legislation, behaviour 
and design. However, private motoring is just one aspect of early automobilism. The 
exploration of the automobile’s social shaping, and the way in which the automobile 
shaped society, will be the central aspect of Chapter 2 which will look at how 
sociotechnical imaginaries surrounding the commercial use of the automobile is 
integral to our understanding of the development of automobilism. In this chapter we 
have explored the importance of the user and non-user in the process of technological 
co-construction and the development of automobile culture. This exploration will be 
enhanced further by analysis in Chapter 3 which will focus on the user’s interaction 
with manufacturers and automobile agents.  
This chapter has only explored some aspects of the automobile’s diffusion, based on 
important historiographical debates, and the availability and familiarity of sources to 
the author. There is much scope for extending analysis using wider and more varied 
source material. For example, our analysis of cycling attitudes used two cycling 
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journalists based in Manchester along with a mixture of some national sources that 
interact with the points made: such as Punch cartoons, Wind in the Willows and 
national cycling journals. This is like our regionally focused look at suburban 
automobile clubs, which looked at the reporting of clubs based largely around 
Manchester. Establishing the complex attitudes of cyclists could certainly be enhanced 
by other regional sources, both in the UK and abroad. Similarly, wider analysis could 
highlight more clearly the development of “modest motoring”. 
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Chapter 2 - Commercial motoring  
2.1 - Introduction 
Here in Lancashire, where, as a cotton spinner told us, ‘the cost of carriage often 
meant profit or no profit,’ there would be the ground for a great industry.1  
This chapter explores the development of commercial motor manufacturing and use in 
the North-West.  Compared to private automobiles, the manufacture and use of 
commercial vehicles has seen very little academic research. In examining the 
commercial aspects of the automobile this chapter provides significant new evidence 
that shows how commercial motoring had a big impact both on the way automobilism 
was imagined and developed and the way commercial motoring interacted with 
society.  
 
Over a decade ago Mom described the state of research into the use and production of 
trucks, or commercial motors, as a “black hole in our knowledge”.2 Since then there 
has still been relatively little new research in the field. Recent research tends to focus 
on the interwar period and the rural environment. For example, O’Connell contributes 
towards our understanding of the relationship between farmers, their vehicles and the 
countryside.3 Law has explored motor coaches and charabancs and their contribution 
to social convergence in the interwar period, allowing the working-classes great access 
to the countryside.4 Jeremiah also explores the increase in rural traffic, highlighting the 
way in which the bus was becoming central to rural travel and noting the increasing 
mobility of small businesses.5  
 
Apart from Mom’s research on electric vehicles and their commercial use, there is very 
little focus on commercial motoring in the urban environment or on the origins of 
commercial motoring in the pre-1914 period. This is possibly due to certain themes 
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identified by scholarship. Research has shown how the First World War exposed large 
numbers to motoring and prompted the mass production of vehicles for war use, 
which were sold for commercial purposes after the war.6 However, the focus on the 
war as the turning point for commercial motoring largely ignores the very long and 
slow period of experimentation and development from 1896 to 1914. The numbers of 
failures both in manufacturing and in use were large, but there were also several 
successful uses for the commercial vehicle.  Studying the inception of commercial 
motoring is important, not only to fill the “black hole” in automobile studies but to 
understand more about technological and social change during the period. This change 
eventually led to the commercial motoring boom of the 1920s, the gradual demise of 
the horse-drawn vehicle and the social acceptance of the motor vehicle on city streets.   
 
In examining the commercial vehicle, its promotion, construction and its use we see 
the complex interaction with the embryonic period of automobilism in general. That 
the commercial vehicle grew despite its technological deficiencies, (such as coping with 
large loads, poor reliability and its difficulty to control) mirrors the general rise of 
motoring. However, Mom’s diffusion theory of adventure based around “racing, 
touring and tinkering” cannot explain the use and development of commercial 
motoring. While a breakdown might have been part of the automobile adventure, for 
commercial motorists the need for “tinkering” could mean the loss of payment and 
contracts, although it must be remembered that horse-drawn haulage was not 
immune to issues caused by overloading, poor driving and bad roads. Similarly touring 
and racing were not part of the appeal of commercial motoring. This section therefore 
is concerned with reconciling the promotion and enthusiasm for commercial motoring 
with the inadequacies of technologies, the dangers of use, and the resistance to this 
new technology. Put simply, why did commercial motoring, unreliable and often 
uneconomical, begin to grow? What the evidence suggests is that commercial 
motoring captured the imagination from many areas of business and that the image of 
innovation, or progress, was as important as the development of technology and 
economy of use. Businessmen and hauliers perceived an opportunity to undercut 
competitors, while engineers and perhaps more importantly automobile enthusiasts 
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promoted the commercial vehicle as a way of legitimising the automobile: if it could be 
proved to have economy, it could overcome opposition and resistance to its general 
use.  
 
Simpson and Bodman’s letter highlights the great optimism and vision for the 
commercial motor around the turn of the twentieth century. Yet commercial motoring 
took a further 25 years before it began to surpass horse-drawn transport as the 
primary form of road haulage.7 For many the decline of the horse and the arrival of the 
motor lorry and van is a simple case of technological determinism, as the former 
became less economical than the later.8 It forms a part of the “toy-to-tool” paradigm 
defined by Mom: the general acceptance in automobile historiography that the 
diffusion of the technology was determined by improving technology and falling costs 
that presupposes it. This is perhaps one of the reasons why this subject has not been 
explored in much detail in automobile scholarship.  
The first section looks at how commercial motoring began, by exploring the powerful 
expectations for commercial motoring and its manifestation and promotion through 
the Liverpool Self-Propelled Traffic Association. It is concerned with reconciling the 
promotion and enthusiasm for commercial motoring on the one hand, with the 
inadequacies of technologies, the dangers of use, and the resistance against this new 
technology on the other.  To explain this, we must look elsewhere for a theoretical 
framework. In the first chapter we explored the origins of motoring culture through 
theories that highlight how the user and non-user interact with each other and with 
designers to co-construct technologies. We will also be using the commercial vehicle in 
this chapter as a case study for the co-construction of technology. However, because 
automobile scholarship is under-theorised on the emergence of commercial motoring, 
we must delve further into science and technology studies to help us understand how 
commercial motoring emerged before serious use and design began. Jasanoff and Kim 
introduced the concept of “sociotechnical imaginaries” as “collectively imagined forms 
of social life and social order reflected in the design and fulfilment of nation-specific 
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scientific and/or technological projects”.9  This definition has since been refined and 
extended to include not just national states but “organized groups, such as 
corporations, social movements, and professional societies”;10 in our case, we are 
looking for evidence of sociotechnical imaginaries at the advent of automobilism that 
explain the fixation on, and development of, the commercial vehicle.  In the North-
West we will argue that the advent of commercial motoring provides an historical 
example of the power of “sociotechnical imaginaries” whereby the design and use of a 
technology is fuelled by imaginings of the future beneficial impact of science and 
technology on society. 
The impact of expectations of the automobile in general has been highlighted by Mom 
who argued that:  
the car enjoyed greater importance in societal discourse than its quantitative or 
economic presence would suggest… Expectations played a crucial role in the history of 
individual motorized mobility. They help explain why elite car cultures in European 
countries had so much in common. The extensive reports on foreign developments in 
the national public sphere functioned as a sketch of future domestic developments.11  
He uses the Dutch example: 
in 1899, when not more than a hundred cars operated in the country, the Minister of 
Waterstaat (Water Management) Cornelis Lely described to a sceptical parliament a 
future in which automobiles would run over well-paved roads at high speeds, uniting 
national spaces in an unprecedented way.12 
One of the important aspects of the general promotion of motoring, politically and 
socially, throughout its history is the promotion of the potential, or real, technological 
usefulness and utility. Mom argues that utility was emphasised as part of the culture of 
motoring, used as an alibi for pleasure motoring and used as a marketing tool by car 
supporters.13 The argument for utility is also a common theme in Plowden’s analysis of 
politics and motoring in the UK, for example arguments of utility were used in the 
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campaign to reduce or change the horse-power tax.14 These arguments are also clear 
at the advent of motoring. During the campaigning for the 1896 Locomotive and 
Highways Act, there was no clear separation of pleasure and commercial vehicle 
interests, just the potential for the establishment of industries and users in both areas. 
For example, the Local Government Board, on introducing the Bill, compared the 
motor vehicle to cycling, a popular pleasure activity going through a boom period, as 
well as speculating on the ability of farmers to transport their produce.15 This 
argument for benefiting farmers was also put forward by Sir David Salomons (1851-
1925), the founder of the Self-Propelled Traffic Association (SPTA), the UK’s first 
motoring organisation and an influential lobbyist.16 In America early automobile 
advocates were also imagining economic and therefore social benefits as they 
envisaged the motor vehicle speeding up the transit of goods, and therefore making 
them cheaper.17  
While these utilitarian imaginaries were important in the development of more 
favourable legislation they also captured the imagination of some businessmen. The 
first section looks at how sociotechnical imaginaries influenced the formation of the 
LSPTA which became a regional group that looked to shape and foster the early use 
and manufacture of commercial vehicles.  
The second section of this chapter continues exploring commercial expectations and 
sociotechnical imaginaries but sets them against the realities of use; and it also 
explores resistance to the commercial motor during the Edwardian period, a time of 
experimentation. It has been found that automobile advocates were still highlighting 
the soon-to-be-realised potential of commercial motor technology for bettering 
society despite economic benefits being at best ambiguous; despite this, advocates 
were still able to secure political support. As in Chapter 1 this section will explore the 
co-construction of users and technology to see how society and technology shaped 
each other during this period. 
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The third section explores the interwar period, focusing on the growth of the 
commercial motor and the “replacement” of the horse in the urban environment. It 
considers other factors in this technological substitution besides technological 
economy, including how the ideals of “modernity” and “progress” provided a pull 
towards the motor vehicle while images of backwardness and old technology pushed 
businesses away from the horse. 
 The final section looks at Manchester and changing traffic in the city centre. This 
section will continue to explore the commercial vehicle in the urban environment. It 
will explain the differing attitudes and solutions to rising congestion; and explore the 
increased technological specialism and variety of commercial motor vehicle uses, by 
looking at how councils, planners and manufacturers responded, and help create 
sociotechnical imaginaries.  
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2.2 - The Liverpool Self-Propelled Traffic Association and the inception of commercial 
motoring: the power of potential and sociotechnical change 
The formation and work of the LSPTA is a particularly good example of the impact of 
“sociotechnical imaginaries” on the development and use of a technology. One of the 
striking aspects of the LSPTA’s formation as a motoring organisation was that very few, 
if any, of the members were automobile owners at the time of its formation; although 
this is similar to other early automobile clubs, this is significant as it highlights the 
importance of the imagined, which predates the use and, in many cases, the design of 
automotive technology.18 At the inaugural dinner of the LSPTA in November 1896 the 
speaker Sir David Salomons, founder of the Self-Propelled Traffic Association, 
articulated the “sociotechnical imaginaries” for commercial motoring: 
I can picture to myself that in the next ten or perhaps five years, the whole of the 
heavy traffic, as well as the public conveyances of this country will be propelled by 
motors, probably steam, instead of by living horse power… motor traffic is the right 
thing in the interest of the community, adding not only to the prosperity of the 
manufacturing classes, but extending also a helping hand to the working population.19 
This raises the question: why was Liverpool, and not another area of the country, 
susceptible to the potential of the automobile for trade so that they formed an 
organisation devoted to the promotion of commercial motoring?  
  
The North-West of England was the centre of the world’s textile trade.20 The factories 
and warehouses of Manchester and surrounding towns, known as “Cottonopolis”, and 
the port city of Liverpool saw the bulk of the UK’s annual transportation of 1,664 
million pounds of raw cotton and the export of 5,125 million linear yards of cloth in 
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1890.21  The haulage economy of the region therefore was large and the LSPTA was 
formed partly because of the economic rivalry created by the opening of the 
Manchester Ship Canal in 1894, which was to spark the Liverpool business community 
and Chamber of Commerce into action from which the LSPTA originated. Liverpool and 
its businessmen looked at many ways of competing, including merchants opening 
branches in Manchester to retain control over timber, grain and cotton; as well as 
dredging the Mersey bar to extend accommodation for trading at Liverpool.22 
Liverpool also looked to technology as an imagined remedy to its new found economic 
problems. Before the LSPTA was formed the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce created 
a “Light Railways Sub-Committee” in March 1896, set up to tackle the high cost of 
haulage imposed by the existing railways and the Manchester Ship Canal by looking at 
alternatives.23  Some of the proposed alternatives included motorised road transport 
and various hybrid railway systems. For example, Alfred Holt’s (later a member of the 
LSPTA)  “Plateway scheme”, which was a hybrid railway-motor vehicle system; a 
system designed by M.E.R Calthrop (also a member of the LSPTA) that was designed to 
hold loaded “lurries”; a scheme proposed by a Mr Kennedy for utilising “road 
locomotives”; and a scheme for intercity electric tram haulage.24 This problem 
occupied the committee for several years and the LSPTA was consulted on the merits 
of different schemes.25 The Liverpool business community therefore was engaged in 
making haulage cheaper when the 1896 Locomotives and Highways Act was passed 
and motorised haulage was embraced as offering great potential. The LSPTA was 
formed after a lecture at the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce arranged by Edward 
Shrapnell-Smith (later Managing Director of a large haulage firm and the first editor of 
the Commercial Motor) and Worby Beaumont entitled “Motor Vehicles for Heavy 
Traffic” read in September 1896 which prompted interest and the formation of a 
regional council of the SPTA.26 Membership was a mixture of commercial shipping 
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interests, railway interests, local engineers and gentlemen. The first speech at the 
inaugural dinner was by the vice-president Alfred L. Jones, managing director of Elder, 
Dempster and Co., merchant shippers, who is reported to say: 
He (the speaker) had attached himself to the society for the sole purpose of obtaining 
improved means of getting cargo to and from Liverpool and adjacent places.27  
Alfred Jones was not alone. There were members of the Liverpool Chamber of 
Commerce, including the President F. C. Danson and Secretary T. H. Barker. Other 
shipping interests included Alfred Holt, founder of a large shipping firm the Ocean 
Group, whilst railway attendees included the Midland Railway, the Lancashire 
Yorkshire Railway, the London North West Railway, the Mersey Tunnel Railway and the 
Liverpool Overhead Railway. The Manchester Ship Canal was also affecting railway 
profits.  Prominent local engineers included City Engineer Henry Percy Boulnois; the 
Musker Brothers, hydraulic engineers who would soon manufacture commercial 
vehicles; Professor Hele-Shaw, who was to have a distinguished career as a leading 
automobile engineering expert; and the Secretary Edward Shrapnell-Smith.  
 
It could be argued that this group was swept away by the enthusiasm that surrounded 
the 1896 Act, and Salomons’ predictions. However, the association’s persistence 
suggests a sustained enthusiasm, in the face of disappointment at a lack of practical 
success, and scorn of other engineering communities. The “Light Railways Sub-
Committee” schemes petered out and came to nothing as their suggestions were 
criticised for being too theoretical and not well enough developed, and the committee 
looked instead at a traditional option of a new railway line. Elder, Dempster and Co. 
offered a tender for road vehicles that could haul at least 1,000 tons a week from 
Liverpool to Manchester in 1897, supported by the LSPTA and reported in national 
motoring journals the AHVJ and The Autocar. However, response was poor and the 
tender was not given. The Manchester Guardian reported on the tender:  
Those prominently connected with the so called self-propelled traffic movement in 
Liverpool have made no attempt to conceal their real object, viz. prevent the diversion 
of shipping to the Manchester Port.28  
                                                          
27
 AHVJ Nov 1896 p.43 
 
117 
 
The day after the Manchester Guardian report, at a dinner of the Manchester 
Association of Engineers, there was laughter heard when the proposal was 
mentioned.29  
 
In 1898 the LSPTA organised the first of their three heavy traffic trials which had two 
stated aims: 
to arrive at a type of Heavy Motor Wagon suitable for trade requirements in Liverpool 
and neighbourhood, which shall be capable of economically taking the place of horse 
haulage and of competing with the existing railway rates, in the transport of heavy 
loads of goods over considerable distances. 
And further: 
Encourage builders to experiment in the construction of vehicles upon the lines 
indicated, and to provide an opportunity for the public to see something of the 
progress being made in this country.30 
The first trial was underwhelming. There were four entries, although the entries 
reflected national interest in the problem of commercial traffic. They include Coulthard 
and the Lancashire Steam Motor Company (LSMC) based in the North-West; 
Thornycroft, based in the South-East; and the Liquid Fuel Engineering Company, based 
on the Isle of Wight. There was also a wide range of attendees including government 
departments, automobile clubs (the Automobile Club of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland [ACGB&I] and the Self-Propelled Traffic Association), corporations and 
businessmen. The motoring press such as The Autocar predictably hailed the trial an 
important technological learning experience and a success despite the few entries; 
however other reports were less enthusiastic.31 The Times declared the trials 
interesting, although this was due to the “entire novelty” of the event,32 while the 
Manchester Guardian took a more negative view reporting that: 
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we are afraid that those who look to cheapen the cost of carriage between Lancashire 
towns and the docks with be little encouraged by the result of the experiments at 
Liverpool  
 
going on further to imply that the expense and effort was a waste.33  
 
However, the LSPTA continued with increasingly successful trials in 1899 and 1901 
(there was no trial in 1900 because of a clash with the Thousand Mile Trial, organised 
by the ACGB&I).  By 1901, the number of competing firms had swelled to 10. The five-
day trial received press that moved beyond the factor of novelty that the first trial had 
provided. Indeed, regional papers like the Wellington Journal remarked: 
 
Whatever misgivings were occasioned by the trials of previous years must have been 
dispelled by the tests which have been concluded, as these have undoubtedly 
demonstrated that the motor-waggon is a practical and commercial success.34  
 
The trials were of a similar nature to the first, the last trial conducted over 5 days, 
including roughly 35-mile trips, laden with goods from Liverpool to Manchester and 
Liverpool to Blackburn.35 Rules and classes of entry varied only slightly. 
 
These trials were moulded by the challenges of the area which in turn influenced the 
development of fledging heavy vehicle design. Most of the judges were members of 
the LSPTA. The aims of the trials as stated above included influencing vehicle builders, 
with the emphasis on heavy tonnage and thus competition with railway haulage: 
vehicles had to have a specified flat area for loading and loads were a minimum of 2 
and 5 tons for two classes of entry. The route was set at 30 to 40 miles, a similar 
distance to that between Liverpool and Manchester, and incorporated the steep 
gradients of Liverpool and the poor roads between Liverpool and Manchester. 
Manoeuvrability tests involved negotiating the dockyards.36  Thus the manufacturers 
designing vehicles for this trial bought into the expectations of the LSPTA: that heavy 
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goods haulage had a rosy future (reiterating Simpson and Bodman). Reinforcing the 
functions of the trial was the enthusiasm of local businessmen for starting motor 
vehicle haulage. During the first trial it was made known to prospective competitors 
that: 
 
A prominent member of the Association… was willing to receive, on the 
recommendation of the Judges, one or more vehicles to work in the heavy goods 
traffic of Liverpool and neighbourhood, on trial, during a period of one month, and 
further, that he is prepared to purchase fifty vehicles in all.37 
 
Using Mom’s model in Figure 1 for the construction and innovation of technology as 
described in the literature review, the LSPTA acted, especially in hosting their trials as 
an influential “Intermediary actor”, as well as identifying an important body of 
“potential users” and functions. This was to influence the innovative direction of the 
various manufacturing companies who competed in the three traffic trials hosted by 
the LSPTA.  
 
The rules and specifications of the heavy traffic trials, designed for haulage work, can 
be contrasted to the French Les Poids Lourds or “heavy-weight motor-car competition” 
of 1897 where the LSPTA only observed one vehicle that might be capable of meeting 
the needs identified in Liverpool. The French trial was notable for its variety including 
passenger vehicles, parcel vans, a charabanc, a tractor and an omnibus.38 With specific 
functions in mind the LSPTA lobbied for legislation change, specifically the removal of 
the 3 ton tare limit, which after each trial was highlighted as an issue holding back the 
development and commercial adoption of motorised haulage.39 During the 1901 trial, 
there was only one vehicle that was actually built within this limit, demonstrating the 
inadequacy of the weight restriction.40 This influenced the change of legislation in the 
“Heavy Motor Car Order” of 1904 in which the Local Government Board increased the 
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weight restriction to 5 tons.41  This course was advocated in parliament by Walter 
Long, president of the Local Government board and LSPTA supporter, and local MP 
Arthur Stanley, son of Lord Derby who was president of the LSPTA.42  
The LSPTA also encouraged innovation through its varied lecture series. These included 
a wide variety of automobile related topics. A scientific examination of wheels was 
made by Prof. Hele-Shaw.43 “Mechanical Haulage on Common Roads” by Worby 
Beaumont explored the technological requirements for economical haulage and 
compared horse-drawn and motor vehicle economies.44 There was also a detailed 
scientific paper entitled “Compressed Air as a Motive power for road carriage” by Rhys 
Jenkins. Practical experimentation was covered in a lecture by Dan Simpson in 1898, 
manufacturer of experimental commercial vehicles based in Manchester. The LSPTA 
took their discussions beyond Liverpool: Shrapnell-Smith toured the country 
conducting a heavy vehicle lecture series for Corporations, motoring clubs and 
universities.45 
 
By 1902 the LSPTA decided their 1901 trial was their last: 
 With six years’ “history” behind them the members of the LSTPA have now reached 
the end of a stage in the career of that body, namely the position of having to 
pronounce a benediction upon Heavy Motor Traffic. From this time forward, it is 
expected that the Association will be conducted more upon Club lines, although its 
watchfulness over the interests of heavy automobilism will in no ways be relaxed.46 
Although there are no definitive national figures, the LSPTA estimated that the number 
of heavy motor vehicles in the UK in 1901 was around 100.47 This was a long way from 
the imaginings of David Salomons five years previously.  Despite this the sociotechnical 
imaginaries of widespread motor haulage remained undimmed and again the idea that 
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commercial motoring could improve society was used in campaigning for legislative 
change leading up to the 1903 Motor Car Act. The ACGB&I used the following 
arguments in their manifesto addressed to MPs and local councils: 
 
They [the ACGB&I] look upon it [commercial haulage] as likely to become a most 
valuable national asset, a beneficial factor in the general life of the community. They 
believe that it will afford speedy and cheap transport of agricultural produce and 
consumption; that it will provide cheap and speedy communication between outlying 
districts… and that it is likely in the same way to prove an important factor towards the 
solution of the problem of the housing of the poor.48 
 
The LSPTA has been described by the British automobility historian Nicholson as having 
“little relevance to the mainstream motoring scene” and one of the final legacies of 
Salomon’s move to promote motoring from 1895 to 1897.49 The idea of a 
“mainstream” supposes that commercial motoring followed private motoring and that, 
as the technology of private motoring grew more reliable, so its application for 
economy created commercial opportunities. This view might be supported by the 
relatively slow growth of commercial motoring. There were supposedly only 100 heavy 
motor vehicles in 1901, while Plowden estimates that in 1907 commercial vehicles 
made up only a quarter of the number of private vehicles: 8,000 out of a total of 
32,500 registered vehicles. In 1905 the Commercial Motor estimated 3,000 commercial 
motors, compared to 16,000 registered private vehicles, a similar proportion.50 
However, the explanation, that commercial motoring followed the mainstream has 
been shown to be inadequate at explaining the very early enthusiasm for the 
commercial vehicle in the UK.  
 
Conclusion 
In this analysis the LSPTA has been shown to be a symptom of the expectations and 
sociotechnical imaginaries that formed around the automobile at the end of the 
nineteenth century, which they then promoted. Commercial motoring was not a “sub-
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category” of the automobile, but was integral, along with the pervasion of the bicycle, 
to explaining why the automobile was favourability legislated for. The automobile’s 
future function in society, as a cheap and fast carrier of goods, to the benefit of society 
as a whole might have been an alibi for some campaigning private motorists, or used 
as an argument to combat those who resisted the automobile as a rich man’s 
plaything.  However, for the LSPTA the imaginaries of technological progress 
represented high expectations, not necessarily for the greater good, but for business. 
An automobile commentator wrote of the LSPTA: 
 
In Liverpool the question of automobilism has been taken up with commendable zeal 
and enterprise – not, we think, from an academic or philanthropic desire to cheapen 
the cost of transit of the poor man’s coals, or his beer, or anything else which is his, 
but in a practical spirit of enlightened selfishness, which, after all, is perhaps the best 
way of regarding any question of public convenience.51 
The LSPTA did not necessarily directly influence engineers and manufacturing firms to 
begin experimenting and producing commercial vehicles (apart from the Musker 
Brothers, hydraulic engineers from Liverpool, who were members of the LSPTA and 
subsequent commercial vehicle manufacturers). Yet their heavy traffic trial provided 
an important proving ground for the experiments of early firms such as Thornycroft 
and the Lancashire Steam Motor Company (LSMC), whose designs reflected the 
expectations of the LSPTA for intercity heavy goods transit, inner city manoeuvrability 
and economy of use. In this we see how expectations highlighting potential users and 
functions could drive innovation in a particular direction. From a regional perspective 
the LSPTA was a manifestation of the tensions created by the large regional textile and 
manufacturing economy. Transport was a large factor in this economy. The railway 
companies and the newly built Ship Canal threatened the profits of Liverpool’s 
merchant shippers and the sociotechnical imaginaries surrounding the automobile 
provided an opportunity for renewed profits. Nationally, and for automobilism, the 
LSPTA was an important link between these imaginaries and the creation of economic 
realities which were slow in being realised.  
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2.3 - Imaginaries versus realities: experience, resistance and commercial 
manufacturing in the Edwardian period 
Technological innovation often follows on the heels of science fiction, lagging authorial 
imagination by decades or longer.52 
The efforts to exploit the potential of commercial motoring were seen in the formation 
and actions of the Liverpool Self-Propelled Traffic Association (LSPTA). However, by 
1902 the LSPTA had relaxed in its role as chief promotors of the commercial vehicle; 
and business enterprises had begun to take more readily to the motorised commercial 
vehicle.53 Despite the increase in the number of firms manufacturing and using 
motorised haulage vehicles from 1900 to 1914, use was generally limited to larger 
companies, corporations or specialised haulage firms which could afford both the 
initial capital cost and the constant maintenance of early commercial vehicles. It was 
noted, even by enthusiastic motoring proponents, that horse-drawn transport was 
more economical over short distances.54 There was a rising disparity in diffusion 
between different forms of transport. For example, motorised taxis virtually replaced 
horse drawn cabs in British cities between 1907 and 1914.55 Yet commercial vehicles 
were markedly slower to diffuse, let alone replace the horse-drawn wagon and cart. It 
was not until the interwar period that commercial motoring started to grow rapidly. 
This was partly due to the long period of experimentation and use pre-1914 and partly 
because the First World War exposed large numbers to motoring and prompted the 
mass production of vehicles for war use, which were sold for commercial purposes 
after the war.56 The period of experimentation was long and slow, and the number of 
failures in manufacturing and in use was large. This is typified by the results of the 
1911 census which records 43,094 chauffeurs, commercial drivers and motorised cab 
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drivers,57 while the number of people in horse-drawn transport employment, rose 
from 347,655 in 1901 to 374,587 by 1911.58  
This section will continue with the important question: why did commercial motoring, 
unreliable and often uneconomical, begin to grow? We have begun to answer this by 
exploring the power of sociotechnical imaginaries and related economic expectations. 
In this section we will explore how these expectations and imaginaries translated into 
reality by exploring the users, manufacturers, resisters and uses of the commercial 
motor vehicle. In doing so we shall see how society and technological innovation 
interact to develop technologies such as the commercial vehicle. 
Users and uses 
The first commercial vehicle in Manchester was bought by haulage firm Sutton & Co. in 
June 1897; it was reported to “set the population agog”.59 While this was an Autocar 
exaggeration, it highlights an important early aspect of automobilism: the power of 
novelty. Some businessmen looked to exploit the spectacle and novelty of early motor 
vehicles for advertising and tourist entertainment. Figure 21 shows the first known 
automobile in Manchester bought by Mr Goodwin to promote his soap business.60 This 
was not necessarily a radical new development as consumer goods, like soap and 
tobacco, were advertised on trams and horse-drawn transport offering the advertiser 
the freedom to move their adverts. However, as Richards argues, the use of novelty 
and spectacle was an important aspect of advertising that was already well established 
by the late Victorian era and can explain the early use and purchase of many 
automobiles in Manchester.61 Several other central businesses followed suit, and it 
was reported in 1898 that: 
The motor-car is making headway. There have been several in the Manchester streets 
lately, chiefly for advertising purposes.62  
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 It is no surprise therefore that the first recorded motoring offence in Manchester was 
committed by a driver of a vehicle advertising a pantomime to passers-by in the city 
centre.63 Similarly one of the first motoring prosecutions in Liverpool was an 
advertising vehicle on Lime Street.64 
 
 
Figure 21 - Goodwin’s Lutzmann Benz, 1896; Science and Industry Museum Archive, 
YMS 0197.2 
As well as advertising in the city centre, the novelty and spectacle of the motor car was 
used to good effect at the North-West’s most popular holiday resorts. The Blackpool 
Motor Car Company was formed in July 1897 with the aim of “running a service of 
autocars for pleasure trips in Blackpool and district.”65 This was quickly followed by the 
Llandudno Motor Car Company, the Motor Touring Company of Southport and Deacon 
and Son of Llandudno.  The Blackpool Motor Car Company provided vehicles for both 
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the 1898 and 1899 Liverpool Heavy Traffic Trials to be put at the disposal of the 
organisers, an interesting move, especially considering the season of the trial. This 
demonstrates how different early automobile interest groups were integrated in the 
early years of motoring.  
 
The use of the automobile for advertising is a very early example of a technology being 
used for purposes it was not designed for, where some of its perceived negative 
aspects were positives: excessive noise, steam or smoke would draw attention, and 
breakdowns and unreliability were not necessarily going to cause a loss of exposure. 
User experimentation has been shown to be an important part of the development of 
technologies, which has been highlighted by Kline and Pinch in their study of resistance 
in rural America where farmers used automobiles as stationary power sources, which 
was part of Ford’s development of the Model T advertised as “The Universal Car”.66  
 
We also see to automobile being used unusually in the democratic process; used 
around the country to transport voters to the polls during elections. Not only did this 
help increase turn out but helped introduce people to the experience of motoring, and 
thus help change opinions, a view held by J. T. Ward: 
The general election of 1906 did more to allay popular prejudice against the motor car 
in one month than had been done in years by motoring organisations and the 
motoring press, but the general election of 1910... will do far more.67 
Tariff reform was one of the key issues during the period, and Ward argued that the 
private motorist might be interested in using their cars to transport voters in its 
interest.68 The election was also significant for Manchester’s motor businesses who 
were “besieged for cars” in 1910, offering them a chance for what was a mass test 
drive of their vehicles, both new and second hand, as well as claiming exorbitant hire 
fees from political parties, of up to six guineas.69 The issue of the unregulated use of 
the car on Election Day was to be a political issues in the coming decades, with the 
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Labour Party arguing in the interwar period that the Conservatives gained an unfair 
advantage, as their supporters were much more likely to be automobile owners.70  
Haulage 
In no other centre of population does motor haulage enjoy greater opportunities of 
usefulness than in Manchester and Lancashire generally.... Carriers are using motor-
lurries in transferring cotton from the Ship Canal docks directly to the mills in which it 
is spun in various surrounding towns. Manufactured goods are taken by motor-lurry 
directly from the mills again, to the Manchester warehouses and docks to be shipped 
abroad.71   
The Manchester Guardian reiterated the potential and the expectations for haulage in 
the North-West, ten years after the passing of the 1896 Act. But what were the 
practical experiences of haulage in the North-West and how was it developing? We 
have already shown how modest the numbers of haulage vehicles were during this 
period. Although Sutton and Co. bought a commercial motor vehicle in 1897 they 
continued using horse-drawn vehicles, as evidenced by a horse related prosecution in 
1905.72  This was common practice well into the interwar period as the horse was 
generally more economical for short range haulage work. One of the best sources for 
early road haulage is the Road Carrying Company (RCC), formed in 1902 with a capital 
of £20,000.73 This is largely because it was managed by Edward Shrapnell-Smith, 
former Secretary of the LSPTA and later editor of the Commercial Motor, and thus 
keen promotor of the commercial vehicle. The RCC had 14 lorries which were used for 
various contracts in Lancashire, mainly raw cotton haulage from the docks to the 
Lancashire mills.74 In 1903 the firm invited a southern journalist reporting for the 
Motor Car Journal to accompany one of their vehicles on a work contract taking goods 
to a Blackburn Mill. The journey began from the RRC’s Liverpool depot, and the report 
begins with the journalist waiting for his lorry to come back from a previous job, which 
starts with news of a breakdown: 
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“Where is number eleven?”… “Towing in number fourteen,” comes the ominous 
reply… A small connection to one of the pumps had fractured three miles from 
home.75  
Of the journey itself the author offers a vivid description from his perch on a sack 
between the driver and the fireman. On leaving Aintree in the dark he describes being  
plunged into darkness… the man was steering by the line of the off-side kerb, or the 
hedge.  
He further comments on the trying road conditions: 
the macadam was shocking. The mud squelched and oozed… These holes in the road 
are anguish, but the driver apologetically assures me that he now knows most of them, 
and avoids them to ensure his bonus for the condition of the wagon.76  
This bonus and the knowledge of the driver were clearly important factors in the 
economy of the enterprise and is further marked by the firm’s practice of driver 
changeover at a half way point so knowledge of particular roads is increased.77 The 
journalist then goes on to describe an innovation instituted by the firm: a series of 
regularly placed clean water tanks for the use of the company’s steam vehicles, solving 
the problem of taking on mud and silt from water supplies such as the rivers and 
canals. Significantly this was also involved engaging the residents, who were reportedly 
offered rewards for reporting strangers who used these watering stations. 78 Working 
with residents was part of the job and later the journalist describes the drive through 
Preston at three mph during the night to minimise disturbance to residents.79 The 
journey continues until, with a certain degree of poetic license:  
with a crunch and a knock, we stop dead… It is 1:28am, and we are stranded in the 
wilderness.80  
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The driver and the fireman left to get assistance and a few hours later the vehicle was 
helped out of a ditch. After more bad roads they made it to Blackburn at about 8am, a 
journey of 40 miles in just over 12 hours.81 The motoring journalist concludes with 
predictable optimism that, while problems have not been entirely overcome, in a few 
years “success is assured and complete, but come it will and must”, echoing the belief 
in the imaginaries of other motoring advocates over a ten year period.82 
However, the narrative of the motoring experience belies this conclusion and 
highlights some clear technological and environmental deficiencies. Over the 40 miles 
the vehicle stops three times to take on water. This is remedied by water stations 
placed by the haulage company along the route, however this is only effective on set 
routes. The poor weather conditions and the narrow and poor roads are repeatedly 
highlighted as a serious issue and were the cause of the two-hour stoppage during the 
journey. The need for experienced drivers is highlighted as important in managing the 
roads, gradients and speed, suggesting long periods of training. There is also the 
recognition of the need to avoid disturbance in residential areas; here we shall go into 
more detail when we look at resistance. Finally, the account of the amount of 
infrastructure and staffing required reveals other deficiencies. The depot is described 
at the beginning as extensive, but garage facilities were also needed at the halfway 
point, and in Blackburn. 
Other industrial sectors began to show an interest in the potential of motorised 
haulage although there is little detail as to the success and problems of these ventures; 
nonetheless they show how widespread business interest was. In agriculture, the Duke 
of Bridgewater began using motor vehicles to transport milk from farms in Worsley as 
early as 1899.83 Later the Cheshire Milk Producers Association formed the Manchester 
Motor Transport Company with a capital of £20,000 with six steam lorries: they also 
had agencies for pleasure vehicles on Deansgate in the city centre.84 There are many 
other examples, including postal services, the collection of refuse, and general local 
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Corporation use.85 Importantly there was also clear interest from Lancashire’s textile 
industry. The Textile Manufacturer reported in 1901 that: 
The convenience of some regular system of transit of this kind will be invaluable. 
Motor-vehicles travelling from, say, Liverpool could serve the various Lancashire towns 
with raw cotton and other imported goods direct from the dock.86  
Although in 1909 the Commercial Motor reported that only just over 5 percent of dock 
haulage in Manchester was by motor traffic, 87 it must be remembered that early 
commercial motor vehicles, like pleasure vehicles, were unreliable and that a 
breakdown for a heavier vehicle could cause significantly more damage than that 
caused by lighter pleasure vehicles. There are several serious instances of accidents 
reported in and around Manchester during this period.  
Opposition, problems and promotions 
In Chapter One we highlighted aspects of automobile resistance which was dominated 
by rural disruption, class arrogance and speed. We also highlighted how users and 
manufacturers were encouraged to change habits and technologies respectively to 
combat resistance and its threat to the automobile through legislation. We have seen 
above how automobile advocates used the potential for commercial motoring to 
legitimise the use of the automobile for leisure. However, the realities of commercial 
vehicle use also brought resistance that made the sociotechnical imaginaries hard to 
accept for the non-advocate. This was something that advocates such as the LSPTA and 
those with a vested interest in commercial motoring, such as the Commercial Motor 
and the Commercial Motor Users’ Association, as well as some early motor haulers, 
were keen to combat. 
Opposition quickly arose to the big, smelly, noisy steam vehicles that began to be used 
on the North-West’s roads. Commercial vehicle incidents were often publicised, and 
records of prosecutions were numerous throughout the period. Significant amongst 
these were several serious incidents in the hilly East Lancashire towns, where incidents 
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of brake failure, damage to property, and injury and death for pedestrians and 
passengers were recorded in the Manchester Guardian and Manchester Courier. For 
example, a crash in Bolton in 1905 involved a motor waggon going out of control up a 
footpath leading to the death of one pedestrian, and the severe injury of another 
pedestrian and the mechanic, leaving the driver in shock.88 The newspaper used this 
fatal incident as an example of “dangers attending the use of motor waggons.”  There 
were records of other mechanical failures and incidents with tram tracks, involving 
both the death of a horse wagon driver and the vehicle overturning causing the death 
of a driver, along with several instances of pedestrians being killed by motor vehicles, 
including the death of a boy in 1907, and the death of a tram passenger alighting in 
1913.89 As well as the fear of injury, death and damage to property, there is evidence 
of more general complaints including improper handling, for example, proceedings 
were brought against a driver for letting off too much steam and smoke causing:  
annoyance of pedestrians and others using the road, particularly those in charge of 
horses.90  
A complaint by a community deputation to the Manchester Watch Committee in 1906 
sums up some of the common issues with heavy vehicles. They complained about the 
vibration, “appalling noise”, “most obnoxious smell”, damage to the roads and the 
difficulty of getting to sleep caused by the motor omnibuses, which saw the 
application for more licenses get postponed by the Manchester Corporation.91  
As we have seen in our trip with the Road Carrying Company, the disturbance of local 
residents was a widespread concern, with the firm going slowly through Preston to 
reduce noise and quell resistance to the commercial motor. Noise and poor driving 
were generally blamed by opponents to commercial motor vehicles. As well as the 
prosecution for letting off excessive steam in 1909, a 1902 case also shows how noise 
and driving were viewed. A motor waggon was alleged to have scared a horse pulling a 
heavy load, resulting in injury to the horse-driver, by creating a scraping noise and the 
driver failing to stop his approach. Despite evidence provided to the contrary the 
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driver was convicted.92 To try and combat this focus on the abilities of the driver the 
Commercial Motor Users’ Association (CMUA) and the Commercial Motor held an 
annual “Parade and Prize Scheme for Good Driving” starting in 1907.93 It appealed to 
business owners as follows: 
It is, of course, a matter of no small sacrifice, for an owner to allow even one of his 
vans, lorries, or tractors to be taken out of service on so busy a day as a Saturday, but 
we think that both the movement as a whole and the interests of drivers deserve 
consideration.94  
The prize scheme involved drivers answering several questions such as:  
Number of days motor has been laid up through fault of driver [and] number and 
character of accidents on the road, other than trivial ones.95  
While the Commercial Motor looked to encourage drivers, this provoked a reaction 
from a Manchester driver in a letter to the Commercial Motor in 1908:  
I myself have to be at the shed to light the fire, and get steam up, at 3 and 4 a.m., and 
it is 8 p.m., and has even been as late as 12 and 1.30, before I have done my day's 
work. I have complained till I am tired, and am about sick of it; can anyone wonder that 
men get stale and careless?96 
This account is an example of the extreme pressure put on drivers both by the public 
and by motoring advocates and commercial motor owners, pressure that was part of 
the complex relationship between the acceptance of a new technology by residents in 
towns and beside roads, and by councils, vehicle owners and drivers. One of the ways 
in which the commercial motor combated opposition was to advocate the benefits of 
the motor as a “supplementary” technology, rather than a substituting technology. In 
Manchester the advent of bus services were designed to connect passengers to the 
tram network, not compete against it.97 Similarly commercial haulage could 
complement intracity horse haulage with intercity potential a position that had long 
                                                          
92
 Manchester Guardian 24/10/1902 
93
 Commercial Motor 17/9/1908 
94
 Commercial Motor 24/9/1908 
95
 Commercial Motor 17/9/1908 
96
 Commercial Motor 4/6/1908 p.21 
97
 Joyce, J., Roads and Rails of Manchester 1900-1950 (London: Ian Allan, 1982) pp.68-69 
 
134 
 
been advocated by the LSPTA. Commentators such as the writer of the Manchester 
Guardian article “Steam Motor Haulage in 1905” argued that: 
distances of thirty to fifty miles would be the ideal daily performance…For short 
journeys… the horse is undoubtedly the more economical.98   
Where motors did advertise as a replacement for horse-drawn vehicles during this 
early period they were often in areas where there was a social benefit. This included 
doctors’ cars, fire engines and postal services.  
Doctors have been highlighted as a particularly iconic group of early motorists, 
emphasised in trade literature.99 For example, Marshall and Co., an early Manchester 
manufacturer, featured a “Doctors’ Landau” in The Autocar in 1897 and letters from 
doctors frequently appeared in trade magazines such as a letter to the Automotor and 
Horseless Vehicle in 1897 from a country doctor “very anxious indeed to try a motor 
carriage”.100 However the extent to which doctors bought automobiles has been 
shown to be both variable by location and disputed.101 In Essex for example over 1 in 
10 registrations in 1904 were for doctors.102 However in Cheshire, of cars originally 
registered between 1904 and 1907, only 2 percent of registrations were for individuals 
involved in the medical profession.103 It is possible, as Mom argues, that the functional 
utilitarian aspects of use were largely an alibi for pleasure and that transforming 
doctors’ mobility was part of the sociotechnical imaginaries surrounding the 
automobile used by motor manufacturers to legitimise their product, while the reality 
was that doctors did not take to motoring in significant numbers. 104  Indeed utility as 
an alibi seems to be the case for Doctor Tracy, who’s surviving published motoring 
diary starts by arguing for the economy of motoring on his rounds, before describing 
his first ride as “thrilling”, and then describing scenes of delight as he presents himself 
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and his car as the first motorist in his Devon village in 1907.105 Further he wrote to his 
wife 
 A motor car enlarges one’s acquaintance, one’s opportunities spiritual, social, etc., 
etc., enormously.106 
The car, for Doctor Tracy, was certainly more about status and pleasure. 
In the Edwardian period motorised fire engines were becoming more common; Figure 
22 shows an early example commissioned in 1902 by the Eccles Fire Brigade. In 1910 
Stockport Fire Brigade bought a motor engine. It had a christening ceremony akin to 
ocean vessels: a bottle of wine was broken against it by a woman and a ribbon was cut 
on its bonnet; it was named the “Mary Dalziel” and the Commercial Motor 
commentated on the enthusiasm of the townspeople and the council men who had 
“the town’s interests at heart”.107 This kind of ceremony was not isolated and similar 
ceremonies have been recorded around the country, such as Hendon Fire Brigade in 
1906, Ryde Fire Brigade in 1908 and East Ham in 1914, where they often involved a 
christening ceremony and demonstrations of use.108 The celebration and christening of 
new engines, as well as ambulances, continued to be important local events into the 
interwar period. Such an event was described in Burnley in 1937 as a new engine was 
named after a celebrated local Alderman Boothman.109  Although described with 
typical Commercial Motor bias the ceremony demonstrates that “upgrading” from the 
horse-drawn to the motor was not merely viewed as progress of economy and 
technology. The act of christening a ship was an important part of its launch and was 
part of bringing good luck against the dangers of the sea, or in battle. Thus, the 
purchase and arrival of a new fire engine was important for the local community, and 
the ceremony was to bring the fire engine luck in tackling the dangers of fire. They 
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were given a familiar name or one which provides reassurance such as “The Alert”, the 
name of the Hendon engine or “Gem” an engine christened on the Isle of Wight.110  
Unlike haulage vehicles, which passed through urban areas disturbing residents, the 
fire-engine served the local community and is perhaps one of the few clear realisations 
of the sociotechnical imaginaries that surround early automobilism. Although there are 
no statistics for fire-engines, there are many instances of Fire Brigades becoming partly 
and fully motorised between 1910 and 1914; this included London County Council’s 
stations in 1911.111 The appeal of upgrading was due to social and political pressure. At 
a christening ceremony on the Isle of Wight the mayor of Ryde reasoned that he: 
was glad to know that everything in connection with the engine was of the latest 
pattern… the Fire Brigade would rise to the occasion and prove themselves to be 
smart, up-to-date… take part in competitions, and bring laurels to that town of 
Ryde.112   
The pressure here had several aspects. Politically, points were scored for keeping and 
advertising a modern “up-to-date” fire service, which the motor engine represented; 
thus, local politicians were seen to be actively looking after their constituents. There 
was also the pressures of local rivalries; turning up to a regional Fire Brigade 
competition in a new motorised engine brought prestige, which in turn put pressure 
on other local services to motorise. This pressure is alluded to in a report of a similar 
event in Ruthin, Wales. At the christening ceremony there were three fire brigades in 
attendance: Mold Fire Brigade had previously brought a motor fire-engine, Ruthin had 
just purchased one and Rhuddlan Fire Brigade were without. Ruthin had bought the 
same machine as Mold, and it was also said that Rhuddlan would in turn be having a 
naming ceremony soon. Throughout the article reference was made to the steam 
engine produced by Shand, Mason and Co. having “set the fashion in the fire engine 
world having been supplied to the leading fire brigades” including London with 58 
engines and many other urban brigades.113 This indicates pressure that was national as 
well as regional.  The Ruthin Fire Brigade were too poor to attend the Fire Brigade 
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Union of North Wales annual inspection of 1906, and the fire engine had not yet been 
fully paid for at the naming ceremony, yet they had endeavoured to get the 
engine.114This was technological innovation driven not by economic competition, but 
by social and regional competition or emulation. In this we see how the utopian 
imaginaries of automobilism transforming society could affect general public opinion 
and reduce resistance. The actual technological impact of the early motorised fire-
engines is hard to judge; although it took several minutes to “get up steam” before it 
could set-off for a fire, the reality of technological performance was not as important 
as the social and political acceptance of the imaginary which can help us explain the 
emergence of the automobile. 
 
 
Figure 22 - A fire engine produced by the Protector Lamp Company for the local 
Eccles Fire Brigade – 1902 – Photograph by R. Espley, formally owned by the 
Protector Lamp Company, now in private collection 
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The environment was also important. The North-West’s was notorious for poor and 
difficult roads, the Commercial Motor noting that: 
Lancashire cobbles, which constitute the hardest school in England and the city which, 
in all probability, has evolved more tried machines—not to say men—than any.115  
A journalist for the Motorcar Journal reported on a trip with the Road Carrying 
Company that: 
The road is nothing short of a crying disgrace, which would not be tolerated in the 
south.116   
Similarly, on the ACGB&I Thousand Mile Trial in 1900 the roads towards Preston were 
noted as being particularly tortuous for the automobiles. Despite the notoriety and 
inadequacy of the North-West’s roads, experiments and use persisted.  
Commercial vehicle manufacturing   
 
Figure 23 - Source of firms from R. H. Clark, The Development of the English Steam 
Wagon (Norwich: Goose and Son, 1962) and various motoring journals including the 
Commercial Motor.  
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It was suggested above that the trials of the LSPTA helped shape the direction of 
technical innovation and that the group helped bring commercial haulage to the 
nation’s attention. There were numerous commercial vehicle manufacturers in the 
North-West, and more steam waggon producers than in any other part of the country, 
as shown in Figure 23. The Lancashire Steam Motor Company (LSMC), Coulthard and 
Foden were particularly successful in the early years. Financial support for commercial 
vehicle manufacturers was also particularly strong during the experimental period up 
to 1905, contrary to Harrison’s findings that only £103,000 publicly floated in four 
years from 1901 to 1904 in the motor car and motor cycle sector.117. For example, 
Simpson and Bodman were formed in 1896 with substantial financial backing from the 
textile industry. Foden also managed to gain significant financial support in their 
£100,000 flotation in 1902, for which over half was subscribed following the success of 
a prototype in the 1901 War Office trials.118 This flotation alone nearly equals the 
entire investment in the motorcar and motorcycle sector between 1901 and 1904.  
While this investment was not particularly large, it came in a period when there was 
little public investment in the motor industry following the failure of the initial overly 
optimistic promotions in the late nineteenth century. Similarly, production figures 
were relatively modest, due to the cost and dubious economy of heavy commercial 
motoring. Figure 24 shows Foden’s production figures over 8 years with a modest rise 
from a handful of vehicles in 1904 to 200 by 1911. 
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Figure 24 - Data taken from Cheshire motor vehicle registrations, Horner 
(forthcoming publication, 2019) Foden's registered all vehicles sold in Cheshire. 
The pre-eminence of steam power in the North-West is noted by a correspondent of 
the Manchester Guardian in 1906: 
Most of the Lancashire experience so far has been gained with steam motor-lurries.... 
The preponderance of steam lurries over petrol lurries in Lancashire may be partly due 
to the fact that Lancashire engineering firms are more conversant with steam-engine 
practice.119 
Explaining this is difficult although many of the North-West’s commercial vehicle 
manufacturers had a background in steam engineering. The rail operator and 
locomotive builder the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co. and the steam locomotive 
manufacturer Beyer, Peacock and Co. both produced steam-powered commercial 
vehicles shortly after the turn of the century. Similarly, North-Western manufacturers 
Simpson and Bodman, the LSMC, Walker Brothers and Foden all had a background in 
steam engineering. Only a few firms produced petrol-powered commercial vehicles 
before 1907. These were mainly motor car manufacturers who sold petrol powered 
chassis for commercial purposes, like the Belsize Motor Company or the Protector 
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Lamp Company. This relationship with steam continued for some time to come. For 
example, Foden continued to produce steam lorries into the 1930s.120  
The propensity for steam in the North-West is reflected in Figure 23. In comparison the 
North-West had only one electric manufacturing firm, the short-lived Lancashire 
Electric Vehicle Company,121 while London showed a much more diverse picture. For 
example, electric taxis and buses were in evidence for much of the period alongside 
steam.122 As Mom has demonstrated in his analysis of the electric vehicle, the decision 
over propulsion type was more complicated than one of a superior technology 
replacing another, less efficient technology.123 The regional variety of propulsion type 
demonstrates both the backgrounds of the industries in the North-West, but also the 
topography of Lancashire, which was much more challenging than that encountered in 
London, for example. It also reflects Lancashire’s long relationship with steam power in 
the textile industry, with cheap coal readily available from large local mining 
operations.124  
There is also an appreciable difference in the home market between commercial and 
private vehicles. The UK market for private vehicles featured several foreign imports 
such as Panhard, Renault and Ford. On the other hand, commercial vehicles saw poor 
penetration for foreign imports. Even Ford before 1914 only produced a few 
commercial vehicles.125 Explaining this difference is difficult due to the lack of research 
in commercial vehicles. However, it is likely that initially the UK was making particular 
technological progress in commercial motoring, through the preoccupation of groups 
like the LSPTA and early manufacturers such as Simpson and Bodman, the Lancashire 
Steam Motor Company and Foden. This is borne out on the rare occasion in which 
foreign and British manufacturers competed. For example, in the 1907 Commercial 
Vehicle Trials there were 38 British vehicles, of which 1 retired; and 19 foreign vehicles, 
of which 5 retired, while British entries scored consistently higher in stoppages and in 
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timing and manoeuvring.126 Henry Sturmey reporting on the trial, while obviously 
biased, concluded that: 
“The result which, perhaps, looms out above all others has been the marked 
superiority, all along the line, shown by the products of British factories over those of 
their Foreign competitors.”127  
Whatever the case, consumers certainly preferred British vehicles.   Cheshire 
registrations from 1904-1911 show no heavy vehicles registered from foreign 
manufacturers; as we have already seen there was also preference for local 
manufacture during this period. The significance of this is that it complicates the view 
that the British motor industry was “lagging” behind foreign competition. Certainly in 
commercial use this was not the case. We see in this the importance of catering for a 
national or regional market and the influence of specific national characteristics, 
highlighted as important by Mom.128 Lancashire-or Cheshire-made commercial steam 
vehicles were purposely made to cope with both the particularly bad roads and steep 
gradients that characterised the area. Similarly manufacturers catered for specific 
British legislation such as tare limits, and finally with reliability perhaps more 
important in the commercial sphere, access to the manufacturer was particularly 
important and there was an emphasis, as seen in the case of Foden, on after sale 
servicing. 
 
The number of North-Western commercial vehicle manufacturers demonstrates both 
the influence of the LSPTA and the varied needs and interests in the region. Early 
commercial vehicle manufacturing and usage in the North-West is notable for the 
variety of interest groups. There were pleasure motor manufacturers such as the 
Protector Lamp Company making vans, light cars and fire engines; likewise, Marshall 
and Co. produced light cars, tricycles and postal vans. We have also seen how haulage 
firms such as the Road Carrying Company and the Manchester Motor Transport 
Company were both taking on haulage contracts and acting as agents for private 
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motor cars. Simpson and Bodman show textile manufacturing support, while firms 
such as the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway company show railway enthusiasm for 
commercial motoring. The eclectic nature of commercial motor manufacture during 
this early period demonstrates the difficulty of separating commercial and pleasure 
motoring interests. Even behind specialist commercial vehicle firms we see private 
motoring interests. For example, the Foden family were keen motorists and members 
of the Manchester Automobile Club.129 Dan Simpson, commercial vehicle 
manufacturer, was a racing cyclist and motor cyclist, also a member of the Manchester 
Automobile Club.130 Finally George Pilkington Dawson, the Managing Director of Beyer, 
Peacock and Co. who oversaw the firm’s entry into the industry, was also a member of 
the Manchester Automobile Club and later a director and investor in the Belsize Motor 
Company. This is like the examination of members of the LSPTA who also showed 
varied interests and backgrounds, the club being run simultaneously as a social 
motoring society and a commercial vehicle lobbyist and promoter.  
Conclusion  
By the Edwardian period commercial motoring had started to become a viable form of 
transport for business purposes. Commercial motor vehicles became more familiar to 
the non-motoring public, although this familiarity was not necessarily a positive thing, 
with the danger and disruption caused by large motor vehicles in urban areas 
mirroring that experienced by rural residents from private motorists. 
Commercial motoring has received little attention in scholarship, in what is generally 
seen as a secondary stream of automobilism. However, there is clearly merit in its 
exploration. We have highlighted that although commercial motoring and 
manufacturing was growing, it was a much steadier growth than that seen in other 
areas of automobilism. This analysis has exposed a new dynamic to our understanding 
of the economy of the North-West: associating entrepreneurship and the willingness 
to invest in new industries, with larger and established ones can contribute towards 
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debate over the stagnation, and interwar decline of the North-West’s cotton trade.131 
The early recognition of the potential of the commercial vehicle and the 
experimentation and adoption of motor haulage by textile manufacturers can be seen 
as an example of management adapting to a new technology that could increase 
competitive advantage and thus be used to counter the argument made by scholars 
such as Mass and Lazonick that there was a failure to adapt to technological 
advances.132 
Similarly, exploration of commercial motoring has shown how varied the diffusion of 
the automobile was during this period. This is particularly apparent when compared to 
the much more rapid diffusion of the motorised taxi. We will see in the next chapter 
how this affected the adaptation of coachbuilders, some of which served upper-class 
clients, while others such as wheelwrights and cartbuilders served the horse-drawn 
commercial trade. This latter trade saw an increase in employment between 1901 and 
1911, and thus the emergence of the automobile had little effect until after the First 
World War.  
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2.4 - Replacing technologies: the horse and the commercial motor boom  
There are very few studies of the transition of technology between the horse and 
motor vehicle. As we suggested in the chapter introduction this is probably because 
economic and automobile studies have assumed that the disappearance of the horse 
was simply technologically determined, and thus easy to explain. One of the few 
studies to explore the decline of the horse, focusing on the urban environment in the 
USA, has been conducted by Tarr and McShane.133 They explore the myriad of uses 
that horse-drawn transport performed and argue that  
When owners perceived horses as obsolescent and unable to compete ﬁrst with 
electric streets cars and then with the new motor trucks and motor cars, they 
disappeared with astonishing rapidity except for some specialized niche areas. In the 
ﬁnal analysis, these living machines were most valued as technology.134 
Despite evidence of early uses, as we have also documented above, they argue that 
the widespread change came about from 1917 due to the development of the light 
commercial Model T and the more advanced development of heavy trucks, particularly 
the “Liberty” truck, until by 1930 there were almost no horses used for freight 
transport.135 This change was not as pronounced in the urban environment in the UK, 
as we shall see, although there was a very similar boom in the use of light commercial 
vehicles. Tarr and McShane provide an excellent empirical study of the decline of the 
horse, yet they also take a technological determinist approach, arguing that horses 
were viewed by business owners as “mostly machines”, and therefore that decisions 
for substituting technology were economical. This is convincingly argued and backed 
up with a range of evidence from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries from 
both the USA and Great Britain. This is an argument shared by Turvey, who argued in 
analysis of horse use in Victorian London that “to most owners… horses were simply 
depreciable capital goods.”136  Despite this Tarr and McShane fail to analysis the non-
economic factors in technological change. We will argue in our analysis of the interwar 
period in the North-West that the ideals of “modernity” and “progress” provided a pull 
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towards the motor vehicle and images of backwardness and old technology pushed 
businesses away from the horse. These pressures can be seen in a 1914 Ford 
advertising campaign in Figure 25 where the horse is compared to a bow and arrow 
and the automobile to a machine gun, the implication being that if you do not get an 
automobile you will be left behind. In the replacement of horse-drawn technology we 
see not just a technologically determined economy but the importance of social 
pressures and sociotechnical imaginaries which have underlined the emergence of the 
commercial vehicle in the early period of study.  
 
Figure 25 - The Grantham Journal 24/10/1914 
The horse and cart versus the commercial motor: Horse power vs brake horse power 
From 1918 there was a boom in commercial motoring which is highlighted through 
road surveys and national statistical analysis. Employment statistics from the 1921 
census recorded just over 50 percent of road transport workers were employed on 
motor vehicles:  
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proportion of horse drivers (718,719) to motor drivers (720,721) is highest in the large 
towns and lowest in the rural districts.137  
This marks a fundamental difference from the census of 1911, which showed that 11 
percent of road employment was in the motorised category, and demonstrates the 
general boom in commercial motoring after the First World War.138 Not only was there 
a rise in motor transport and a decline in horse-drawn, but generally there was a 
remarkable increase in road traffic. This boom is recognised in national and regional 
road surveys. A road census in Lancashire in 1922 showed a fourfold increase in 
tonnage on the roads compared to 1911, and the average speed had doubled.139 While 
a fourfold increase was an average, the census also showed some key areas of growth. 
At Sankey Street on the Manchester-Liverpool road the census showed a sevenfold 
increase in tons per day from 1,167 in 1911 to 8,250 in 1922.140 At this same point 
motorised transport had risen from 26 percent in 1911 to 98 percent in 1922.141 These 
statistics suggest that the horse and cart was becoming obsolete on Britain’s roads 
early in the interwar period. This is supported when we look at other snapshot 
statistics. In the 1922 traffic census the Preston and Blackpool road saw daily 9,048 
tons of mechanical vehicles and only 71.2 tons horse-drawn. Nationally the statistics 
from 1922 show that at 221 points in the country 93.6 percent of transport was 
mechanically propelled and 6.4 percent was horse-drawn, and overall there was a 
threefold increase in traffic measured at these points since 1911.142 What is striking 
about this is the conflict with the employment census data which shows an almost 
equal parity of employment between horses and motor vehicles. Some of this 
difference can be accounted for in the rising popularity of private motoring, however 
not all. Horse-drawn transport showed a remarkable persistence even towards the end 
of the interwar period. The data shows that the horse and cart had all but disappeared 
from the main roads of Britain, yet the data does not show how successful and 
preferred horse transport was in the urban commercial environment. Evidence from 
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both Manchester and Liverpool shows how the motor vehicle failed to gain superiority 
to the horse in certain areas of use. This was often caused by congestion and the 
narrowness of British city streets, which was not such a factor in the USA.  
Manchester and Liverpool – horses for courses 
Data for transport at the Liverpool Docks in 1921 showed that horses still had the 
upper hand with 52.4 percent horse traffic and 47.6 percent motorised.143 The 
persistence of the horse in these urban and congested areas was the source of much 
grief amongst the writers of the Commercial Motor. This was illustrated in an article in 
1927 which vehemently attacked horse-drawn vehicles in Liverpool, suggesting 
[the] horsed vehicle be barred altogether from those thoroughfares where it at 
present impedes other traffic… How often one sees slow-moving units occupying far 
more than their rightful share of the road, followed by quite a queue of motors!144 
The article suggested that horse users should be compensated and a switch to motor 
vehicles be made compulsory. This action was similar to that advocated by motor 
advocate Lord Montagu of Beaulieu who argued that: 
 Everywhere horse-drawn carts and vehicles block the faster traffic…increases the 
dangers of the streets to pedestrians and road users…If horse-drawn vehicles could be 
forbidden in certain crowded thoroughfares between 10am and 6pm, what immediate 
relief there would be!145 
This motoring bias reflects the strength of belief in the sociotechnical imaginary that 
the speed of motor vehicles would benefit society if only it could be realised, in this 
case by the removal of horses. However, there was reaction against this attack on the 
horse-drawn vehicle, even from those heavily invested in the promotion and use of the 
motorised commercial vehicle. For example, Mr R. W. G. Barnett, ex-president of the 
Commercial Motor Users’ Association (CMUA) and director of the Liverpool Cartage 
Company was one of many respondents who owned both a fleet of motors and a 
stable of 150 horses. He argued that the horse was still noticeably more economical in 
the city centre.  He uses the example of a £1,000 motor, with a mandatory 3-man 
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complement compared to a £250 two-horse wagon with just one driver.146 Another 
local expert was also interviewed and argued that replacing horses with motors would 
not change the traffic problem which he viewed as a “utopian” fantasy, challenging the 
imaginary view of the benefits of motor only streets, arguing that: 
Congestion would not be abolished by the abolition of the horse; neither would 
terminal delays at the docks, factories and warehouses be eliminated.147  
The situation was similar in Manchester. The traffic on the outskirts and in the centre 
of Manchester was notoriously bad. In an interview with the Commercial Motor a 
driver of a petrol lorry noted that: 
he could run a full load of raw cotton from the docks at Liverpool to the outskirts at 
Manchester in well under four hours. It took him an hour to run the last three miles 
through Manchester.148  
This problem meant that even in the interwar period the horse was often as 
economical, if not more so, than the motorised commercial vehicle for short distance 
urban haulage. Similarly at the Shudehill Market in the centre of Manchester a 1929 
traffic report, commissioned due to excessive congestion, noted the nature of market 
traffic as being an eclectic mix of motorised transport, mainly comprised of through-
traffic, customer vehicles and farmers transport; horse-drawn carts mainly used by 
railway deliveries for perishable goods; and hand carts used by the market to transport 
goods to the customers’ vehicles.149 This is typified in a few other case studies that 
reveal a symbiotic relationship between the automobile and the horse, rather than an 
antagonistic one.  
The symbiotic use of horse and motor vehicle 
For many haulage firms in the North-West, improving commercial vehicle technology 
was welcome, not necessarily as a replacement for the horse and cart, but as an 
opportunity to provide longer distance and faster deliveries whilst still being able to 
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provide the same short distance services with the horse in congested and narrow city 
streets. However, the idea of “backwardness” or a failure to “modernise” was a 
pressure that could overtake economic sense. As we have seen in Chapter 1, the 
purchase of a Ford by a small businessman could make it difficult for him to feed his 
family. Similarly this pressure could account for the reports that large Liverpool-based 
haulage firms were looking in the late 1920s to increase the size of their stable after 
the experience of years of motor vehicle use had given them a more considered 
perspective.150  
Examples of a symbiotic relationship can be seen if we look at a few regional 
businesses. The Manchester Corporation’s cleansing department used both horses and 
motor vehicles for its varied operations: the yearly budget for 1934 exposes the 
continuing importance of horses, with £79,852 allocated for horse transport and 
£32,496 for motor transport.151 The Manchester and District Co-operative Laundries 
Association had four large laundries that provided services throughout Manchester, its 
suburbs and surrounding towns. The Co-operative washed over ten million items of 
clothing in a half year in 1927. Each laundry had its own fleet of vehicles, totalling 23 
motorised vans and 48 horse-drawn vans. These vehicles worked together as follows: 
motors working the districts... relieve the horsed vans of their loads, thus saving 
travelling time to and from the works. This means that a horsed van might leave the 
laundry first thing in the morning and not return until the finish of the day’s work, and 
yet be kept clear of accumulated loads.152 
The Co-operative laundry had been using motorised vehicles before 1914, but the 
horse was more economical for the stopping and starting experienced with localised 
pickup and delivery jobs. This was particularly the case for this laundry service which 
dealt with families’ washing, thus the horse vans would need to do at least 1,000 
successful collections and deliveries a week to turn a profit. However, the intelligence 
of the horse was also given as a reason for their superiority by the Managing Director 
of the firm: 
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while the driver is collecting at one house, the horse takes the van along to the next 
customer’s address, and waits until the driver has deposited his collection... the driver 
need not trouble about his van – the horse sees to that.153 
The horses’ intelligence has also been used to explain the persistence of the horse for 
certain specialised work in America.154 The Commercial Motor also describes a firm 
which specialised in cotton haulage, which created specialist depots just outside 
Manchester which were used to convey loads from motor vehicles to horse-drawn 
vehicles and vice versa for the journey to outlying mills and to the city’s warehouses.155 
Where the roads were wide enough in Manchester, such as can be seen on Deansgate 
in Figure 26 in 1924, we see both how widespread the use of the horse for commercial 
vehicles still was and how traffic was organised into a neat three-lane system, to 
accommodate the large amount of horse-drawn commercial traffic, the faster 
motorised taxis and private vehicles and the city’s trams. It is unclear whether this was 
organic, or organised and enforced by the local police, seen in the middle of the 
crossroad.  Horses also still featured in corporation road-building activities as late as 
1939: the Eccles Corporation introduced automatic traffic signals on the humpback 
bridge over the Bridgewater canal on the Liverpool-Manchester Road which “will not 
subject horses to the severe strain of holding and restarting heavily loaded wagons on 
the steep inclines.”156 And it was not until well into the 1950s when horses 
disappeared completely from the city centre of Manchester. The last corporation 
refuse horse and cart was retired in 1951.157  
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Figure 26 – Deansgate, Manchester 1924 – Manchester Local Image Collection - 
m81203 
 
 
Figure 27 - Liverpool traffic 1927- Commercial Motor 25/1/1927 
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The sustained presence of the horse in the urban environment is not only a curiosity 
but is of significance for our understanding of traffic interest groups, the development 
of the urban haulage economy, and our understanding of technological substitution. 
As we have seen in Figure 25 and in some of the columns in the Commercial Motor, the 
horse and cart were targeted by motor manufacturers and motoring advocates as 
backward, even archaic relics of the previous century. Indeed the following from the 
Commercial Motor of 1926 contrasts the “conservatism” of the old with the ambition 
of the young, linking business and marital success to motor ownership:  
The tradesman has constituted the most conservative section of its community, and 
has been slow to follow the example of manufacturers and distributors in the use of 
motor vehicles...Nowadays, the possession of a car is the earliest ambition of the 
youth who is progressing at business and is contemplating marriage.158 
This emphasis on entrepreneurialism, motoring and youth tallies with the increasing 
prevalence of motoring in the youth culture of this era.159  However, as an experienced 
haulier observed, the view that if mechanical transport were to completely replace 
horse-drawn transport we would see speedy, non-congested city centres was an 
unrealistic “utopian” vision. In reality the speed with which commercial motoring was 
adopted in the interwar period caused a number of acute problems, especially for 
urban traffic with pollution, congestion, noise and an increased risked to the 
pedestrian.  
Utopian and progressive sociotechnical imaginaries surrounding the automobile 
continued to be pushed during the interwar period by motoring advocates; these 
imaginaries no longer revolved around replacing the horse, but instead involved the 
railway. Figure 28 is a campaign cartoon from the Commercial Motor protesting 
against licensing of commercial vehicles which motoring groups viewed as unfairly 
advantaging the railway, leaving the commercial motoring “legislation bog” on the 
course to increasing “prosperity”. A similar struggle was happening in America where 
in the face of railway-led “anti-road propaganda”, the Nation Highway User’s 
Conference  
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requests the President to bear in mind that road transport is a step in the march of 
progress. It is definitely bad policy to invent restrictions for the benefit of the 
railways.160  
Legislative bias towards the railways during this period has been identified.161 
However, the arguments for freedom of technological progress and subsequent 
prosperity provided by the automobile show that the commercial vehicles meaning 
and diffusion went beyond improved economic competition and technological 
determinism.  We shall see in the next section how these sociotechnical imaginaries 
also impacted the decisions of city planners and councils as weight grew behind the 
commercial motor vehicle. 
 
Figure 28 - Cartoon following the Road and Rail Traffic Act 1933- The Commercial 
Motor 12/5/1933 
                                                          
160
 Commercial Motor 17/5/1935 
161
 Plowden, The motor car and politics p.195 
 
155 
 
  
Conclusion 
At the beginning of the chapter we explored the predication of automobile advocates, 
such as Sir David Salomons, that the horse, used for haulage, would be replaced almost 
entirely by the automobile within five or ten years of the beginning of the twentieth 
century. This prediction was right that the automobile would triumph, but it was not 
until after the Second World War that the presence of the horse became a rare sight 
on city streets. We have highlighted the horses’ persistence as a specialist in the urban 
environment, still used by large haulage firms, and companies well into the 1930s. We 
have also, therefore demonstrated how national road statistics could be misleading, 
with surveys often taking place on the large inter-city roads where the automobile 
quickly dominated. Scholars who examine the transition between the horse and the 
automobile, such as Tarr and McShane, Thompson, and Turvey, argue that the 
substitution was often one of cold economy. Indeed, we have seen in this section how 
economy was important to the changing of haulage technologies. Yet it was also a 
battle of technological perception. Automobile advocates targeted the horse as 
backward, whilst the automobile developed a strong sociotechnical imagining as the 
future of commercial transport. We shall see how this imagining came to dominate the 
urban transport debate in the following section, which focuses on congestion in 
Manchester in the interwar period.  
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2.5 - Traffic and the city of Manchester: utopian visions and contested streets   
This section will explore how the imaginaries and realities of the automobile impacted 
the city streets. As commercial motor vehicles boomed in use during the interwar 
period the city centre and the roads surrounding it became increasingly contested and 
hard to manage spaces, with several different interest groups competing for their own 
space. Buses replaced the tram system in the 1930s and horses and motor vehicles 
contested space, while dangers for pedestrians increased. Town planners and councils 
were in the position where action needed to be taken to deal with traffic on the urban 
streets. Manchester and surrounding councils commissioned a Joint Town Planning 
Advisory Committee to explore the issues and find solutions, while the Traffic 
Congestion Sub-Committee looked specifically at measures to deal with congestion in 
the city centre. In both these bodies we see a fundamental shift towards automobile 
interests during this period, through traffic solutions and planning recommendations. 
In a study of the automobile in American cities, McShane argues that the automobiles’ 
powerful cultural image entranced planners and public officials with utopian visions of 
the city dominated by the automobile, while the reality was cities were a “socially and 
politically fragmented, gas-guzzling environmental nightmare,” as space became 
dominated by the automobile.162 Similar utopian visions were created in the UK. 
Jeremiah argues that the utopian imaginings of artists like Guy Lipscombe’s 1908 
“Utopian. ‘A thoroughfare of the future’” set the agenda for the interwar period. 163 
The drawing shows a wide urban road segregated with pavements, horse lanes, motor 
lanes and tram lanes; apart from the wideness of the road the drawing shows the 
speed with which the central motor traffic was moving and the direction out into the 
countryside. As we have already highlighted, the segregation or elimination of certain 
types of traffic, especially horses and trams, was the answer for many motor 
advocates. For example, F. Fissi’s 1913 vision of 1933 London included the city centre 
without horses or trams hindering the eclectic and relentless motor through-traffic, 
noticeable also for the lack of commercial motor vehicles.164 
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These utopian futures are highlighted by motoring advocates like Rees Jeffreys, who 
argued for motoring-centred road building: he noted in 1907: 
it is an absurd state of affairs that road vehicles have now been constructed that can 
travel conveniently at a mean speed of 30 miles per hour, yet in no wise are they able 
to maintain this speed in urban or suburban centres.165 
Jeremiah therefore highlights the tension between these motoring advocates and their 
visions for future highways, and rural preservationists looking to protect the 
countryside from the modern highway and traffic vision.166 However, the urban 
environment had its own, perhaps more complex tensions: between the different 
road-users and pedestrians, and different business interests; and finally the 
corporations and managing companies responsible for roads, infrastructure and town 
planning. The challenge in dealing with the road traffic boom of the interwar period 
was not only a challenge for the British rural ideal, but for the functionality of the 
roads in Britain’s cities, and visions of the future. By looking at Manchester during the 
interwar period we can add to the findings of O’Connell and Plowden, who highlight in 
their work on the motorcar in politics and the development of road safety respectively, 
the influence of political, social and economic power in the way in which society makes 
certain technological decisions.167 O’Connell for example argued that 
once car ownership began diffusing amongst the influential professionals and 
commercial middle-classes there was little chance that an effective opposition to 
private motoring might arise.168  
This certainly appears to be the case in Manchester as we explore the nature of the 
traffic problem in the city. The opinions and actions of different interest groups show 
how different traffic systems and management plans developed over time, in the 
dynamic and changeable urban and social environment. In many of these difficulties 
we see how traffic and systems of dealing with this traffic originated in this period or 
have been reinstituted depending on the prevailing moods or political emphasis. We 
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see this now in the introduction and emphasis on segregated cycle lanes, or the re-
introduction and promotion of Manchester’s tram network roughly 50 years after its 
abandonment. After years of motoring imaginaries private motoring in the city centre 
is now discouraged, while in the 1920s the council actively sought to help the private 
motorist with issues such as city centre parking.  
The problem of road traffic in Manchester and more widely in the counties of 
Lancashire and Cheshire was often tackled co-operatively by the different corporations 
and councils of the region. This manifested itself in the Manchester and District Town 
Planning Advisory Committee and its subsequent Report upon the Regional Scheme, 
published in 1926. This was the first of a series of regional and city town planning 
reports with others following in 1945, 1951 and 1961 that would attempt to highlight 
and offer solutions to the problems of the region’s traffic, geography and building 
development. The report highlighted the problems of traffic both in Manchester and in 
the region’s other industrial towns, specifically the inadequacies of the region’s road 
system: poor links to important industrial towns, few orbital roads, and inadequate 
width of roads, especially through towns. One example given was traffic on the 
Liverpool-East Lancashire road, which passed through the centre of Warrington, 
through a thoroughfare only 15ft 4in wide, which can be seen in Figure 29. In this 
image we can see the volume of motorised commercial and municipal transport on 
what was one of the most important roads between Liverpool and Manchester, with 
barely room for two vehicles side by side; the same stretch of road for which traffic 
had increased 7 times since 1911.169 The report recognised that the problem of road 
traffic was particularly acute in this region of the country due to the nature of the 
manufacturing industries; this was also recognised by the Commercial Motor.170  
This regional traffic problem was accentuated by the Manchester Ship Canal. The 
report noted the lack of road bridges over it, with only four between Warrington and 
the Docks, a distance of about 17 miles. On top of this these were swing bridges, which 
caused bottlenecking and long delays. An article in 1929 reported over half a mile of 
traffic built up in the time it took the Barton road bridge to swing back in place, and 
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this was worse at meal-times with increased bicycle and foot traffic from Trafford Park 
workers trying to get home to Eccles for lunch or tea.171 The Barton Bridge had over 
1,000 heavy vehicles crossing it every day.  Similarly, the port itself was noted as being 
badly connected by road.  
These problems prompted the report’s recommendation for new roads and the 
widening of existing important thoroughfares, the extent of which is highlighted in 
Figure 30, which shows all the new roads and bypasses recommended to tackle the 
chronic traffic problem in the region.172  What is most notable about Figure 30 is the 
emphasis on better connections, bypasses and orbital roads outside of the city. These 
proposals totalled 256 miles of new roads and 79 miles of widening roads, mainly in 
Lancashire and Cheshire.173 
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Figure 29 - An image of the narrowness of important commercial roads. Source:  
Manchester and District Joint Town Planning Advisory Committee, Report upon the 
Regional Scheme (Manchester: Henry Blacklock and Co., 1926) p.39 
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Figure 30 - Map of the proposed new roads and bypasses drawn in red (lighter grey 
when printed in black and white), against existing roads in black. Source: Manchester 
and District Joint Town Planning Advisory Committee, Report upon the Regional 
Scheme (Manchester: Henry Blacklock and Co., 1926) p.63 
The report also set recommendations for the design and width of roads. For what they 
called “First-class Roads”, or the major roads, they recommended 100 feet width with 
buildings set back a further 25 feet on either side. This recommended width was 
almost ten times as wide as the gap indicated through Warrington.174 These widths are 
highlighted in Figure 31 which shows sketches of the widths in question, and roads and 
footpaths lined with shrubs and trees. These wide green boulevards were never 
realised, but their imagining shows both the expectations for increasing motor traffic 
and the vision for segregation of the streets that were often part of the utopian 
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imaginings of the previous decades. The automobile-centric vision continued into the 
post-Second World War era. The next town plan, the City of Manchester Plan 1945 
argued: 
We must have a road network properly designed to serve its essential purpose – the 
smooth, safe and speedy passage of a vastly expanded volume of motor traffic.175 
In Manchester between 1931 and 1938 725 people were killed on the road and 29,297 
injured. The plan argued that  
if all these people were Mancunians, then about one in every 1,180 of our citizens was 
killed and one in every 29 was injured. This slaughter must not go on.176  
A similar segregated, green, wide-boulevard design was recommended as a solution to 
the pedestrian problem, along with large “parkways” of 400 feet width, including up to 
4 lanes of traffic on each side and wide green avenues bordering the roads, reserved in 
case more lanes needed adding in future.   
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Figure 31 – Recommended road widths. Source: Manchester and District Joint Town 
Planning Advisory Committee, Report upon the Regional Scheme (Manchester: 
Henry Blacklock and Co., 1926) p.63 
In the city centre the council set up a Traffic Congestion Sub-Committee (TCSC) to 
periodically deal with the increasing traffic problem through analysis and traffic 
solutions. The minutes of this committee and the actions of the TCSC, while not 
necessarily that significant on their own, highlight the changing influence of different 
traffic interest groups. This is most striking in the conflict between the trams, road 
users and pedestrians. In the 1920s and in the decade before the First World War 
tensions were high between tram and motoring interests, with the council and the 
local police force often choosing between these different areas of interest. A writer to 
the Commercial Motor complained in 1905 that:  
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some municipal tram committees and managers which, indirectly, have influence and 
control over the local police, can and will punish the private owner for carrying above 
the licensed number of passengers, whilst at the same time they order their tram 
servants to do the very thing they fine others for. This is very notably the case at 
Manchester.177  
 
The great influence and power of the Tramways Company in Manchester prior to, and 
during, the First World War is evident in the TCSC minutes from this period. However, 
opinions were starting to change in the traffic power struggle in the city centre. Firstly, 
the makeup of TCSC included a representative from the tramway department but none 
from any other road user group.178 At a meeting of the TCSC in 1917 a proposal to 
restrict tram routes through the principal streets of the city centre was made by the 
Chief Constable, who believed that they were the main cause of congestion and any 
other scheme of relief would be ineffectual.  Predictably this was rejected by the 
General Manager of the Tramways who was, 
not prepared to discuss any scheme for relief of traffic in the City which does not allow 
tram cars to run through the principal streets.179  
The belief that trams were the cause of the problem mirrors the view of the 
Commercial Motor and many motoring advocates whose power to influence 
favourable legislative development was increasing both at a national and local level.180 
A report in the Commercial Motor described a typical city centre situation:  
Six or eight stationary trams in line, slow-moving horse vehicles between them and the 
kerb, a swarm of alighting and boarding passengers dodging the horses and, finally, a 
heterogeneous collection of traffic of all sorts waiting in the rear.181  
Horses too were under threat as the Corporation looked at constituting a Transport 
Department in 1919,  
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to control the whole of the vehicular traffic of the Corporation except Tramways, by 
the substitution of mechanically-propelled vehicles in place of those worked by horses, 
with the object of preventing the spread of infectious disease, to secure greater 
economy in working, lessen obstruction to street traffic, and ultimately to apply such a 
method of working to the whole of the street traffic of the City.182 
 
The urgency of the TCSC intensified in the 1920s and meetings, reports and actions 
became more frequent. It conducted research, surveying traffic usage and seeking 
information from other urban corporations such as London, Birmingham and Leicester, 
asking questions of use, economy and efficiency, and attended the road and transport 
congress in London in 1921.183 With the growing traffic problem the council 
acknowledged the growing “perils of street traffic” and they began to consider the use 
of one-way systems to minimise congestion and pedestrian risks.184  The proposed 
one-way system was shared with both the tramways manager and chief engineer, and 
the Manchester Committee of Road-Users (MCRU). 
 
R. C. Reynolds, Chairman of the MCRU, argued in 1923 for a more collaborative 
approach to traffic solutions involving all parties.185 However, as they became involved 
in consultation later in the decade, the MCRU endorsed a change, while the tramways 
opposed and were overruled by the Council. One of the chief points of contention was 
the passing of trams by motor vehicles at tram stops, often in the middle of the street. 
The tramways and the council pushed for legislation that restricted passing when tram 
passengers were on the roadway. This was opposed by motoring organisations such as 
the CMUA, MCRU, AA and RAC.186 In Manchester in 1923 there were 43 fatal and 1,396 
non-fatal accidents, mostly caused by motor vehicles, and many incidents occurring 
with pedestrians alighting or entering trams. The chief constable noted:  
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There were signs of a growing movement on the part of the public, though he 
admitted the blame was not always on the side of the motorist.187 
 
The MCRU endorsed the proposed circular one-way system around the city centre and 
the Chief Constable reported on its success in 1929:  
stoppages seriously hampered the business of the City, causing general interference 
with road transport in the neighbourhood, and resulted in discomfort and danger to 
pedestrians who of necessity had to thread their way through congested traffic…the 
adoption of the One-way System has practically eliminated the difficulties described, 
providing a natural – flow for all north and south bound traffic. The new system has, 
with the exception of the Piccadilly end of Mosley Street, had the effect of speeding up 
traffic considerably.188  
The exception was blamed on the build-up of tram traffic, with a restriction of stops 
proposed. The Chief Constable considered the one-way system a resounding success. 
Indeed, it would prompt its extension in other parts of the city. Yet accidents increased 
after the introduction. After 3 months of the new system there were 53 accidents and 
23 injuries, while under the old congested two-way system of the same period in 1927 
there were 46 accidents and 16 injuries, suggesting the balance of success was skewed 
towards the better movement of traffic rather than pedestrian safety.189 The Chief 
Constable’s response was that pedestrians would get used to it, and casualties would 
reduce. This attitude reflects the general attitude of local and national government 
identified by O’Connell and Moran, that good sense and education of pedestrians were 
relied upon more than motoring legislation or systems for road crossing during this 
period.190 
Further evidence of the increasing influence of motorists and sociotechnical 
imaginaries on the council and its traffic planning can be seen in a response to 
complaints from motorists that there was a distinct lack of parking in Manchester, 
whilst Birmingham had a municipal car park. The Chief Constable was in favour of 
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having such a car park in the city centre and proceeded to investigate. It was found 
that there were 38 garages offering accommodation and 3 garages for private 
customers with space for 2,660 vehicles, with an average number of motorcars parked 
on weekdays of 1,248, leaving 1,412 spaces available. Non-use was put down to 
excessive cost, with few spaces being obtained for under 1s a day, much more 
expensive than a tram fare which cost as little as 1d.191 While insignificant compared to 
commercial traffic, taxis and trams, the rising number of private motorists in the urban 
environment reflects the beginnings of the influence of commuter motorists on the 
city streets. In Manchester this meant the development of old industrial sites into car 
parking opportunities. The council for example used an old abandoned gas works as a 
temporary site for parking in the late 1920s and early 1930s.192 
As for the tram services, their decline was rapid. In 1929 the Chief Constable made a 
recommendation for an alternative bus service due to tram problems around Shudehill 
market, or to exclude trams from particular streets. This was attacked by the tramways 
general manager, yet the Chief Constable was backed by the Committee, marking a 
shift from a decade earlier.193 This was symptomatic not only of official opinion, but 
the opinion of prominent Manchester businessmen such as Herbert Whitworth: 
Many of my friends visiting home from the East during the past twelve or fifteen 
months have remarked about the deplorable state of our means of transport when 
they have seen the congestion of traffic in the main streets. I am not writing from a 
motorists’ point of view but purely as a citizen who is proud of Manchester and 
anxious for its reputation as a progressive city.194 
Silent in this debate was the voice of the ordinary tram commuter. This idea that the 
motorcar symbolised modernity, or “progress” has been identified by Pooley and 
Turnbull as an important interwar paradigm, and the argument that the trams were 
old-fashioned, and not only blocking the roads, but somehow blocking cultural and 
economic development was mirrored in other cities such as Glasgow.195 Throughout 
this chapter we have explored the pressures created around the meaning of 
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“progress” and the automobile, and exploring the changing attitudes of city planners 
and council leaders also reflects the influence of social and political pressures on the 
pervasiveness of the automobile and its increasing emphasis in the urban 
environment. 
Manufacturers and adaptation: heavy vehicle systems and developing specialism  
Commercial vehicle manufacturers tapped into this idea of “progress” and 
“modernity” that the automobile represented, looking to promote its use, both 
through specialist production of vehicles and through the development of different 
power sources.  
Miller and Church identify the trolleybus and the motorbus surge in the 1930s as 
important for the home market, with take up in urban centres like Manchester 
increasing considerably to 41 trolleybuses and 224 motorbuses by 1941; both Crossley 
and Leyland were prominent at developing their public transport manufacturing.196 
This can be seen as a response to the enthusiasm for motoring that was capturing 
urban corporations. At the same time, firms like Walker Brothers developed specialist 
systems for Corporation refuse collection - which was essentially a tipper lorry - for 
bespoke refuse carts used by horses. These proved to be a popular and economic for 
the hybrid use of horses and motor vehicles by a series of urban corporations both 
North and South.197 Walker Brothers also produced a tipping waggon that was 
particularly narrow:  
which was originally designed to meet the requirements of the Liverpool Corporation 
for a tipping wagon capable of manoeuvring in confined spaces. This chassis has now 
become so well known, particularly in the colliery and factory districts of the north.198  
Leyland also produced such vehicles especially for use on narrow streets.199 These 
problems show a particular urban demand and identify a need on the part of the 
potential user and manufacturer to solve the “horse problem” in the urban 
environment. From an economic point of view these examples also highlight how the 
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specialist commercial vehicle market could be especially resilient to foreign 
competition as design was tailored to specific UK urban situations and needs. 
The importance of specialist vehicle manufacture for firms like Crossley led them to 
slowly abandon their private motorcar production. Crossley historians argue that the 
firm thinly covered a wide market of commercial vehicles and cars to provide a degree 
of insurance and the car branch was not in deficit.200 We see the lessening importance 
of private motorcar production in the director’s minutes from the late 1930s. The 
directors keep deferring the decision to commission new projects until eventually the 
discussion is completely dropped.201Legislative factors also favoured this decision, and 
the direction of several firms. The War Department, for example, subsidised the 
construction of commercial vehicles that could be used in the event of war, and thus 
Crossley continued their relationship with military vehicle production from the First 
World War to the beginning of the Second when orders began increasing.202 
[Crossley] used its local and political influence to persuade the newly bus-minded City 
Council to buy from his company, emphasising the need to maintain employment for 
local people…. Offering to build buses to the precise specification of the Transport 
Department.203 
This relationship lasted for the rest of the interwar period and in the opinion of 
Crossley historians ensured the survival of the firm. The “Condor” bus model sold 152 
units, including 92 to Manchester and 20 to Rochdale, demonstrating the importance 
of securing local markets.204 Later “Condors” also showed a local bias, the 1934 
“Condor” was distributed as follows: Manchester 89, Rochdale 42, Portsmouth 21, 
Barrow 11, Northampton 9, Aberdeen 8, Bury 5, Ashton 4, St Helen’s 3, Burnley 2, 
Lancaster 2, Perth 2, Maidstone 2, Widnes 2 and 1 for Birmingham, Leicester, 
Liverpool, Stockton and Warrington.205 Crossley historians argue that: 
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AEC was a much larger firm and its principal customer for buses was London General. 
In an equivalent way, Manchester Corporation provided both encouragement and 
substantial orders for Crossley.206  
Crossley’s bus manufacturing and their relationship with the local councils offers a 
good example of technological co-construction, which we also see in the development 
of the diesel bus.  
Commercial power: diesel  
Today we are seeing a shift from diesel and petrol power to electric in an effort to 
make the automobile less environmentally harmful. One of the defining technical 
changes during our period was a shift from steam and petrol propulsion to diesel 
engines, of which North-West manufacturers and the engineering firm Gardners in 
particular, were prominent. There has been very little research on this shift, largely 
due to the general lack of research on commercial vehicles. However, Miller and 
Church suggest that the adoption of diesel power was linked to cheaper taxation, 
which by 1935 when the taxation was removed, had resulted in 11,000 vehicles being 
on the road.207 Diesel also had several technical advantages over petrol, which were 
particularly relevant to commercial or passenger vehicles, being more economical to 
run, capable of producing more torque and generally more reliable. Diesel’s 
disadvantages, such as less power and more noise were much more relevant to private 
motoring. 
Diesel gave off fewer fumes than petrol powered vehicles. A Manchester Corporation 
test in 1932 showed lower carbon monoxide content than petrol and generally less 
obnoxious fumes from different buses.208 This, and the running costs, was given as the 
main reason for the preference for diesel vehicles that Manchester Corporation put 
out from 1933, which in turn stimulated the direction of local manufacturing.209 This 
might not seem to be much of a consideration in the interwar period, however it was 
considered to be a significant factor in its favour and it became known by the public as 
“Yes, this is the bus which runs on heavy oil—you know what I mean, the one that runs 
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without giving off fumes.”, such was the testimonial of a passenger on a Crossley-
Gardner bus.210 This was not only a factor for passengers, but for drivers. It was 
remarked in the Commercial Motor that the diesel engine commercial vehicle “can be 
driven for hours without the dizziness so often occasioned by the fumes of a petrol 
lorry”.211 This opinion was echoed by an experienced commercial vehicle driver in 
Preston, writing to the Commercial Motor, who favoured the oil engine for this 
reason.212    
The development of diesel tied in with the theme of progress that the motor vehicle 
represented and formed part of the rapid replacement of extensive tram systems. For 
example, the Crossley advert in Figure 32 shows the “old Barrow trams” replaced by 
new “Crossley petrol and oil double deckers”. The advert also notes how this has 
happened across the region in Bury, Burnley, Rochdale and Manchester; further 
comparisons are made with Barrow as an “engineering centre” and this technological 
modern change that they have adopted.  This formed part of the imaginaries of 
progress that we have already explored as the electric tram was increasingly becoming 
the target of “modernising” motoring interests as the bus was quickly replacing the 
tram in many urban centres in the North-West.  
                                                          
210
 Commercial Motor 14/10/1930 
211
 Commercial Motor 3/5/1932 
212
 Commercial Motor 19/8/1930 
 
172 
 
 
Figure 32 - Crossley advert - Tramway and Railway World 9/7/1932 
 
Commercial power: electric 
We have already established that horses still had an important role in the 1920s and 
1930s on the streets of Britain’s industrial cities. The petrol commercial vehicle had 
failed to completely replace the horse, which had certain advantages in specialist 
situations that could not be overcome by petrol power. However, from 1930, electric 
vehicles, which were quiet and easy to stop and start, as well as economical at low 
speed and short distances marked the end of the horse on Britain’s roads. Electric 
commercial vehicle numbers began to grow steadily during the 1930s before booming 
after the Second World War.213 Mom highlights this as a striking development, as the 
UK did not favour the electric vehicle previously; there were for example, only 288 
electric vehicles in England in 1914, but over 4,500 by 1938, although this was only a 
small percentage of the 500,000 estimated commercial vehicles on the road.214 In the 
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Manchester region there were estimated to be 400 to 500 electrics by 1939, about 10 
percent of Britain’s electric vehicles.215 Why the UK developed an especial interest in 
the milk float and other short range delivery vehicles is unclear. Mom suggests 
legislation that prohibited the engine from running while the driver was not in the 
vehicle was a factor.216 However, it was horses that were often used for short range 
pickup and delivery jobs during this period. It is possible that the UK’s highly urbanised 
population relative to other countries had a role; we also see, especially in the UK that 
milk, bread and laundry services were managed by regional co-operative societies, 
which had the relative financial capital and stability to afford a fleet of electric vehicles. 
As well as this local fleet owners in Manchester managed to co-operate well with 
electricity supply authorities to get a standard, night-time charging tariff.217 The variety 
of electric vehicles was demonstrated at the Electric Vehicle Association of Great 
Britain’s annual exhibition, held in Manchester in 1939. There were 17 vehicles, from 
six manufacturers, including an ambulance, electric van and a coal delivery lorry as well 
as the more popular milk and bread delivery floats.218 
An example of a user of electric vehicles was the Manchester and Salford Equitable Co-
operative Society (MSECS) which began using electric in 1935 with the purchase of four 
vehicles. By 1939 they had 82 electric vehicles in operation, which was on a par with 
the level of petrol vehicles they used.219 Thirty of these vehicles were used to deliver 
bread house-to-house and the remainder were used to deliver milk, directly replacing 
horse and hand-drawn carts, although horses were still used for very dense work.220 
Similarly to the laundry service described above the MSECS used petrol vehicles to 
supply 10 local depots where the electric vehicles worked about 20 miles a day.  The 
Commercial Motor reasoned that drivers could get milk to customers earlier and more 
hygienically.221 Similarly the electric vehicle was adopted by the United Co-operative 
Dairies, who distributed milk for 16 of Manchester’s regional co-operative societies. 
Figure 33 shows the Bury Co-operative Society fleet featuring 4 milk and two bakery 
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delivery vehicles. One of the biggest orders, demonstrating the financial prosperity of 
co-operative societies, was made by the Bristol Co-operative Society which ordered 
285 electric vehicles in 1939, although this was partly due to the fear of the War 
Department requisitioning their petrol fleet for a possible war.222 As well as co-
operative societies, urban corporations were also purchasing electric vehicles, for 
example Glasgow looked to electric as an alternative to horses for refuse collection, 
purchasing custom vehicles designed by Metropolitan-Vickers Electrical Co. Ltd 
(Metro-Vicks).223  
 
Figure 33 - Bury District Co-operative Society - Metro Vick electric vehicle fleet - The 
Metropolitan Vickers Gazette April 1939 p.96 
Metropolitan-Vickers, a diverse large electrical firm based at Trafford Park, was a 
prominent producer of electric vehicles during the 1930s. Activity started with interest 
from corporations and co-operative societies in the mid-1930s, and a department was 
set up for construction of vehicles. However, production was modest and orders 
intermittent. There was also Victors Electrics of Southport, founded by a bakery in 
1923 to manufacture electric vehicles for their own use. During the 1920s there were 
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no known electric vehicle manufacturers in the UK, so the bakery looked at importing 
and found it too expensive.224 After using vehicles for four years they decided to 
produce electrics for the market for as little as £150 a unit. This firm represented one 
of the few successful entries into the motor industry during this period. This was the 
case because the firm found a niche of production due to its experience as a user. The 
electric vehicle had been used and tried as a taxi fleet, as private vehicles, and now 
found a long-term successful place as a replacement for the horse and cart for short 
distance delivery and pick up work, the use of which also showed the modernity and 
prosperity of the electric vehicle users. 
Conclusion 
Traffic and the “invasion” of the private motorcar and passenger vehicle in the 
countryside has been identified as an important paradigm of the interwar period, 
offering both working-class and middle-class families the opportunity of broadening 
their holiday and weekend options, in what Law describes as social convergence.225 
Similar to the charabancs of the 1930s, the tramways in Manchester and surrounding 
areas that developed from the beginning of the twentieth century have been 
described as offering the working-classes the opportunity to live outside of walking 
distance to work, the majority of fares costing 1d or less in 1907, with fares subsidised 
by the Corporation.226 Oral history interviews recorded by Pooley and Turnbull 
highlight how the trams were both very cheap, and extremely frequent, and a 
preferred mode of transit for many working-class families. Indeed, trams in 
Manchester in 1930 carried a total of 400 million passengers, and this continued as 
motor services started to replace the tram system in the 1930s and 1940s.227 This 
compares to 1,248 cars parked in the city per week day, or roughly 350,000 a year, 
representing less than 0.1 percent of journeys into the city centre when compared to 
trams.228 Despite the tram’s important role in democratising travel there was a shift 
towards favouring the commercial motor vehicle by the TCSC and the council, in what 
was part of a social shift highlighted by O’Connell in his research on pedestrian safety, 
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namely that the economic and political mass of the motoring lobby, both commercial 
and private, was starting to have a strong effect.229 Traffic was also important in the 
city’s economy. Textile industry historian Dupree described the Manchester textile 
industry by 1938 as “a shadow of its former self”.230Traffic and the effectiveness of 
road haulage is an unexplored factor of the industry’s demise.  
Traffic even affected Manchester’s reputation as a progressive city. Urban traffic 
during this period underwent massive change, not just in Manchester but in many 
other UK cities. This was generally caused by the massively increased potential of 
commercial motoring, deemed to offer a flexible and quick alternative to rail, canal or 
horse haulage; in Lancashire’s case, with an industry which required the often-complex 
movement of raw materials, spun cotton and unfinished and finished goods, such a 
change was vital. This shift to motorised road transport has had a significant impact on 
our lives and is still prevalent today, although now we focus more on the problems of 
motor commuter traffic, rather than commercial. We see however the shift in 
dominance on the urban road, which started in the interwar period with the motor 
vehicle as a part of the whole but ended with its dominance of the road. This paradigm 
shift can only be understood if we look at the meanings and imaginaries created 
around automobilism during this period. The utopian visions championed by 
automobile advocates and manufacturers, especially the idea that the automobile 
represented “societal progress”, were accepted by the council who looked to the 
automobile for solutions to traffic problems and planners, who started to recommend 
and re-design the city landscape to reflect the needs of motor traffic above other 
forms of mobility.   
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2.6 - Chapter 2 conclusion 
This chapter has focused on the sociotechnical imaginaries surrounding the 
automobile: broadly, that as the automobile improved it could help solve some of the 
problems of society. These imaginaries generally revolved around increasing the speed 
of the conveyance of goods, people and services, which in turn improved economies 
for all. It has been argued that this imaginary had a particularly strong impact on the 
emergence of commercial motoring which was neither particularly reliable nor 
economical in the Victorian and Edwardian period. During the interwar period the 
sociotechnical imaginaries were not just promoted by motoring advocates but had 
been accepted generally by local councils, planners and the wider business community. 
The utopian visions of the automobile speeding goods, people and public services 
across the country grew to widespread acceptance, an important aspect of which was 
the symbolic power of the automobile as representing both technological and social 
progress, and modernity. The commercial vehicle played an important role in 
legitimising the early use of the automobile and in bringing about a wider acceptance 
of the technology.  Users, non-users and manufacturers have been shown to play a 
part, shaping the general direction of technical innovation and closing the gap 
between the imagined future and the technical and infrastructural realities of the day.  
We have shown that commercial motoring deserves more scholarly attention. Often a 
sub-category of the automobile, and rarely studied in much depth, the concept of the 
utility of motoring, an argument often used to justify automobilism, was used 
frequently from the beginning of automobilism around 1896 through the interwar 
period. Studying this, and the development and acceptance of the commercial motor 
vehicle, can help us understand more about how the automobile in general moved 
from an unreliable technological curiosity to a ubiquitous and integral factor in 
Western society.  
So far in Chapter 1 we have looked at alternatives explanations for the diffusion of the 
automobile, to technological determined economic theories. In Chapter 1 we showed 
how cultural aspects moulded the automobile’s adoption by an examination of the 
user. Similarly, in Chapter 2 we have seen how sociotechnical imaginaries and 
intermediary actors such as the LSTPA also played their part in influencing 
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manufacturers and technological development. Thus, in the final chapter, on the 
automobile industry, we will continue to challenge economic theories by looking at 
how the evolving automobile culture, the user, and the automobile dealer, influenced 
the manufacture of the automobile.  
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Chapter 3 - The North-West’s motor industry 
 
3.1 - Introduction 
This chapter explores the motor industry in north-west England from 1896 to 1939, 
including regional motor manufacturers and automobile agents and dealers. It 
examines their relationship both with the region, the engineering workforce, and with 
the growing number of automobile users discussed in earlier chapters. In the literature 
review we identified several areas in which UK automobile scholarship is weak, which 
we shall address in this chapter. These include a lack of studies for outside of Coventry, 
an absence of research on motorcar dealers, and an imbalance of focus on motorcars 
and the interwar period. Considering the previous two chapters we will also look to 
reconcile the economic and cultural views of the emergence of motoring and motor 
manufacturing which we identified as forming two separate streams of automobile 
scholarship. 
 
The first section will start with a statistical overview of the regional motor industry. 
Analysis shows a much greater number of firms producing automobiles than expected. 
The reason for this is the identification of many experimental and short-lived local 
manufacturers in the pre-1914 period. While scholars acknowledge the existence of 
such firms, they do not feature in statistical analysis, or detailed study. For example, 
Saul commented that, “then came the flood of tiny engineering firms which mostly 
failed within a very short time in a boom between 1901-1904”.1 Why they failed is not 
explored. Later, Foreman-Peck, Bowden and McKinley argued that entry into the 
industry was rapid until a trade slump in 1907-1908, without going into detail.2 Small 
manufacturers are missed because they are economically insignificant, and source 
material is elusive because of the brevity of their existence. This makes statistical 
analysis difficult, and inaccurate; and a comparison with national statistics redundant, 
as so many of these small firms are missing from national analysis. This therefore 
raises some important questions and areas for further research: why did these small 
firms start manufacturing? Why were they so brief? Regional and economic 
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scholarship arguments are relatively straightforward, although in some cases they are 
implied due to lack of focus in this area: that these firms failed to get capital 
investment to successfully increase manufacturing scale, and therefore could not 
compete with large firms who came into the industry later and could afford to produce 
cars at a greater economy and at a greater scale.3   
 
These questions lead us to the second section, on the origins of the industry in North-
West. This section looks more closely at identifying and exploring regional firms who 
entered the industry during this early period. Furthermore, analysing these firms and 
individuals can help us to explore the direction of technological innovation. These firms 
often had local links to cycling and thus were close to potential users, and the ready 
“bicycle culture” that has been argued as so important for fostering enthusiasm for the 
automobile. Secondly many early designers and manufacturers were themselves 
users;4 indeed there are several examples of knowledgeable users who made vehicles 
independently. Small local cycle and motor manufacturers and agents were 
themselves keen users. We saw in Chapter 1 how sceptical cyclists noted that most 
motorcycle users they noticed in were involved in the trade.5 These “traders”, either 
early agents or manufacturers, played a role in generating interest among potential 
user groups; they did so by promoting vehicles at local cycle and motor shows 
organised through local trade organisation. While many of these firms might have 
briefly manufactured automobiles and indeed probably did exit manufacturing for 
economic reasons, they often continued in the industry as local agents for the larger 
manufacturers using their experience in design and use, as well as their knowledge of 
local motoring to promote and sell other automobiles. Analysis shows that entries into 
the industry came from a large range of other industrial backgrounds including textiles, 
coachbuilding and electrical engineering. Understanding why these individuals and 
firms entered the industry is difficult, although analysis of sources when they are 
available suggests that these “experimental” firms were inspired not so much by the 
prospects of economic gain but by less tangible factors such as engineering curiosity, 
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personal experience of motoring, or a more general belief in the future of the 
automobile. 
 
The third section focuses on the dealer and agent, and the sale of the automobile, an 
area of study that has been described as “the true ‘missing masses’ of technology 
studies”.6 In order to remedy this, this section examines the unique archive material 
from local businesses: coachbuilder Joseph Cockshoot and Co. and car dealer Quicks, 
both based in Manchester. By looking at these firms this section highlights the 
important role of the regional agent and dealer in connecting the user, or customer, to 
the manufacturer, the way in which dealer and agent networks could be used to 
market automobiles, the importance of long lasting relationships between dealer and 
manufacturer, and the way in which dealers were integral to the success of 
manufacturers. 
 
The final section finishes by looking at specific regional factors that affected either the 
demise or movement of motor manufacturing firms. Analysis shows that generally 
there were few regional aspects that were important. However, labour in the motor 
industry played a role in regional performance. The management of labour and the 
ability for automobile workers to organise is an important aspect of the automobile 
industry and forms part of the larger narrative looking at the fate of the UK’s motor 
industry after the Second World War.7 This section looks at labour organisation in 
Manchester during the First World War and the 1920s in order to engage with 
arguments on this subject that suggest regional differences in labour organisation 
played a part in regional performance.8 While Coventry in particular has been the 
source of much study in this regard, Manchester has not. Analysis of union activity in 
the automobile sector shows that unionisation in Manchester, compared to other 
centres of the automobile industry, was relatively strong. Furthermore, national events 
such as the iron moulders’ strike of 1919-1920 and the Engineering Employers 
                                                          
6
 Pinch, “Giving Birth to New Users” p.248 
7
 For example, Foreman-Peck, Bowden and McKinley, The British Motor Industry pp.165-190 highlight 
how labour relations, management and organisation were important factors in the decline of the British 
motor industry 
8
 Tolliday, “Management and Labour in Britain 1896-1939” p.42; Foreman-Peck, Bowden and McKinley, 
The British Motor Industry p.64; Thoms and Donnelly, The motor car industry in Coventry p.81 
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Federation (EEF) played an important role in the regional performance of the 
automobile industry and affected firms in radically different ways, complicating our 
understanding of labour relations and the industry during the interwar period. 
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3.2 - Statistical overview and regional context 
A statistical analysis complements the largely qualitative data used in this chapter and 
the rest of this work. High level statistical analysis has been used by economic 
automobile scholars in order to draw conclusions about the national industry. 
However, a lack of comparative depth in regional studies has led to some errors in 
information in national studies which especially affects analysis of the pre-1914 period.  
Saul provides a table for national production for 1913, which he puts at 34,000 and 
proceeds to breakdown by manufacturer.  He lists Belsize, a prominent Manchester 
firm, as producing roughly 1,000 vehicles. Yet investigation of company records, 
contemporary newspaper reports and trade journals puts estimates for production in 
1913 closer to 3,000 vehicles a year, a considerable difference from 3.4 percent of the 
national market to nearer 10 percent. Saul’s table has subsequently been used by 
historians although several urge caution when using these figures.9 Similarly historians 
since Saul have erroneously categorised Belsize as originating from the cycle industry, 
even those who have subsequently explored the firm in more detail such as Clayton 
(2004), George (1989 and 2004) and Worthington-Williams (1984).10 These mistakes 
highlight the relatively poor research into Manchester based companies, although this 
is largely because automobile historians have not been aware of the dedicated local 
research of Manchester motor historian A. D. George. 
One of the main problems with Saul’s analysis of survivability and geographical 
location is that the large number of small firms that operated regionally do not feature 
in his analysis. Similarly, scholars focus on motorcar manufacturing rather than 
commercial and motorcycle manufacturing which were also important parts of the 
industry, as demonstrated in the previous chapters. Demonstrative of this failure in 
national analysis is the large number of firms that research has uncovered in the 
region, both by this research and the work of George. This is indicated by the 138 
manufacturers of motor vehicles found in the North-West between 1896 and 1939, a 
                                                          
9
 Riley, Lilleker and Tuckett, The English Model T Ford p.72; Beaven, The Growth and Significance of the 
Coventry Car Component Industry p.46 
10
 Historians who categorise Belsize accordingly include Saul, “The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914” 
p.25-26; Peck, Bowden and McKinlay, The British Motor Industry p.14 and p.30; Lewchuck, W. A., 
American Technology and the British Motor Vehicle Industry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987) pp.124-125; Tolliday, “Management and Labour in Britain 1896-1939” p.41; Georgano, Baldwin, 
Clausager and Wood (1995) pp.32-3 & pp.59-60  
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much larger number than expected at the start of this study. These firms and the 
information known about them are listed in Appendix 1. These high numbers can be 
explained by the relatively large numbers of small firms in existence at the beginning 
of the industry. Many of them were cycle producers, or cycle shop owners who 
motorised their products by purchasing components such as an engine and attaching 
these to the cycle frame. However, there are still many significant later firms missed by 
national analysis. For example, Saul lists three motorcar manufacturers based in 
Manchester in 1913: Ford, Belsize and Crossley. However, there were at least 5 others 
producing cars or cyclecars. These included Newton and Bennett, Haynes Economy 
Motors, Bell Brothers, Jackson and Edwards, Robertson and Woodrow.  
The problem with this difference is a lack of sources and a lack of detailed research on 
smaller firms. This has been helped by Georgano’s encyclopaedia of the automobile, a 
meticulously researched list of motorcar manufacturers that includes many small firms 
and short-lived manufacturers. Georgano’s work looks to explore not just prominent 
manufacturers but all those with: ”intention to manufacture, even if it was not a 
success, and resulted in more than a single prototype.”11  Georgano’s encyclopaedia 
postdates many of the prominent economic works on the motorcar, with the obvious 
result that Georgano’s work identifying motor manufacturers is missing from the body 
of analysis.12 A more accurate data analysis can be found in Marr’s work on the British 
motorcycle industry which used a number of well researched motorcycle 
encyclopaedias to gather data.13 Having said this, encyclopaedias still miss the most 
fleeting and small of firms, many of which only have one or two sources documenting 
their existence. This makes it difficult to be certain if firms manufactured and sold any 
vehicles. For example, the only source for the Express Motor Vehicle Company in 
Manchester was the auction of assets on winding up advertised in the local 
newspaper: listed are a number of motor vehicles, many of which were produced by 
other firms and named as such, but a few were unnamed so were probably 
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 Georgano, N., The Beaulieu Encyclopaedia of the Automobile (London: Routledge, 2000) 
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 Particularly Church, The rise and decline of the British motor industry and Foreman-Peck, Bowden and 
McKinley, The British Motor Industry 
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 Such as Bacon, R. and Hallworth, K., The British Motorcycle Directory: Over 1,100 Marques from 1888 
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constructed by the firm.14 Insufficient information is available in several of these cases 
to gather even basic data, such as when they entered and exited the industry. 
Manufacturers can also be known primarily as agents. Several produced their own 
versions of vehicles and continued for many years as automobile agents; firms such as 
William Lea of Liverpool owned a large motorcar depot in Manchester, and operated 
for many years as a motorcar agent, but also produced the “Liver” car for an unknown 
number of years during the early 1900s. Similarly, L. F. Harvey and Co. produced their 
own “New Pick” motorcar in 1907 but were also agents for Rex and Roc motorcycles, 
and later agents for commercial vehicles.15  This lack of information creates problems 
for basic statistical analysis and thus Figure 34, showing entry and exit figures, has 
excluded firms where the years of operation are unknown or cannot be 
approximated.16  
That said, Figures 34 and 35 track the entries and exits in the North-West’s motor 
industry, whilst Figure 36 shows the number of firms overall in the industry in each 
year. Again, these charts do not include many firms for which no clear chronology is 
possible. This is particularly the case for motorcycle manufacturers as only 7 out of 45 
can be dated; for most of these the only source is the Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 
published in 1906, which highlights many firms’ operating in this year; subsequent 
research has failed, in most cases, to find further information. Local trade directories, 
such as the annual Slater’s Manchester, Salford and Surburban Trade Directory, are 
useful for providing basic information on firms; however, the categorisation of firms 
makes some of the listings inaccurate. Several manufacturers identified in the Motor 
and Cycle Trade Directory of 1906 are not listed in the trade directory as “motor 
manufacturers”, but instead are listed under “cycle makers and dealers” probably 
because this was their primary trade. These issues mean that statistical analysis needs 
to be viewed as giving a rough overview rather than an accurate mapping of the 
industry. The North-West follows national trends in the motor industry in several ways. 
First the period between 1896 and 1905 is marked by many firms entering the 
industry, followed by a period of a large number of exits between 1906 and 1909. This 
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pattern is recognised by Marr for the motorcycle industry in the UK, and Beaven in his 
overview of entries and exits in the national industry.17 Similarly a peak in entries 
between 1919 and 1921 is recognised as a national trend following post-war optimism 
and demand, followed by production being concentrated in the hands of fewer and 
fewer manufacturers during the interwar period.18 
 
Figure 34 –Overall entries and exits in the motor industry in the North-West per year, 
1895-1939 
 
Figure 35 - Change in the number of firms per year in the North-West, 1895-1939. 
See Appendix 1 for data and sources 
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 Marr, “The geography of the British motorcycle industry, 1896-2004” p.170; Beaven, The Growth and 
Significance of the Coventry Car Component Industry p.46 
18
 Miller and Church, “Motor Manufacturing” p.186 
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Figure 26 – Total number of motor manufacturers in the North-West – See Appendix 
1 for data and sources 
The problems surrounding the documenting of firms in the early years means that a 
comparison cannot be attempted with Saul’s analysis, or with Foreman-Peck, Bowden 
and McKinley’s examination of the survival of motor firms pre-1914. The latter’s work 
shows that a higher proportion of pre-1900 firms survive to 1914 than of those who 
start between 1901 and 1905. The difference is significant, with more than 1 in 3 pre-
1900 firms surviving, compared to 1 in 10 of those who started between 1901 and 
1905.19 This ratio of survival might also apply to the North-West, but the validity of the 
two studies can be doubted, due to the previous discussion. 
The North-West’s motor industry then, was generally more numerous than scholars 
suppose; although this is likely the case for other areas of the country where small 
firms or individual constructions have also gone unrecognised. This economically 
insignificant group of small manufacturers are little studied and is an aspect we will be 
exploring in the following section on the origins of the industry.  
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3.3 - The origins of the motor industry 
Cycling  
Automobile scholarship has long established the importance of the cycle industry in 
the origins of motor manufacturing in the UK. This has been clearly demonstrated in 
the cycle industry’s heartland of Coventry and the Midlands, where by 1913 75 percent 
of Coventry’s motor vehicle output came from firms that had a cycle background.20 
Scholars emphasise the obvious technical link, reasoning that all the Coventry cycle 
firms that expanded into automobile production were successful.21 Scholars have also 
stressed the economic link as many cycle firms entered the motor industry for reasons 
of alternative income following the end of the cycle boom in the late 19th century.22 
More recent scholarship has emphasised the cultural link between cycling and 
motoring. The established “bicycle craze” created a ready culture that embraced the 
experience of speed, tinkering and touring that formed the basis of automobile 
culture.23 We examined the complex nature of this cultural link in Chapter 1 
highlighting factors such as speed, novelty and peer pressure as aspects of the 
automobile’s uptake.  This section will look at cycle firms in Manchester and will argue 
that cycle culture created a ready consumer group for early automobiles, which local 
cycle manufacturers and agents very quickly identified. This is demonstrated by the 
actions of local trade organisations and small cycle producers. Manchester’s cycle 
industry shows a small, but growing, locally significant industry which served the needs 
of cyclists in what became a popular local pastime. Small firms have not previously 
been explored in scholarship, which has instead focused on large manufacturers and 
national clubs. An overview of Manchester’s cycle industry will be followed by an 
examination of the links between cycling and motoring in Manchester.  
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 Thoms and Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry in Coventry p.14 
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Manchester’s cycle industry 
Apart from work by Nick Clayton, scholarship on the cycle industry tends to focus on 
the Midlands, the industry’s centre. Clayton’s article on the Manchester cycle industry 
from 1870-1900 provides a history of some of the important Manchester cycle firms 
and offers an overview of cycling interest in Manchester. However, like economic 
historians of the automobile, Clayton focuses on large, economically significant 
manufacturers leading him to conclude that: “lacking major cycle makers at the end of 
the century, the region consequently spawned relatively few local motorcar 
companies.”24 While Manchester certainly lacked major cycle makers, it spawned 
dozens of automobile manufacturers, which had a prior or parallel relationship with 
the local cycle trade.  
McLeay showed that in 1891 88 percent of cycle firms were situated in 
Wolverhampton, Birmingham and Coventry.25 Millward examined data from national 
trade directories and compiled a database for the number of firms engaged in the 
cycle industry from every year until 1939. This data is useful for comparative research 
on a local level. For example, in 1900, there were 3,329 companies listed as cycle 
manufacturers and agents nationally.26 The Manchester and Salford trade directory 
shows 191 firms in Manchester for the same year, 5 percent of the national figure, a 
small but significant percentage. Sources for Manchester’s cycle industry include trade 
directories, trade periodicals, show catalogues, advertising material and local 
newspaper reports. Trade directories provide the names, locations and numbers of 
companies every year which allows for a certain amount of statistical analysis. While 
the number of firms is a useful indicator of the size of an industry, there are no volume 
statistics available; therefore, firms producing radically different volumes carry the 
same weight. This is particularly important when comparing Manchester’s cycle 
industry to the Midlands.  The Manchester Cycle Manufacturing Company, 
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 N. Clayton, “A Missed Opportunity?” p.193 
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Manchester’s biggest bicycle manufacturer, had a capital of £50,000, significantly less 
than many Midland producers.27  
Trade directory research shows that the cycle trade in Manchester developed on 
similar lines to the national industry. Although it was small, it was healthy, and had a 
regional identity. Figure 38 shows that the number of firms started to increase rapidly 
from 1896 to 1900 reflecting the cycle boom of the 1890s. Numbers also appear to be 
relatively unaffected by the end of the cycling boom at the turn of the century. This is 
contrary to the national trend, which saw a decrease in the overall number of firms.28 
This is perhaps a reflection of the small size of the Manchester firms, whilst larger firms 
based in the Midlands struggled due to increasing competition in the export market.29 
This saw the demise of Manchester’s biggest firm, the Manchester Cycle 
Manufacturing Company, which relied on their overseas market.30 
Trade directories also show the areas in which the cycle industry was operating in 
Manchester. Although the majority of businesses were in the city centre, there were 
significant pockets of firms in Hulme and Salford, and to a lesser extent Ardwick, 
Chorlton-on-Medlock and Moss Side (Figure 38). The number of firms in “other” 
locations shows the large dispersal around Manchester, reflecting the large number of 
suburban cycle clubs and cyclists. The component and accessory industry was much 
smaller, but numbers increased at the same time as the number of cycle agents and 
manufacturers seen in Figure 39.  
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Figure 37 - Sources: Slater's Manchester and Salford Trade Directories (1881-1900) 
(trade directory for 1898 missing)  
 
Figure 38 – Source: Slater's Manchester and Salford Trade Directory (1900) 
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Figure 39 - Sources: Slater's Manchester and Salford Trade Directories (1883-1900) 
(trade directory for 1898 missing).  
The Manchester cycle industry was small but significant enough that in 1896 the 
Manchester and District Cycle Trades’ Association (MDCTA) was established to protect 
local interests. The Association organised the Manchester Cycle Show from 1897, 
which became the Manchester Cycle and Motor Show (MCMS) in 1899. The show was 
increasingly popular and a catalogue for the 1899 show proudly states that it was: 
“over applied for before a single advertisement appeared in any journal”.31 Further 
demonstrating the health of the industry was a report in the Manchester Guardian 
during the 1898 show:   
One thing the exhibition makes very clear is the extent to which the manufacture of 
cycles is becoming a Lancashire industry. A large number of Manchester firms are 
represented, and machines have been sent in from almost every town in the district – 
in particular from Oldham, Bolton, Bury, Rochdale and Blackburn. The quality of the 
Lancashire work is extremely good.32 
Despite the northern bias, analysis of the exhibitors at the 1899 show does 
demonstrate the strength of local manufacturing: 50 of the 67 stands for cycles were 
taken by Lancashire manufacturers.  
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Manchester’s cycling and motoring links 
Early links are in evidence when we examine the MCMS and the organisation of the 
MDCTA. Of the eight companies that had motorised vehicles on show at the MCMS of 
1899 (two motorcars, six motorcycles), seven were also exhibiting a variety of cycles.33 
Frank Bullock, one such exhibitor, was the owner of the Strangeways Cycle Company, 
and a committee member of the MDCTA. He showed a very early interest in entering 
the motor industry, advertising several times in The Autocar during 1896 and 1897, 
including: 
All kinds of light autocar and motor work undertaken – F. Bullock, Strangeways Cycle 
Works34 
Advertiser with workshops situated in Manchester is open to undertake experimental 
autocar and motor work, or would manufacture any specialty under contract35 
Several other individuals involved in the 1899 show were also prominent in both the 
cycle and motor industries. For example, John Newton, committee member of the 
MDCTA, was an agent for Enfield Cycles, before partnering and becoming motorcar 
agents and then manufacturers. There was also Fredrick Nawell of Hulme who went 
from ironmonger, to cycle maker and dealer, to motor manufacturer and back again 
finally to ironmonger. Ralph Jackson, cycle maker from Altrincham, went from making 
bicycles to manufacturing the Century tandem, which took part in the 1900 Thousand 
Mile Trial. 
There were also firms far less committed to either industries. Baxendale and Co. 
exhibited both “Beanco” cycles and motorcycles at the 1899 show, which must have 
been a brief venture from a company whose “Beanco” trademark covered products 
from toilet seats to golf balls. The number of firms at the 1899 show exhibiting both 
motorised and non-motorised cycles was relatively small: under 10 percent of 
exhibitors. Despite this by 1906 about 40 small firms in Manchester were making both 
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bicycles and motorcycles, most of which would have been based on the same basic 
cycle frame, with both bicycle and motorcycle having the same name.36 There are 
several examples of this in the 1906 trade directory (see Figures 40 and 41). The clear 
technical crossover between cycle and motor manufacturing in these earlier years 
made it easy for the small Manchester firms to experiment. In Chapter 1 we explored 
the relationship between local cyclists and motoring, and it is likely that customers of 
these firms fuelled this experimentation as local cyclists were exposed to this new 
form of mobility. These potential customers were also exposed to motoring through 
the showing of machines at local events such as the annual MCMS and through club 
runs. 
A stronger connection with local users, or potential users, can help us explain the large 
number of early experimental firms. Economic analysis shows how many large cycle 
firms entered the industry much later than many of these small experimental firms. 
Rover, Triumph, Swift and Singer, - large Coventry based firms - were relatively late to 
start production; for example, Rover and Triumph only started producing motor 
vehicles in 1902.37 Thoms and Donnelly highlight that the industry was relatively 
unprofitable for around the first decade from 1896, and that larger firms benefited 
from the pioneering experimental work of smaller firms, when they later entered the 
industry.38 It is difficult therefore to explain the large number of experimenters 
without considering automobilism, the imagined or potential user, and the 
sociotechnical imaginaries and enthusiasm that it created.  
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Figure 40 – WM. Wilson advert - Source: Motor and Cycle Trade Directory (1906) 
p.144 
 
Figure 41 – Albert Jones advert - Source: Motor and Cycle Trade Directory (1906) 
p.144 
The complex motivations and relationships of early manufacturers can be seen in the 
design innovation of motorcycles which so closely resemble the pedal bicycle. Taking a 
particular aspect such as the persistence of pedals on motorcycles not only shows the 
technological influence of cycling, but also the expectations of the user and designer. 
This provides a good example of how the innovation of technology is, as Mom argues, 
“a complex societal phenomenon”.39 Initially it was thought that the motor could offer 
cyclists auxiliary power. Thus the cycling experience was not radically being altered but 
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enhanced as in the case of the motorcycles in Figures 40 and 41, by an auxiliary motor. 
This auxiliary wish has been highlighted previously, although the reality often differed 
from expectations, as explained by the Manchester Guardian cycling columnist: 
Often a wish is expressed by cyclists that they could have some light motor clipped on 
to their machines to help up hills or when they become fatigued. Motors have been 
clipped to cycles, but the cyclist soon finds that it is uphill where he must help the 
engine, and that it will only run alone when the running is favourable40 
Why then did pedals persist for several decades of motorcycle design? One factor is 
that the pedals were engineered as a starting mechanism for the engine.41 Another is 
the unreliability of the early combustion engine, the pedals being used to recover a 
vehicle from a breakdown. The design is however more understandable if we use the 
theoretical framework developed by Mom in Figure 1.42  Using this model pedals 
reflect the need of cyclists (users) for some sort of physical exertion. This need was 
identified in chapter 1, and is encapsulated in the desire for “auxiliary” power despite 
the unachieved reality of “auxiliary” power. If we look at trade journals and the actions 
of organisational bodies (intermediary actors) we see other attitudes and problems 
with pedals expressed which adds to the picture of the complex sociotechnical 
interactions surrounding a particular aspect of cycle and motorcycle technology. The 
Motor Cycle argued that pedalling should not be allowed in races, such as the yearly T. 
T. race organised by the Auto Cycle Club, as the auxiliary power from pedalling varied 
from rider to rider and thus was not a fair reflection of the competing machines’ 
capabilities.43 Here we see a flip of the “auxiliary power” concept. Rather than the 
motor aiding the pedalling cyclist, the pedalling motorcyclist was pedalling to enhance 
the performance of the engine and thus was believed to be adversely affecting the 
development of the “ideal” touring motorcycle. 44 This is reflected in “pedalling” and 
“non-pedalling” classes for hill climbing competitions such as the Motor Cycle Union of 
Ireland’s hill climb in 1907. The margin of difference was minimal: four riders who 
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entered both competitions only averaged of 9.5 seconds slower when not pedalling.45 
Further to this an anonymous motorcycle manufacturer believed that: 
if I sold only machines that were not fitted with pedals the sales would decrease, as 
practically every [unreadable word] pedals his motor away in the manner he has been 
used to on a push bicycle.46  
Here pedalling takes on a different function, offering the cyclist a familiar action, while 
providing limited technological advantage. This hybridity can also be seen in heavier 
early automobiles which used carriage technology for bodies and suspensions; on top 
of this tiller steering was widely used before 1900, associated with water navigation.47 
In these changes there was familiarity, but also other psychological relationships. For 
example, Mom argues that the way in which motorists physically and psychologically 
“looked down on commoners” was inherited from carriage culture. This aspect can be 
seen clearly in evidence explored in Chapter 1 where MAC members act in a cavalier 
manner towards local residents. 
The development of motorcycles with pedals by experimental manufacturers can be 
seen to reflect the vision of the motor bicycle as offering an enhancement of the 
cycling experience. This was an imaginary vision for the technology that did not 
necessarily reflect the realities of use, in a similar way to the commercial vehicle 
imaginaries and realities discussed in Chapter 2. The persistence of the pedal, and 
changing realities of the “auxiliary” power concept shows how the imaginaries of users 
and designers and the realities of use and the attitude towards peddling in racing were 
complex interactions that not only shaped the direction of technological innovation 
but inspired engineers.  
Small firms linked with cycling and the cycle industry, were often brief and insignificant 
from an economic point of view. Output was small, profits, if any, were therefore 
modest and they were unlikely to get investment. However, in the mediation between 
designer and user to form the technological artefact these firms played an important 
role; like the agent and dealer in later sections they were closer to their customers 
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than large manufacturing firms who relied on agents to sell their products. Figure 50 
for example shows how customers of small firms such as Eagle (Altrincham) and 
Robinson and Price (Liverpool) were largely based within close proximity of the town 
of manufacture, and thus had personal contact with the maker. The way in which 
several of these firms exited the manufacturing industry to become agents shows that, 
far from being failures by not increasing the size of their business, these firms can be 
viewed as both pioneering and adaptable and can be used as an example supporting 
the findings of newer economic historians such as Rose and Colli who argue that small 
businesses were important in driving innovation.48 Firms such as Newton and Bennett, 
who manufactured the S.C.A.T. car in Manchester, continued as successful motor 
agents into the 1920s. Similarly firms such as William Lea of Liverpool produced the 
“Liver” car for a short period but was also a successful agent for a decade longer.49 The 
adaptability of these firms also offers a different perspective from older economic 
theories such as Lazonick who viewed personal capitalism as a barrier to innovation; as 
a single enthusiast engineer, many of these ventures into motor production were not 
constrained by having to convince directors or shareholders.50 
So far, we have focused on cycle traders. However, firms came from a variety of 
backgrounds that belies the region’s reputation for textiles or the heavy industries that 
supported the staple trade. In both the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
Manchester is often referred to as “Cottonopolis”, the world centre for the textile 
trade. Its reputation for textiles and related heavy engineering has often led it to be 
dismissed as a centre for light or electrical engineering. For example, Lee suggests that 
the motor industry sprung up in Coventry, Birmingham and the South East because of 
the diversity of engineering skills in these areas.51 Saul also concurs arguing that the 
Midlands was better suited to the manufacture of cars due to the concentration of 
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light industries, which most naturally led to motor manufacture.52 Manchester’s 
alleged lack of relevant industries, coachworks, cycle industry and other light 
engineering companies is accepted too easily by automobile scholars. Both studies by 
the North-West’s regional scholars and scholars from other disciplines show that the 
engineering industry in Manchester was much more diverse.  
Hume attempted a nationwide overview of the engineering trade by comparing the 
census data of 1851 and 1911. The study provides a useful overview although the 
periods covered are a little away from our starting point of 1896. The 1851 data shows 
Manchester as one of four engineering nuclei, with over 10,000 engineers. Manchester 
was also one of three cities with over 500 engineers employed in the carriage trade, 
another important industry in relation to early motor manufacture. Oldham is also 
listed as a smaller centre for tool, engine and machine engineering. Hume then looks 
at comparative density levels of county employment in engineering. Lancashire shows 
41-50 engineers employed per 1,000, which is a moderate density comparable with 
the three midland counties, of Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Worcestershire.53 The 
national growth in engineering industries in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
led to a more diverse national picture, with the huge expansion in shipbuilding, 
railways and electrical and mechanical engineering. By 1911, the number of towns and 
cities with over 10,000 engineers rose from four to 23. In Lancashire, Bolton, Oldham, 
Salford, Manchester and Liverpool had over 10,000 engineers, showing a large increase 
in the North-West. Despite the assertion that Lancashire specialised in textile and 
other heavy machinery, the statistical analysis shows Manchester and Salford as two of 
the nine cities with over 1,000 electrical engineers. 
Although Manchester’s other industries receive comparatively little attention in 
regional studies, there is still much evidence of the importance of diversification during 
the mid to late Victorian era.  Timmins noted the increasing diversity of Manchester’s 
manufacturing in the late Victorian and early Edwardian period, relative to the slowing 
growth of the cotton industry.54 Lancashire’s diversity was masked by the relative size 
of the textile industry and its reputation as “Cottonopolis”. Important aspects of the 
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city’s industry, growing especially during the latter half of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries included locomotive manufacture, general engineering, electrical 
engineering, coach building, cycle manufacturing, household goods and foodstuffs and 
the automobile industry. 55 
Many automobile manufacturing ventures actually originated from textile-related 
firms. Simpson and Bodman were financially supported by local textile manufacturer 
and calico printers Simpson and Godlee.56 Dan Simpson, the son of a cotton 
manufacturer, showed an awareness of how motor transport could impact the cotton 
industry:   
here in Lancashire, where, as a cotton spinner told us, ‘the cost of carriage often 
meant profit or no profit,’ there would be the ground for a great industry.57  
Horsfall and Bickham, a textile machinery manufacturer, started manufacturing 
motorcars in 1900. They diversified into motorcar production as a side project and 
engineering experiment.58 Or as Norris and Lomax out it, “having some spare plant and 
room, they decided to make a few cars for friends.”59 Marshall and Co. (later Belsize), 
one of Manchester’s largest manufacturers, also had origins in the textile industry. 
While scholars often attribute the firm’s beginnings to the cycle industry,60 closer 
examination shows that the firm began as T. E. Marshall and Co. in 1894, taking its 
name from a Thomas Edward Marshall which in the 1895 trade directory is listed as 
“Scientific Instrument makers”, based in a workshop in the Springfield Works on 
Springfield Lane in Salford.61 The firm is also listed in these early years as machinists 
and makers of drosophore humidifiers, used in the textile industry to guard against 
fire.62 There was also Turner, Atherton and Co., who made electrical lifts and 
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mechanical products for the hat industry whilst experimenting with motor vehicles.63  
Firms with many other backgrounds also took up motor manufacture in the North-
West, notably the Lancashire Steam Motor Company which produced steam powered 
lawn mowers; Royce Ltd, electrical engineers; the Protector Lamp Company; Beyer, 
Peacock and Co, locomotive manufacturers; Musker Brothers, hydraulic and electric 
engineers; Walmsley and Co. of Preston, coachbuilders; and Thorton Motor Co., which 
had a background in camera manufacturing.  
Why these firms and many others entered the industry is difficult to judge, especially 
as there are few sources which provide an insight into the motives of early motor 
manufacturers. One of few personal accounts comes from Dan Simpson in his letter to 
The Engineer,64 motivated by the imaginary that the motor vehicle can provide a new 
business model that can improve the cheaper transport of goods, specifically in the 
case of the prosperity of the cotton trade but also more generally. Unfortunately no 
other examples of direct reasoning for entering the motor industry have been found, 
but it seems as though there were several firms and individuals who, at the other end 
of the scale from Simpson, started making a few cars for friends, during a slack phase 
of business. Evans suggests Royce began to produce motorcars after getting involved 
in motoring, tinkering with and improving both his De Dion quadricycle and a 
Decauville car, which broke down after delivery. He then stripped the car down and 
rebuilt it with improvements, preceding his decision to manufacture his first three 
vehicles.65 Belief in the future of automobilism and personal engineering and 
recreational curiosity are perhaps the better explanations for manufacturing attempts, 
especially as the business of automobile manufacturing was not seen as profitable for 
many years. Harrison in his analysis of public floatation notes that the absence of 
public investment between 1897 and 1905 reflected the lack of demand and the lack 
of profitability in the industry.66 This is also demonstrated by contemporary opinion: 
Claremont, Royce’s business partner, was opposed to entering the motor industry. 
Described as cautious in business, he is thought to have believed that motorcar 
production was irresponsible to shareholders; he even advised a young apprentice to 
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leave and join Glover’s, a firm for which Claremont was also a Director.67 John Norris 
describes Cockshoot’s entry into the motor industry in 1902,  
There was, in fact, a sharp difference of opinion between the Directors, which 
persisted for many years.68   
He continued, 
I remember my brother’s own tough fight with his co-directors on Cockshoot’s board 
to persuade them to take the trade seriously.69  
And yet paradoxically hundreds of firms and individuals were manufacturing or 
assembling vehicles. 
The exit and survival of firms to 1914 
Statistical analysis, both regionally and nationally, shows that most firms that entered 
the industry between 1896 and 1905 did not survive for long. 70 Between 1906 and 
1914 there were 14 entrants in the North-West but 27 exits. Economic historians  point 
towards an economic slump in 1907 and 1908 which saw a decline in demand for 
motorcars and the price competition from Ford who came to dominate the market in 
the years leading up to the First World War.71 Economic historians used “exits” to 
describe a firm ceasing to manufacturer. However, high level statistical analysis of 
these “exits” does not take into account why or how firms exited the manufacturing 
industry. It is assumed therefore that exits were failures, which was not always the 
case. Exploring the survival of firms highlights factors for success which included the 
level of commitment to the industry; the level of experience gained; the access to 
investment; and the development of agency networks and relationships between 
customers, agents and manufacturers, whether a small or a large business.  
                                                          
67
 Evans, In the beginning  pp.134-135 
68
 Science and Inudstry Museum Archives - Norris’s short typed history on the Deansgate “Arches” – 
YMS 0197/3/3/2 
69
 Science and Inudstry Museum Archives - YMS 0197/8/5/9 
70
 Saul “The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914” p.23; Foreman-Peck, Bowden and McKinley, The British 
Motor Industry p.13 
71
 Foreman-Peck, Bowden and McKinley, The British Motor Industry pp.12-13; Church, The rise and 
decline of the British motor industry pp.4-5; Saul, “The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914”  
 
203 
 
However as the industry evolved other aspects rose in importance as well. The made-
to-order basis of motorcar sales was changing. This former approach required little 
investment and subsequently came with fairly low risk, as it marked a diversification of 
production, an approach that Horsfall and Bickham, for example were comfortable 
with, and an approach that was to be expected from specialist and high-cost, high 
quality manufacturers like Rolls-Royce. However Ford agents advertised immediate 
delivery in part thanks to the way in which Ford dealt with their agents, who would go 
to the assembly plant to pick up vehicles as and when they needed them, an approach 
that differed from other manufacturers, who set monthly delivery quotas.72  As the 
popularity of motoring grew, so did the volume of orders from agents and customers, 
which saw more ambitious and committed motor manufacturers expanding 
production and requiring capital investment. Without this, orders could be missed, and 
advantages lost. While pleasure and commercial motoring numbers were increasing 
steadily, it was in public motoring (private hire) that there was a particular demand 
boom. Adeney notes, for example, that in London in 1904 there was one motor-cab, 
compared to 585 horse-drawn, while in 1908 there were 21 horse-drawn cabs 
compared to 1,715 motorised.73 There were relatively few companies, if any, that 
could successfully fulfil the lucrative demand for motorised taxis on the streets of 
Britain’s cities during this period. These orders were particularly valuable; not only 
were they in bulk, but once made, it was advantageous for the operating company to 
continue to use the same supplier due to the non-standard nature of spare parts. 
Indeed in 1910 taxicabs accounted for nearly half of Napier’s production. The newly 
enlarged Belsize Motor Company was also able to take advantage and the taxi side of 
the business grew especially rapidly; there are several articles in The Commercial 
Motor up to 1914 with testimonials, records of purchases and uses of Belsize taxis. The 
taxi was so popular that the Annual General Meeting in November 1911 noted they 
were supplying more taxis to Birmingham than any other manufacturer.74 The 
company grew a reputation for good taxis and in reply to numerous enquiries as to 
which car a cab driver should buy, The Commercial Motor included Belsize among the 
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few companies recommended.75  The boom period for motor taxis came at a time 
when there was a private motor sales slump in 1907 and 1908 and was an opportunity 
to take advantage of a relatively slack period.  
The change in structure of the sales, orders and demand for taxis affected the exit of 
Horsfall and Bickham in 1908. it is estimated that the firm produced around 2,000 
vehicles by the time they ceased production in 1909.76 Yet they went out of the 
automobile industry because they had too many orders, rather than too few. Orders 
increased to such a point that they could not complete them, leaving the company 
with a choice to seek investment to commit fully to the automobile sector or focus on 
their traditional manufacturing products. This is typified by the rejection of a massive 
order for 2,000 taxi cabs for use in London that led to the resignation of the head of 
sales Mr Cranham.77 The directors decided to stick with textile machinery and gave up 
automobile manufacture.78  Part of this decision might have been the “hobby” attitude 
of the firm’s manufacturing process. Even in 1908 they only made cars to order, rather 
than producing a stock of models.79 This attitude was more suited to the earlier period 
than to the batch production methods that many firms were using. As we see in other 
cases it was sometimes the enthusiasm of certain individuals of a firm’s management, 
rather than financial difficulties, which led to a firm’s exit from the industry. 
One of the key trends identified in entries and exits was the lower chance of survival 
for firms starting after 1900,80 the suggestion being that a history of experimentation 
and the experience that came with it was a valuable asset in the competitive market. 
Often the value of the experience came in the form of the sale of designs or in the 
hiring of experienced staff. Simpson and Bibby (formerly Simpson and Bodman) sold 
their designs for £25,000 to large engineering firm Alley and Maclellan in a profitable 
royalty deal that lasted for several years.81 Walter Bodman went to work for the 
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Milwaukee Automobile Company in 1900, after the firm had come to Lancashire to 
trial the Simpson and Bodman system for production in the US.  James Bibby, the later 
partner, was offered the highest paid position at Wolseley by Herbert Austin in 1903 to 
design commercial vehicles for the firm; he stayed there until Austin left in 1905.82 The 
Musker Brothers, joint owners of C. and A. Musker Ltd, Liverpool hydraulic engineers, 
produced products like hydraulic lifts and presses. The company also produced steam 
wagons, and were involved with the LSPTA, present at the first meeting in 1896.83 They 
were also participants in the Liverpool Heavy Traffic Trials of 1899 and 1901. However 
in 1905 they sold the steam waggon side of the business to traction engine 
manufacturers Savage Brothers of Kings Lynn.84 Paying for business experience and 
design was to continue into the interwar period as small but experienced firms and 
designers sold their businesses. The Bell Brothers sold their car designs to the Co-
operative Wholesale Society in 1919 who were looking to enter the motor industry in 
the period of post-First World War demand. There was also a merger of the motor 
department of Coulthard and Co. and the Lancashire Steam Motor Company (LSMC), 
who became Leyland Motors in the same year. The two firms had been linked, with 
Coulthard and Co. providing funding for LSMC early on.85 After the merger there was a 
significant extension of the Leyland works to increase output from 6 vehicles a month 
to 3 vehicles a week.86 Thus we cannot necessarily label those who exited the industry 
through merger or through the sale of the business as failures, but as recognition of 
the strengths and weaknesses of individual experience.  
One of the important debates for this period of the motor industry was over the risk 
and success of public flotation, used to get quick capital for the expansion of works and 
production. This was less of a risk for firms like Belsize and Leyland who were able to 
expand on existing sites; this was not possible for firms like Rolls-Royce whose 
workshop space was limited in a heavily built up area. The flotation put forward by 
Rolls-Royce for a new factory in Derby, therefore, was a high risk move, while Belsize 
and Leyland were able to offer small sizes of public shares as and when they needed 
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the capital. Big investment in the British industry as a whole came after 1904.87 
However in Manchester investment in commercial motoring came earlier, showing a 
particular need or confidence in this sector of the automobile industry. Despite this, 
nearly all first public flotations made by companies based in the North-West - Rolls-
Royce, Belsize and Foden - were undersubscribed. Later, however, subscriptions were 
more successful as firms had established a clearer profitability that was much more 
attractive to investors. This was particularly the case for Belsize who offered several 
modest numbers of shares, released when investment was needed. They were 
successful in raising subscriptions, for £20,000 in 1911 and £50,000 in 1913.88 This adds 
to our understanding of venture capital in the motorcar industry which Harrison 
showed was generally available for firms with a good record, contrary to Mitchie who 
argued generally that capital was easily available.89 
Ford marketed their car as universal and advocated against the purchase of the large 
range of “experimental” cars and motorcycles on offer. However in our examination of 
small manufacturers we have seen that they were actually fairly resilient during this 
period with a large range of manufacturers’ cars still being registered towards the end 
of this period of study. Yet as firms grew and the motoring public became larger, 
customers were able to better know the relative reputations of motorcycles, cars and 
commercial vehicles. This factor is highlighted in the Manchester Courier in 1913:  
The Lancashire man and Northerner generally is a discriminating person who will buy 
only cars that are well tried and proven. He will have none of experimental cars, or 
those he knows not of... The better a car is known and the more there are of them to 
be seen running about, the better it will command sales in the Manchester district and 
Lancashire generally.90  
This was a sign of things to come in the interwar period, where a large number of firms 
entered the motor manufacturing industry in an attempt to fill the demand for motor 
vehicles. However, regionally as well as nationally, most of these firms failed as they 
                                                          
87
 Harrison (1982) p.167 
88
 Manchester Courier 17/11/1911; Manchester Courier 22/11/1915 
89
 Michie, R. C., “Options, Concessions, Syndicates, and the Provision of Venture Capital” in Business 
History, Vol.23:2 (1981) pp.153-154; Harrison (1981) pp.184-185 
90
 Manchester Courier 26/2/1913 
 
207 
 
had little experience, no established reputation, nor had they established agency 
networks or a clientele base. 
Conclusion  
This section has built on the exploration of how bicycle culture interacted with the 
origins of motoring in Chapter 1. Cyclists were susceptible to the automobile, and this 
section has shown how small cycle sellers and manufacturers were similarly 
susceptible to early experimental manufacture. Although Manchester’s cycle industry 
was fairly insignificant compared to the much larger producers in the Midlands, many 
were quicker to adapt their bicycles to motorcycles to serve local customers. It is 
difficult to analyse why there were so many manufacturers in the early period of the 
automobile as there are relatively few personal insights. However the number of 
entries, in a new, competitive industry suggests the power of the sociotechnical 
imaginaries surrounding the future of automobile technology, explored in Chapter 2. In 
this period there was little separation between the user and the designer, with many 
manufacturers being pioneering early users.    
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3.4 - Coachbuilders, dealers and the importance of the automobile manufacturer, 
sales, customer relationship 
Considering that car dealerships have become the customers’ first point of contact for 
purchases, repairs and servicing it is surprising how little the relationship between 
manufacturers, dealers and customers features in both automobile scholarship and 
science and technology studies. Pinch has identified salespeople and marketing as “the 
true “missing masses” of technology studies” due to their role as mediators between 
users and manufacturers:  
they also are often the first to hear about deficiencies in current use, how a technology 
can be improved, and what works and what doesn’t. Such information is often passed 
onto designers and manufacturers.91  
In his study of the sale of electric synthesisers, it was the salesman and the salesman’s 
interaction with potential users, and not the designer, which influenced the direction 
of technological innovation. This section therefore looks to explore the role of the 
agent and dealer in the automobile industry. It argues that the dealer played an 
important role in linking the user and customer with the manufacturer which was 
important for developing products that both the customer wanted and the agent could 
easily sell. Analysis also shows the importance of lasting dealer-manufacturer 
relationships in several areas, most notably in after-sale customer service, pioneered 
by Ford and its dealers in the pre-World War One era and from then on, an important 
aspect of car sales that provided confidence to existing, and potential consumers. Ford 
also showed the importance of a nationwide coverage of dealerships, which coincided 
with the end of many experimental, or small automobile manufacturers. These 
networks of hundreds of dealers had to be maintained, and we see in our case study of 
Belsize the impact that the loss of these dealers could have on business. We also see 
evidence of agents adapting quickly to the changing attitudes and needs of the 
customer, further demonstrating the importance of them as mediators between 
designers and users. 
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The way in which dealerships worked changed very little over the period of study. 
Dealers would agree season-long deals with manufacturers, often for a specific 
number of vehicles. These agreements included territorial areas which agents would 
be solely responsible for. As the industry developed, territorial agencies also included 
the responsibility for sub-agencies in the given area. Due to the regional, often local, 
nature of early car agencies the customer base was small, but this meant that agents 
had specialist local knowledge of regional conditions and customers. Dealers often 
came to the motor industry from established trades such as coachbuilding or cycle 
agencies, and had their own loyal clientele, which was important for early 
manufacturers as it offered them a ready outlet for sales. As we saw in Chapter 1, 
cyclists and coach owners were important early user groups.  
This section will explore the importance of dealership through the archive material of 
two Manchester-based firms. The first is Manchester coachbuilder Joseph Cockshoot 
and Co., whose extensive archival collection offers a unique perspective on the advent 
of the motorcar and the adaptation and importance of coachbuilders as agents. The 
second firm is Quicks, an important interwar local dealership that sold almost 
exclusively for Ford. This section will also look at a few important local manufacturers 
and explore their relationship with agencies; these include Ford, whose relationship 
with agencies was pioneering; and a case study for the interwar period of a 
Manchester manufacturer Belsize, and a Midlands-based producer Austin. 
Ford: price, technology, marketing and dealerships  
Ford had a long history in the UK before establishing an assembly plant in Manchester 
in 1911. They began importing cars in 1903 through the American Motor Car Agency, 
later the Central Motor Car Company, based in London.92 Crucial to the sale of UK 
Fords from this beginning was Percival Perry (1878 -1956), who would later be 
instrumental in Ford’s success, both in persuading Ford to invest in a British assembly 
plant and in steering the British operation as managing director. The Ford Motor 
Company of England was formed in 1910 and from this point dealership operations 
expanded. In 1909 to 1910, 91 percent of sales were made through Perry’s dealership 
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network, with sales rising to 570 for 1910.93 This justified the opening of the Trafford 
Park assembly plant. Ford moved to Manchester for a number of reasons, some of 
which are outlined by the Ford Times, which noted the proximity to the Manchester 
Ship Canal for ease of import, good rail links and unrivalled access to labour, with the 
North-West as the centre of the cotton trade.94 Parts were imported from America, 
and motorcar bodies were built in Manchester for the British market. The growth of 
sales was rapid, more than doubling every year to 1913.95 The Model T Ford price 
varied depending on the body, but a runabout model cost as little as £135 in 1912 and 
1913.96 This compared to competing cars such as the Belsize 10/12 H.P. which sold at 
£225 in 1912.97 However, the Ford was still over double the price of a new motorcycle: 
a Triumph in 1912 could be bought for £55 new.98  
 
Economic automobile scholars explain Ford’s dominance by 1914 by focusing on Ford’s 
ability to produce much cheaper vehicles than native competitors.99 However, analysis 
of Ford often stops with the manufacturing process. In Chapter 1 we looked at how 
popular perception played a part in the success or failure of a motor manufacturer. 
Being cheaper than British competitors did not necessarily lead to better performance, 
and it has been argued that the cheapest cars were often unpopular because of their 
low price.100 As well as price, the sophistication of their dealership network and the 
emphasis on post-purchase customer service had a large impact on Ford’s competitive 
advantage. Ford developed a level of service and range of dealerships that was well 
beyond other motor manufacturers during the Edwardian period. While other 
manufacturers might have dealerships in the major cities, Ford had expanded to as 
many as 272 dealers nationally by 1912, after only the first full year of production at 
Trafford Park, offering national coverage, as demonstrated in Figure 42. One of the 
important aspects of this relationship was Perry’s understanding of the British sales 
system which saw dealers given exclusivity to specific regions, with sub-dealer contract 
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rights. Percival Perry noted in his memoirs that finding the best dealers in regions was 
a key factor in his sales strategy.101 Once a good dealer had been found they were 
encouraged to market the car in innovative ways that were often specific to the region 
they were in. In Manchester the main dealers were Lookers and Co. who used their 
links with the Manchester Courier’s motoring journalist J. T. Ward, to get a review of 
the Model T published in 1911. He was: 
agreeably surprised at the steady running of this car… It also possesses speed and 
extreme flexibility…. At £190 it is really remarkable value, and our British makers will 
have to look to their laurels.102  
The most famous dealer-led publicity stunt however, was undertaken by Scottish 
dealer Henry Alexander, who used the Model T to scale and descend Ben Nevis in 
1911.103 The aim was both to promote the abilities of the Model T and to combat the 
American prejudice being promoted by British manufacturers.104 Aspray, studying the 
history of car buying in America, noted that Ford’s success in the US was also to do 
with its relationship with dealers. This included a greater level of instructions than 
other motor car manufacturers, such as walking sales, which was certainly effective for 
local Ford dealer Quicks who employed several walking salesmen in the interwar 
era.105 Ford was the first manufacturer to release its own dealer-based magazine, The 
Ford Times, a free publication launched in June 1912. It was distributed by dealers 
along with owner aids such as the Ford Owner’s Manual, also published in 1912.106 This 
nationwide, or indeed worldwide, aspect to the sale of cars marks a distinct change 
from the often local market served by the large number of small manufacturing firms 
described above. 
One of the benefits of the wide dealership network was the widespread availability of 
spares and repair specialists. This was particularly important in this period when 
breakdowns and the replacement of parts was a regular part of the motoring 
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experience.107 In the early experimental period, with hundreds of manufacturers, there 
was much more uncertainty and difficulty involved in receiving support for repairs, 
which we have suggested might make customers more inclined to buy locally. As 
agency networks improved and advertising started to emphasise the supplies of spares 
and where they could be bought, the importance of being able to get to the 
manufacturer for such support lessened. It was much easier for these smaller 
producers to become agents for manufacturers, rather than manufacturers 
themselves, as we see several doing during this period.  
Ford used their repair and supply network to great effect in marketing campaigns. An 
advert from 1912 lists the chief Ford dealers around the country who “carry a 
complete stock of SPARE PARTS.”108 Ford also issued complete spare part 
catalogues.109 An advert by The Western Counties Automobile Company noted that 
the complete stocking of parts meant owners “avoiding the delay of sending to 
London, or perhaps abroad, as with some cars, for the parts wanted.” The advert 
finished with the snappy line, “You see them wherever you go, and they go wherever 
you see them”, one of Ford’s much used slogans during this period.110  The wide 
distribution of Ford dealerships and repairers would have appealed to those who 
enjoyed touring, or holidaying in their cars, with repairs quickly available across the 
country. This national coverage is emphasised by the Ford map of dealers seen in the 
“Autumn Touring 1912 Ford Service Map” in Figure 42. It shows a total of 201 dealers, 
of which 32 held a full stock of spares.111 While Ford sold a car that other companies 
struggled to compete with in terms of value, small firms could not support their 
customers after purchase in the same manner as Ford. This issue was still an important 
factor into the interwar period, where demand for individual model repairs became 
important. Firms like Morris learnt from the Ford model, with regional dealers such as 
Cockshoot in Manchester opening specialist Morris repair depots, separate to their 
salesrooms and normal workshops that Morris owners could take their cars to.112 
These services and the security it offered potential buyers over other experimental 
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manufacturers led Ford dealers such as Stirling-based agents Menzies Brothers to 
argue the following in their advertising: 
Don’t experiment – buy a Ford... there is no element of risk in the purchase of one. 
Satisfactory service rendered to users in all parts of the world accounts for increasing 
popularity.113  
Dealers also looked to tackle the prejudice against American cars. In film footage of the 
Ford’s climb of Ben Nevis in 1911, the car drove through Fort William with the US flag 
waving, demonstrating the prowess of this foreign vehicle.114 In this regard, as well as 
in other publicity stunts, Ford was able to combat the prevailing prejudice that 
American cars were cheap and poorly built.  
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Figure 42 - "Ford Service Map", The Ford Times (September 1912) 
In terms of wider economic debates, one could argue that Ford’s wide dealership 
network represented just another aspect of the benefits of corporate capitalism, to go 
alongside the reduced price of the Model T, thanks to the import of mass produced 
parts from America. However, the emphasis on dealerships and sales in the UK largely 
pre-dates the investment that came with the formation of the Ford Motor Company 
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(England) Ltd. in 1910.115 The groundwork for this network was made by Percival Perry, 
who secured a network of dealerships for Ford before persuading the American 
company to invest in the UK. Perry had experience dealing with customers and their 
needs and without investment Perry had managed to secure key dealerships that 
covered the UK, including dealerships in Aberdeen, Southampton, Edinburgh, Dublin, 
Yeovil, Bristol, Leeds, Suffolk and Newcastle.116 Before Ford’s investment Perry also 
worked to overcome anti-American prejudice which caused Ford to perform badly in 
the UK from 1903.117 Perry described the “impregnable prejudice” of the public when 
it came to regarding the cheap American car.118  Thus the investment and the 
formation of the company in 1910 coupled Perry’s knowledge of the British market, 
the British customer, its sales and its agencies, with access to the resources of one of 
America’s biggest companies.  
Scholars often consider Ford’s arrival, with its plant at Trafford Park, and the 
introduction of American production methods, the use of unskilled and semi-skilled 
labour, and capital resources as significant to the firm’s ability to sell cheaper cars and 
thus gain dominance of the British market.119 However, McIntosh argues that the 
emphasis on production line technology is misplaced. A moving assembly line, for 
example, was only introduced in 1914, well after market dominance had been 
established and the bodies especially were not standard, but made specifically for the 
British market, as Ford and its dealers adapted to British users.120 Between 1911 and 
1914 Ford was assembling cars in batches, in a similar manner to British producers, as 
can be seen in Figure 43. Similarly they were using unionised skilled labourers from 
1911 as evidenced by the six-month tinsmiths and joiners’ strike in 1913/1914, 
although Ford were successful in virtually ousting the unions at this point.121 Ford’s rise 
in the UK can be traced back before the assembly plant, and any technological or 
labour savings to do with the manufacturing process in the UK. Sales had tripled 
between 1910 and 1911 with 570 and 1,485 sales respectively; and yet Ford only 
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moved to Trafford Park at the end of 1911.  If anything should be emphasised in regard 
to production it is the lack of an import tariff, meaning that imported American parts, 
produced en masse in the US, could compete unhindered by trade barriers until the 
First World War.  
 
Figure 43 - Ford chassis assembly room 1913 - Source Riley, Lilleker and Tuckett 
(2011) p.54 
McIntosh and Riley et al draw attention to the way in which the American Model T was 
adapted specifically for the British market. There was, for example, an objection to 
American coachwork, so the Ford was distinctively British in design and material.122 
There were many differences between the American and British models including 
different windscreen designs, doors, mudguards and an English horn.123 McIntosh also 
argues that there was an emphasis on continually improving the production process.124 
This is evident when we look at the memoirs of Herbert Morton, who worked for the 
firm during the interwar period. He worked on the shop floor and put a suggestion for 
axle assembly improvement in the firm’s suggestion box in 1918. He was given the go 
ahead to give it a try, and when it was successful he was given a pay rise. He tried this 
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again a few more times and eventually he was offered a job as the firm’s 
“improvement finder” and was given his own assistant.125  
It is clear from the analysis of Ford UK’s strategy that cheap American parts and cars 
was not a guarantee for successful penetration of the British market. A combination of 
factors made for the success of Ford in Britain, where other American producers failed 
during this period to penetrate the British market with any significance. American 
producers in Britain also struggled after the First World War despite the continued 
price differences. Similarly Ford’s performance in the interwar period shows how 
cheaper prices and efficient production were not enough to maintain their market 
lead. Culturally there was a “buy native” prejudice that was important in British 
consumerism, which developed further in the interwar period, as we have explored in 
Chapter 1. Important to Ford’s success was its British adaptation to suit British users, 
its use of marketing initiatives, and the way in which it won over British car dealers and 
then the British public. Ford was able through its price to begin to offer a bridge 
between the motorcycle and the motorcar, by being affordable for the “modest 
motorist”, and providing the comfort associated with the richer motorist. Only in the 
interwar years were firms like Austin able to aim for this market with the sale of cars 
like the Austin Seven.  Behind this was the synergy between Ford’s American scale 
production, British free trade policy and the good knowledge of the British market 
brought by the management of Perry. 
Cockshoot: a case study of a coachbuilder entering the motor industry 
The focus on the automobile has led to a lack of exploration of the horse-drawn 
vehicle and its supporting trades, such as the coachbuilder or the wheelwright. More 
recently, scholars such as Kinney (2004) for the USA, and Tjong Tjing Tai (2015) for the 
Netherlands, have sought to address the imbalance by exploring how coachbuilders 
adapted to the arrival of the automobile.126 They highlight the great disparity in the 
speed of coachbuilders to transition, and the contradiction that coachbuilders were 
seen as natural builders of the new horseless-carriage with their woodworking skills, 
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yet unsuited to the new demands of metalworking and mechanical engineering. Also 
the emergence of the automobile variably affected the trade depending on the types 
of coachwork. High-class coachbuilders were affected much quicker than 
wagonbuilders. The archive material relating to Cockshoot offers a case study of 
technological adaptation as the firm embraced the automobile. They were successful 
in this transition largely because they were in touch with their clientele’s needs as well 
as the changing experiences of coachbuilders nationally and internationally, well 
outside its customer base. While we see the firm hold onto their coachbuilding 
traditions well into the interwar period, the firm quickly began to make most of its 
money as motorcar agents, an area they were completely unfamiliar with at the turn 
of the twentieth century. The quick and relatively seamless progression of this small-
to-medium-sized family firm can be used as an example supporting the findings of 
more recent economic scholarship by historians such as Colli who argue that family-
run, small business was often innovative, international in awareness and quick to 
adapt to technological change.127 This is contrary to the perspective of older economic 
theorists such as Hobsbawm who argued generational ownership led to less 
enterprising businesses; or Lazonick who viewed personal capitalism as a barrier to 
innovation.128 This section argues that the firm’s closeness to a core customer base 
meant they were very much in touch with how and when their customers were using 
automobiles and this close customer relationship led them to be particular about 
which manufacturers they worked with. 
Business listings in local trade directories allow for an analysis of the regional motor 
and carriage trade in the first few decades of the twentieth century. Figure 44 shows 
relatively little difference between 1901 and 1911, notable only for a small number of 
motorcar garages and agencies emerging, with only a small drop in associated horse 
and carriage trade businesses; however between 1911 and 1921, and 1921 and 1931, 
there are appreciable differences, especially in the rise of motorcar garages and the 
decline in wheelwrights. However, the number of carriage and coachbuilders stayed 
roughly the same throughout the period. Many coachbuilders like Cockshoot became 
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motor body builders, agents and garage proprietors as the automobile rose to ubiquity 
and horse-drawn vehicles declined into obscurity. 
 
Figure 44 - Data collected from the Slater's Manchester and Salford Trade Directory, 
1901, 1911, 1921 and 1931  
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Introducing Joseph Cockshoot and Company 
 
Figure 45 – Drawing of the High Sherriff of Lancashire’s coach built by Cockshoot in 
1902 – Science and Industry Museum Archive - YMS 0197/1/1/9 
Joseph Cockshoot set up as an independent coachbuilder in 1844 before forming a 
partnership with William Norris in 1851. By the twentieth century the firm had a long 
history of building quality carriages for Lancashire and Cheshire’s upper-classes, as well 
as selling second-hand carriages. Examples of the firm’s elegant and high quality work 
can be found in abundance in the company archives. They include the carriage (in 
Figure 45) which was commissioned by the High Sherriff of Lancashire in 1902. The 
firm also won numerous awards such as the Premier Gold Medal at the Paris Exhibition 
of 1878.  
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Cockshoot entered the motor industry between 1901 and 1902 by building a few 
motorcar bodies for clients, before opening a motor department in 1903.129 By 1907 
they had auctioned off their remaining stock of horse-drawn carriages and accessories 
and were wholly committed to the motor trade thereafter.130 As motor body custom 
declined they expanded motorcar sales and repairs for which they were successful well 
into the latter half of the twentieth century. The business was bought in 1968 by Lex 
Garages Ltd. and by 1970, after 119 years, the Norris family ceased involvement in the 
management of the firm.131  In the following analysis we will explore the decision to 
set up the motor department and the firm’s relationship with both customers and 
early motor manufacturers.  
Cockshoot’s entry into the motor industry 
In Chapter 1 we looked at the link between carriage customers and early motoring and 
used as evidence the letter addressed to shareholders in 1902 which justified the 
opening of a Motor Department. They reasoned: 
It has been evident for some time past that customers of the firm have been 
purchasing motorcars in addition to their carriages, and it requires no great amount of 
argument to show that if that be the case their carriages, used alternatively with 
motorcars, will last much longer than if they used carriages solely. 132   
They then noted that although there was no change at the moment, there would be if 
the fortune of the motor industry continued to improve. Their research involved 
visiting coachbuilders in London, Paris and the provinces to see how they had been 
adapting to the new motor industry. As we demonstrated in Chapter 1, the ownership 
of an automobile was often in addition to carriages. 
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Figure 46 – Drawing of a Cabriolet Victoria Phaeton made in 1902. Carriage 
nomenclature was also used for automobile bodies - Science and Industry Museum 
Archives - YMS 0197/1/1/20  
 
The decision to enter the motor industry shows bold leadership from the Norris family, 
whose second generation were largely responsible for running the business during this 
period. Despite this, the decision was challenged within the company. Two of the six 
directors, John Ainsworth and Ezra Miller, voted against entering the motoring 
industry.133 Ezra Miller was a harness maker and therefore represented a specific 
skillset within the coachbuilding trade. This highlights that coachbuilding firms were a 
collection of many different crafts. Trimmers, coachbuilders, carpenters and painters 
would still have a role, whereas harness makers and wheelwrights might feel 
threatened by the new department.134 This split is highlighted in the United Kingdom 
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Society of Coachbuilders membership.135 Roughly 33 percent of the workforce might 
be affected negatively, which would certainly explain the opposition within Cockshoot 
and more widely among other coachbuilders.  
The venture was only one vote from not starting. The internal loggerhead is 
remembered in a note on the subject written in the 1950s, by former director John 
Norris, working for the company at the time. 
There was, in fact, a sharp difference of opinion between the Directors, which 
persisted for many years.136   
He expands on this in other memoirs: 
And again there was a tremendous amount of prejudice surrounding the motorcar and 
a serious maker found he not only had to break down this but also fight the vested 
interest. 
I remember my brother’s own tough fight with his co-directors on Cockshoot’s board 
to persuade them to take the trade seriously.137  
However, this decision was viewed very differently by the company in later decades. 
The company’s catalogue for 1924 announced: 
it was but a natural development that the firm should take its place with the pioneers 
of the motor industry in this country.138   
This insight into the firm’s dilemma is a rare opportunity to challenge the assumption 
that coachbuilders naturally adapted to the change brought about by the automobile. 
This adaptation and the changing views over time (one breaking down prejudice and 
fighting the vested interest, and later as a “natural” progression) show how social 
attitudes changed towards horse and automobile technologies over time. It also 
highlights the inadequacies of a technological determinist view of the automobile as a 
superior technology. It is assumed later on that the transition from horse to 
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automobile was “natural” and technologically determined, which belies the reality of 
the contemporary experience, which we have explored in Chapters 1 and 2.  This entry 
period also highlights the problem with considering coachbuilders as a single trade, 
when in fact there were several that made up the industry, each with quite different 
roles and prejudices.  
Early dealings (1902-10) 
Miller might have been justified in his objections to the automobile trade. Cockshoot 
leased a garage on Deansgate, known as “The Arches”, and negotiated the agency for 
the Velox, the Rex, the Northern Runabout and the Stanley Steam Car, all of which 
were initially unsuccessful for Cockshoot and led to a loss for the new department in 
1903 of £1,556 6s, which had to be offset by carriage trade profits.139 The opening of 
the motor department in 1903 might have been viewed as visionary in hindsight, 
however it demonstrates how difficult and unnatural it was for a coachbuilder to open 
a garage and begin with motorcar agencies. Cockshoot lacked expertise among the 
staff already employed at the firm and relied on those in Manchester who did. For 
example Fred Settle was employed as chief mechanic. Mr Settle had been involved in 
one of Manchester’s first garage ventures, the Manchester Motor Car Corporation, 
and had at least three years’ experience as a motorcar mechanic.140 With a good 
reputation as a coachbuilder, Cockshoot were well placed to sell motorcars to their 
clientele. However in the UK dealerships were almost always agreed with a territory 
arrangement, so picking the right car agency could be tricky, especially with no 
experience. In this respect the firm bought the business and the rights to the agency 
agreements of Manchester dealer F. Wilkinson and Co., who had already established 
agencies for the American Stanley Steam Car and the petrol-driven Northern 
Runabout.141 Like Settle, Wilkinson also had a history in the local industry. For several 
years previously he sold steam engine components and steam-powered 
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automobiles.142 To demonstrate the difficulty of selecting agencies we only need to 
examine the number of motorcar manufacturers at the time. The North-West alone 
had 20 automobile manufacturers, while estimates show there were around 200 
automobile manufacturers in the UK, not counting all the foreign manufacturers.143 
Adapting to engineering and agency sales was not straightforward, a step that is often 
neglected. Automobile scholars such as Georgano and Foreman-Peck, Bowden and 
McKinley focus instead on coachbuilders’ more natural transition to motorcar body 
production.144 For example, Cockshoot had already been approached by several clients 
to fit motorcar bodies prior to 1903.145  
The initial poor performance did not deter the firm who soon established themselves 
with some more successful agencies and some regular motor body building work for 
local and international firms, including Renault, Rolls-Royce and Panhard. Crucially 
these relationships were longer lasting, suggesting both customer and agent 
satisfaction. Despite the opposition to entry into the motoring industry, Cockshoot 
ceased all involvement in the carriage trade when in October 1909 the remaining 
stock, including harnesses, whips etc. were put up for auction.146 Although 
coachbuilders by tradition from then onwards, Cockshoot were solely engaged in the 
motor trade. 
Despite Cockshoot’s bold decision to enter the motor trade in late 1902, economically 
it was a difficult road to success. Indeed John Norris in his memoirs put a large 
emphasis on the firm’s crucial relationship with Renault, both as agent and motorcar 
body builder.147 To demonstrate how complex and contradictory this period was for 
coachbuilders we only have to explore Manchester’s other coachbuilders. Anne 
Cowburn was also a high-class, long established coachbuilder. Yet they did not enter 
the motor industry until 1909 when they announced in an advert: 
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Finding that there is an inclination amongst our numerous clients to replace their 
Carriages with Motor Cars, we have opened and equipped... an engineering 
department and garage.148  
However, there were also new firms like Hollingdrake of Stockport that set up business 
as early as 1902 specifically to manufacture motorcar bodies.149  
Relationships with customers  
As seen above, Cockshoot was motivated to enter the industry after noticing the 
changing trends in vehicle ownership amongst their customers. Coachbuilders with 
upper-class clientele were more likely to take this step early.150 Examining Cockshoot 
customers and their early business in the motor industry has highlighted the 
importance of the relationship between the customer and the coachbuilder in the 
early motor industry. It is clear from our analysis of Cockshoot’s customers in Chapter 
1 that Cockshoot’s customers were upper-class, which included titled owners and the 
use of heraldry (in Figures 3 and 4), and the stabling facilities offered to customers. 
Carriages tended to last a long time and required very little maintenance, especially 
compared to early automobiles,151 which, in their infancy were prone to unreliability 
and breakdowns which entailed frequent new purchases for those who could afford it. 
Among Cockshoot’s customers there were several repeating commissions, the most 
frequent of which were Mr and Mrs Ashworth, who returned four times to Cockshoot 
for new motorcar bodies between 1903 and 1912.152 The relationship between the 
coachbuilder and the customer was important in the making of custom motor car 
bodies, which could include several visits to the works, and lengthy correspondence 
over the specifications of design.153 This could span several months, as often chassis 
were made after receipt of an order and coachbuilders would work with each 
customer to build their specific body. This included choosing the interior decoration, 
the colour, the style of the body, whether closed or open, how many seats, as well as 
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any other number of customer demands such as luggage space, or items like additional 
horns, as seen in Figure 47. 
What is also noticeable is the number of customers that bought both carriages and 
motor cars from the firm. For example, the Rice family used Cockshoot either to buy 
carriages or to get carriages re-painted in 1892, 1896 and 1897 and then 
commissioned motor car bodies in 1906 and 1908. Similarly G. S. Ball had work 
commissioned on carriages in 1889, 1890, 1893 and 1895 before purchasing motor car 
bodies in 1905 and 1906.154  There are many more examples, but they serve to confirm 
that the existing wealthy customers who had purchased coaches provided Cockshoot 
with the potential to move into motorcar body building during the Edwardian period.  
Brooks has listed all the motor car bodies manufactured by Cockshoot and shows that 
between 1908 and 1912 women made up over 10 percent of total motor body 
customers.155 This was particularly high especially compared to Cheshire motor 
registration data which shows that between 1903 and 1911 only 41 out of 3,658 
vehicles were registered by women, a proportion of just over 1 percent.156 An 
international comparison shows that in Arizona in 1915, only 5.5 percent of 
automobile registrations were by women.157 The customer records at Cockshoot 
therefore support Scharff’s suggestion that there were more women drivers and 
buyers than registration statistics suggest, with the habit being for vehicles to be 
registered in the male name.158 The range of female customers and the types of cars 
they were purchasing shows an interesting variety. Merriman argues that while many 
women motorists were challenging gender assumptions by racing or driving large 
powerful cars, other upper-class women positioned motoring as a suitable past-time as 
chauffeur-driven passenger-owners.159 This complexity is certainly evident in 
Cockshoot’s female customers of the Edwardian period. For example, racing driver 
Miss Daisy Hampson purchased a 60 horsepower Mercedes in 1904 and a 120 
horsepower FIAT race car that had finished second in the Gordon Bennett race of 
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1905.160 At the other end of the spectrum was Miss Ella Ross Cordingly Shaw’s more 
sedate 12 horsepower Velux, bodied by Cockshoot in 1903. While somewhere in 
between was Miss Parry’s 20/30 horsepower Renault bought in 1905, as seen in Figure 
47, with a horn for the rear passenger, presumably so Miss Parry could do some 
backseat driving, behind her chauffeur. 
 
Figure 47- Mrs Parry's 20/30 Horsepower Renault with horn attached to the back 
seat and chauffeur at the wheel - YMS Cockshoot Photograph Box 1, 1905 
Relationship with manufacturers  
The relationship between automobile manufacturer, coachbuilder and customer was 
complex, the coachbuilder acting as an intermediary between the manufacturer and 
the prospective customer. Cockshoot’s large established clientele of rich and upper-
class carriage owners wanting to purchase a motorcar would be an attractive 
proposition to a manufacturer looking for new customers. Cockshoot, as the provider 
of the car body and as the agent for the manufacturer, would have been the first point 
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of contact when there was a problem with the vehicle. Therefore it was not just the 
relationship between Cockshoot and its customers that had to be maintained, but also 
the relationship between the newly emerging car manufacturers and Cockshoot as the 
agent that had to be established and built upon in order for both the growth and 
future survival of the new partnerships. 
This becomes clear in the case of Mr R. P. Richards who was sold a Rolls-Royce chassis 
and custom body by Cockshoot in 1911. Full correspondence survives between 
Cockshoot and Mr Richards and shows the level of customer support that Cockshoot 
gave, dealing with problems with the coachwork, creating bespoke solutions to 
mechanical issues, as well as offering to acquire new parts.161 Mr Richards’ motorcar 
body came with 36 personal specifications including a small folding table in the rear, a 
portable luggage grid at the back with strappings, silk curtains with tassels, tool boxes 
under the steps, and a generally light body, well sprung, with seats not too upright. 
Cockshoot also provided him with spares for his Renault, which was being taken by 
Cockshoot in exchange for his new Rolls-Royce. Richards thanked Cockshoot for writing 
to Rolls-Royce to press them for quick delivery of the chassis, which Rolls-Royce could 
not guarantee before Easter 1911. The car was finally ready for Mr Richard’s touring 
holiday in July 1911, the whole process lasting around six months. After delivery, a 
rattle developed which Cockshoot promised to rectify: 
we shall… either send out a man to do what is necessary, or better still to correct the 
fault here if you will drive it in some day.162  
Clear in the correspondence is the complexity of the work and the difficulty of dealing 
not only with bespoke orders but mechanical issues after the sale. The service 
provided by Cockshoot demonstrates how important it could be for manufacturers to 
cultivate relationships with good agents such as Cockshoot, who began to build up 
years of experience building on particular chassis as well as becoming intimately 
familiar with particular models.    
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After the short-lived agency for American steam cars in 1903 Cockshoot struck up a 
good relationship with Renault that lasted several years. This relationship developed 
through personal contacts and the former Motor Department Manager Mr P. Dobson 
left to work for Renault in London. It was this agency, and the custom body orders that 
came with it that helped guarantee Cockshoot’s success before 1914. Brooks’ analysis 
of motorcar bodies built shows that 36 of 52 bodies built in 1906 were Renaults, and 
78 out of 118 in 1907.163 However this relationship ended around the time of the First 
World War, perhaps because Dobson left Renault to manufacture his own cars. A more 
lasting relationship was formed with Rolls-Royce, for whom Cockshoot would be local 
agents well into the middle of the century. While Rolls-Royce and Renault agencies fit 
with Cockshoot’s upper-class clientele, after the First World War their relationship 
with mass car producer Morris was to be of more importance in a period that saw the 
rapid growth of automobile sales in the UK.  
A new heading for the future can been seen in many aspects of the automobile during 
the interwar period, not just in sales figures and the number of new manufacturers, 
but also in the activity of dealers and coachbuilders, who were quick to establish 
selling patterns. An advert by E. Bradshaw of Preston highlights the scarcity of 
available cars: “1919 Model Fords actually in stock”164. While all over the country 
showrooms were newly taken up such as E. Brown of Burnley advertising to motorists 
in March 1919.165 Figure 48 shows the rapid increase in dealers and agents after the 
war doubling from 22 in 1918 to 44 in 1921. This optimism is demonstrated with 
ventures in the co-operative movement such as the setting up of the Rochdale and 
District Co-operative Motor Society in 1919, a joint venture with many of the local co-
operative societies, whose services included sales, repair and servicing.166  
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Figure 48 - Source for data Slater’s Manchester and Salford and Suburban Directory 
(Slaters Directory Limited, Manchester) 1912 to 1939  
 
Earlier in the chapter we explored how motorcycle manufacturers were able to tap 
into existing customer-dealer relationships in the cycle industry. These existed for local 
cycle retailers, which began to offer both bicycle and motorcycles to their customers. 
Similarly established coachbuilding firms like Cockshoot offered fledgling motor 
manufacturers an opportunity to tap into their rich clientele who were, in the 
Edwardian period, beginning to buy motor vehicles instead of horse-drawn carriages. 
At the same time new types of agencies developed, neither attached to the carriage or 
the bicycle industry, but run by young entrepreneurs. One of the best examples was 
Charles Rolls’ partnership with Henry Royce, Rolls acting as sole-agent for Royce cars. 
This relationship demonstrated the importance for a manufacturer of securing good 
agents; the annual shows acted as a way in which manufacturers could sell and 
advertise in order to get large contracts with prospective dealers. This in turn led 
dealers to advertise and sell to their local sub-agents and to local customers. The Ford 
dealership Quicks also represents how enticing the automobile was for young 
businessmen. Harry Quick, aged 21 in 1911, was given a 15 HP Fiat by his father. 
Instead of using it for touring, he started a taxi business. A year later his brother Jim 
partnered up and they built a garage with a fleet of hire cars, taxis and a small repair 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
1
9
12
1
9
13
1
9
14
1
9
15
1
9
16
1
9
17
1
9
18
1
9
19
1
9
20
1
9
21
1
9
22
1
9
23
1
9
24
1
9
25
1
9
26
1
9
27
1
9
28
1
9
29
1
9
30
1
9
31
1
9
32
1
9
33
1
9
34
1
9
35
1
9
36
1
9
37
1
9
38
1
9
39
Motorcar dealers and agents, 
Manchester and Salford 1912-1939 
 
232 
 
business, which quickly involved the selling of cars at which after the war the firm 
would become very successful.167  
Cockshoot continued their association with Rolls-Royce into the interwar period both 
making the occasional body and acting as regional agent. However, more important to 
their survival and prosperity was their relationship with Morris, one of the most 
successful mass producers of the era. The first agency agreement with Morris was 
signed in September 1919 for a modest 50 cars.168 However, as Figure 49 shows, the 
number of cars being supplied to Cockshoot’s was as high as 2,200 by 1925. This boom 
in sales coincided with the rapid rise in fortunes for Morris. It also shows the 
importance of gaining an agency for a popular car. A rise in car sales necessitated the 
opening of a new showroom in St. Ann’s Square in 1927, increasing their potential 
usership. The first Morris Minor was delivered to the show room, advertised as the 
first £100 car, in 1930.  John Norris remarked from memory that “Within minutes the 
showroom was almost besieged by people wanting to see this new, cheap car”.169  
 
  
Figure 49 - Data from Cockshoot surviving dealership agreements YMS 0197/1/2 
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Motorcar advertising developed in the interwar period to be an extremely important 
aspect of the industry in what is, in modern times, one of the biggest sectors of 
advertising. In America motorcar advertising spending rose from $3.5 million in 1921 
to $9.3 million in 1927.170 Examining Cockshoot’s yearly contracts with Morris shows 
the rapid development of the relationship between agent and manufacturer during 
this period, demonstrated by the changing emphasis of the dealer’s advertising 
stipulations. In 1919 Morris stipulated that agents simply put up a sign outside and 
highlighted their role as Morris agents on all advertisements and printed material. 171  
By 1924 with the number of cars taken by Cockshoot rapidly increasing the agreement 
changed to include much more detail for sub-dealers, including rates of commission 
and rules of appointment. Whilst Cockshoot had the agency for East Lancashire and 
Cheshire, they were based solely in the city centre until after the Second World War, 
so they relied on sub-dealers in the towns outside of Manchester. By the 1939 season 
the agreement described Cockshoot as “distributors”, overseeing the appointment of 
“dealers” and “retail dealers”. They were provided with a small fleet of nine 
demonstration models which they were to use during the season, and Cockshoot and 
its partnered dealers were selling 4,000 of the various Morris vehicles a year. The 
contract for 1939 included increased advertising stipulation, as well as maintaining a 
“demonstration fleet”. Cockshoot were now obliged to spend a minimum of 10s per 
vehicle sold on advertising:  
The distributor shall actively and continuously advertise Morris Vehicles, using as 
media his local papers, poster hoardings and mailing list.172  
Important in the success of both Cockshoot and Quicks was a continued emphasis on 
complete customer service, an important aspect of the customer’s decision to 
purchase particular motorcar makes. Both had excellent service facilities for their 
customers. For example, Cockshoot opened a Morris Service Depot in Manchester 
town centre in addition to its sales and general garage facilities. The depot offered a 
“periodical Inspection Scheme”, and a service booklet sold with the car offered 
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coupons for regular service. Furthermore, an advertising leaflet emphasised the 
“expert staff” and the wide variety of held spares, with a value exceeding £6,000.173 
Quicks also had a large dedicated Ford service depot. On the sign outside the front of 
the depot was “Sales” and “Service” alongside each other and Quicks boasted that 
their  
section devoted to stocking, selling and forwarding “spares”… takes up an area nearly 
four times the extent necessary to comply with regulations.174  
That both dealers were able to do this shows both the stability of the relationship with 
the manufacturers and the value in which good dealers were held by manufacturers. 
This steady relationship was also valued by customers. In 1933 an advert in the 
Manchester Guardian boasted 10 years of supplying the Manchester Corporation with 
Ford trucks and vans, and an important part of this continued relationship was their 
“unrivalled service facilities… Quicks are not merely dealers – they are specialists in 
after-sales service.”175 
Examination of dealers and agencies shows that these long and lasting relationships 
were difficult to maintain, partly because of the competition amongst manufacturers, 
but also because the abilities and motives of agents differed wildly. An article in the 
1919 Motor Cycle highlighted this and argued  
One of the first reconstruction problems I therefore maintain, in the interests of 
business prestige, is the abolition of promiscuous agencies without investigation. The 
manufacturer must work directly hand in hand with his accredited agencies, so that 
"real service " may be maintained.176 
The article highlights that for many agents service ended with the sale, and they took 
no interest in advertising, using the advertising allowance as a bonus. It also draws 
attention to unscrupulous agents who, especially in early interwar years looked to 
corner the local territory by securing as many agency agreements as possible and thus 
take out competitor agents just by holding stock of several makes without really 
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focusing on selling. Thus a trusting relationship was key and through Quicks and Ford, 
and Cockshoot and Morris, we see how this developed over the interwar period. 
Ford gave more autonomy and freedom to its agents, who unlike several other 
manufacturers in the UK, allowed their agents to pick up as many cars as they wanted 
from the factory as they rolled off the production line, paying in full on collection, with 
Ford also allowing for returns.177 This allowed great flexibility and was certainly an 
important factor in attracting the 829 dealers that the company could boast at the 
beginning of 1919.178 Other manufacturers such as Morris agreed the number of 
models for the dealer at the start of every motoring season.  Things changed however 
when Ford imposed American management after the resignation of British Managing 
Director Percival Perry. In 1919 new contracts were imposed which set dealers quotas, 
made dealers sell Ford cars only and abolished territories. Riley, Lilleker and Tuckett, 
and McIntosh, identify this move as disastrous for the dealer network that Ford had 
built in the UK since its arrival in the early 1900s, as it signalled the end of years of 
good relations.179 In July 1919 only 268 dealers had signed the new agreement and 
Perry in his memoirs alluded to the damage done: 
Warren Anderson [Managing Director] almost completely ruined the marketing system 
which had slowly and painfully to be rebuilt... most of them would not handle a Ford 
car on any terms whatever.180  
While Perry would certainly be prone to overexaggerate the damage done, when we 
examine the Quicks archive material we see some evidence of the alienation caused by 
successive American managers on the sales side of the business. For example, in a 
series of letters between the Sales Manager at Ford and James Quick in 1923 Ford 
began interfering in the autonomy of the dealer, by refusing to sanction the opening of 
a new showroom in the middle of Manchester and threatening to cut off the supply of 
cars, in which Quick replied by demanding an apology for the abusive behaviour of the 
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sales manager.181 Although relationships were strained during this period they 
managed to recover with Quicks being ever more committed to their manufacturer.   
Scholars highlight how the manufacturing structure changed from large numbers of 
small producers, to a small number of large-scale producers.182 This was not mirrored 
in the service motoring sector which offered an opportunity for many successful 
smaller business ventures in local areas. While motorcar manufacturing in Manchester 
disappeared during the interwar period, other motor businesses adapted, and thrived. 
During the period the number of garages, repair shops, dealerships and agencies in 
Manchester and Salford went from 77 businesses in 1919 to 307 by 1939, a sign not 
only that motoring was becoming an ubiquitous activity, but that the car, and its sale, 
had become a key aspect of the city’s high street shopping experience.183 Important in 
this was the relationship between the dealer and the manufacturer, where lasting 
relationships were key, and the stability this produced encouraged continued 
relationships between dealer and customer over many years. It was therefore 
important for manufacturers, in the success of their production, to find “good” dealers 
and to maintain loyalty once they had been appointed. While the fortunes of Morris 
and Ford were variable during the interwar period, both Quicks and Cockshoot 
expanded and grew their reputations for service and customer care and both were to 
continue their relationships with their manufacturers successfully well into the second 
half of the twentieth century. 
 
Belsize and Austin: the power of dealer networks in the interwar period 
The early 1920s was a difficult period for automobile manufacturers. As Figure 36 
shows the numbers were in steep decline. It was not only the new firms that struggled 
in the interwar market, but established firms too. Ford went from market dominance 
at the beginning of the period to a much smaller market share and Belsize entered 
receivership, liquidated by 1925. Ford’s troubles are explored in Chapter 1, particularly 
the relatively under explored negative portrayal of the Model T in popular culture. 
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Compared to Ford, and other successful interwar firms, Belsize are relatively 
unexplored in scholarship and therefore serve as a useful case study during this period. 
What is striking about the firm is their relative similarity to Austin immediately after 
the First World War and a comparison between Belsize and Austin during this period 
can provide us with some insights into the difficulties facing larger motor 
manufacturers during this era. Both firms supplied the Ministry of Munitions during 
the war, massively expanding their workforces and factories. Belsize produced about 4 
million shells, and Austin 8 million.184 Because of this, both were slow to return to 
normal production and were therefore affected particularly by the iron moulders’ 
strike of 1919-1920. Both entered receivership with the Midland Bank soon after the 
war, Austin in 1921 and Belsize in 1923. Yet while Belsize had wound up by 1925, 
Austin was well on the way to becoming one of Britain’s largest interwar motor 
manufacturers having turned things around successfully. This case study examines why 
Belsize struggled when Austin did not, with particular attention to the overall attitude 
of management, relationship with their dealers and the reaction to receivership. These 
two firms have also been chosen for comparison because there is much research on 
the Austin Motor Company, for example by Roy Church, while the Belsize receivership 
papers held at the HSBC archive represent the largest collection of material for any 
single company in Manchester during this particular period, and are a good source 
highlighting the difficulties manufacturers faced.  
Automobile historians emphasise the need in the immediate period after the war for 
affordable, light cars, evidenced by the successes of the Morris Cowley and the Austin 
Seven from 1922.185 Until then, both Belsize and Austin had been slow to recognise the 
demand in this area, focusing instead on single mid-ranged models. For Austin it was 
the Austin Twelve and for Belsize a 15/20.  This seems especially surprising for Belsize 
who moved into the light car market in 1911 with the successful Belsize 10/12. It is 
possible however that they saw the dominance of local manufacturer Ford as tough 
competition in this area, and a focus on a single model was influenced by Ford’s pre-
war success with the Model T. Church notes that Austin ignored the call from its agents 
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for a small car in 1918,186 while at Belsize’s 1919 AGM the directors were 
concentrating efforts on improving their medium 15 horsepower car.187 Belatedly both 
firms recognised the increasing demand for smaller cheaper cars; however the success 
of their attempts were markedly different. Austin built the Seven which was sold from 
1922, for “the man who, at present, can only afford a motorcycle and sidecar, and yet 
has the ambition to become a motorist.”188 The Belsize-Bradshaw, a small car with a 9 
horsepower oil cooled engine, was described by motoring historian Worthington-
Williams as no match for the Austin Seven in terms of engine ability.189  
While technical superiority and pricing were important there were other factors of 
difference that are similarly striking, and relatively unexplored. One of these was the 
difference in reaction to entering receivership. What is clear from Church’s analysis of 
Austin’s receivership is that the core of the firm’s management remained, with Herbert 
Austin still at the forefront. However, for Belsize the firm’s leaders, who had been in 
place for decades, were completely changed. This might have been due to the 
following report by Francis Wade commissioned by the receivers for an independent 
engineering review in June 1923: 
All these gentlemen were extremely courteous, but there appeared to be a lack of 
purpose and all seemed to have lost heart in the undertaking, and thus the general 
organisation – which probably existed more or less efficiently in the past – now 
appears to be entirely lacking, and no initiative or any description were evident in the 
general control of the Works or the Works’ policy.190 
Soon after receivership the board of directors was completely new apart from James 
Hoyle-Smith, who instead of being Managing Director was now “Technical Advisory 
Director”, replaced as Managing Director by the former consultant engineer Francis 
Wade.191 And in 1924, Hoyle-Smith is no longer mentioned in any of the bank’s 
correspondence. This lack of energy and the almost complete absence of former 
leaders in the board room stands in contrast to the Austin Motor Company, whose 
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management and boardroom changes, Church argues, served to help Herbert Austin’s 
“fertile mind”.192 At the Olympia show of 1920 Belsize were advertising “a reputation 
of a quarter of a century”, however by 1924 the firm’s management and board of 
directors were entirely new to the firm.  
Examining the demise of Belsize also shows the importance of the long term loyalty of 
dealerships. With its 25-year history, Belsize had established a number of these lasting 
relationships. However, these relationships were badly damaged by the 1922 
Engineering Employers Federation (EEF) lockout which brought production to a 
standstill. Orders were not completed, resulting in a loss of business for agents and the 
firm alike. In 1924, with a number of cash and restructuring problems, the Sales 
Director blamed the inability of the firm to supply dealers quickly enough as reason for 
their poor performance: “we did not get into production until all my most valuable 
Buyers were booked up”.193 While the 1923 receivership report noted that: 
there seems to be a lack of confidence between the Firm and its agents which has 
resulted in the falling off of the orders.194  
This confidence is highlighted as crucial by the firm’s new Managing Director Wade. A 
year after taking over he noted: 
When I came into the matter I found that all the Company’s agents were thoroughly 
dissatisfied with their treatment in the past, and it was only by the personal influence 
and promises given… that we were able to re-establish their confidence and induce 
them to place contracts.195 
Surviving correspondence with agents shows the high level of feedback that 
manufacturers received. In 1924 for example, the Edinburgh and District distributors 
Forest and Company highlighted the quality of the 14/30 HP car and its suitability for 
the hilly roads of the area and, while offering to put the firm in touch with satisfied 
customers, regretted the increased price of the car.196 However, the damage was done 
and by 1924 the firm only had 38 contracts signed by agents in the UK, compared to 
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178 in 1921.197 Winning back dealers was made even more difficult while in 
receivership. This highlights the importance of continued dealership confidence, with 
was difficult to win back, even with the quality product that reviews suggest the 1924 
14/30 HP Belsize was.198 
Austin also suffered with their agents ignoring the agents’ call for a small car.199 
However, Austin turned this around and kept the confidence of agents throughout 
their receivership period. Evident in Church’s analysis of the firm were some key ways 
in which agents felt involved. This included visits to the works to have a say in the 
development of the Austin Seven in 1921,200 and in 1928 initiatives such as the Austin 
Finance Company allowing agents to buy stock with credit.201 Austin was also acutely 
aware of supply problems during receivership arguing in 1924:  
We cannot expect to continue to get whole-hearted support from agents and dealers if 
we don’t supply them with as many cars as they can sell… at the present rate of output 
we are only annoying our agents and customers.202 
Automobile scholars focus on managerial decisions, technical aspects of production, 
engineering, pricing and financial constraints when explaining the success and failure 
of firms. This comparison between Belsize and Austin highlights the importance of 
other factors, particularly the relationship between dealers and the manufacturer, an 
often ignored part of the automobile supply chain, and an important link between the 
designer and the user. Firms such as Austin, then, were better able to manage this 
relationship, both through the continuation of personal relationships, but also in the 
way in which they got agents involved in the decision making at the firm. Belsize, 
during their tricky period from 1922, utterly failed to deliver, resulting in the loss of 
confidence, loss of agencies and therefore the loss of orders of some well-engineered 
cars. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter’s aim is to investigate areas of the automobile industry that are relatively 
under explored. Salespersons and sales organisations have been highlighted as the 
“‘missing masses’ of technology studies”.203 Therefore this section has focused on the 
role played by automobile agents and dealers in the industry. The first chapter 
highlighted how local traders played an important role in local automobile clubs, 
engaging with customers, but also fellow motoring enthusiasts. Building upon this, we 
have shown in this section how dealers and agents formed an important link between 
the manufacturer and consumer. As the industry evolved, Ford pioneered the 
nationwide dealership network that focused on after-sales service, including easy 
access to spare parts and repairs. This emphasis contributed towards the end of small 
localised manufacturers who could not compete with such nationwide coverage. 
However, this was not just because of Ford’s access to capital but because it was able 
to build confidence amongst dealers as to the quality of the Model T, and in the 
mutual benefit of a lasting relationship.  
 
The importance of the customer-dealer-manufacturer relationship has been shown to 
be crucial in the rest of the analysis, both looking at the fortunes of Cockshoot, and by 
examining the failure of important local motorcar manufacturer Belsize. 
Manufacturers built relationships with agents that depended on strong mutual 
cooperation. Agents wanted a steady supply of good quality vehicles, access to spares, 
an agreed area of control, and a manufacturer willing to listen to feedback. 
Manufacturers wanted agents with an established customer base, proactive 
advertising and sales strategies. We see in this mutual relationship how the balance of 
power did not always necessarily lie with the manufacturer. When new management 
at Ford tried to increase control over their agent network, their attitude led to agents 
abandoning the firm. Similarly agents quickly abandoned Belsize when promised 
deliveries did not arrive.  
 
This section has also shown how exploring “missing masses” can contribute towards 
our understanding of the co-construction of technology. Agents played a crucial role 
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linking the user and the designer. Closer to user feedback, agents were the first to pick 
up customer wants, demonstrated by the agents push for Austin to produce a lighter 
car long before the manufacturer focused on such a model. Similarly the coachbuilder 
built the amenities and body that the user desired, which built an understanding of 
what the user needed, which in turn influenced what qualities coachbuilders desired 
from motor vehicle manufacturers.  
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3.5 - Regional factors in the development and decline of the industry 
The initial aims of this project involved investigating regional aspects of the motor 
industry in order to examine if, and to what extent, it differed from the national 
context. In the previous chapters we examined a few aspects of the regional market. In 
Chapter 1 we argued that although a few northern firms used regional ties to market 
vehicles, this was often done by the region’s American firms Ford and Willys Overland 
Crossley as part of their drive to combat anti-American prejudice in the British market. 
In Chapter 2 we showed how commercial specialisation was important for regional 
markets. Yet overall there were few important regional aspects that affected the 
North-West’s motor industry, or indeed in any region, especially as the industry 
became established.  
Timmins, writing about manufacturing industries in the North-West, argues: 
the process of industrialisation, which after all is a regional or sub-regional 
phenomenon, has varied substantially from one place to another, not only in terms of 
product emphasis, but also regarding the means of production adopted and its 
organisation. Accordingly, generalisation at national or international level, including 
“stage theories” of economic development, can do no more than provide broad and, 
perhaps, rather limited insights204 
Unsurprisingly due to the regional focus of his research, Timmins emphasises regional 
factors and differences as an important step to understanding industrial development. 
Coventry and the Midlands was the centre of the early motor industry due to the large 
number of cycle manufacturers, an industry from which the motor industry emerged, 
and often used as the primary argument for the concentration of motor manufacturers 
in the region.205 Scholars argue that the move of early firms such as Daimler to 
Coventry also contributed towards Coventry’s position as the centre of the motor 
industry, and a number of firms followed their lead. Daimler set up in Coventry 
because there was a large disused cotton factory that was convenient, and Henry 
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Lawson, the founder of the firm, had links with cycle traders in the area.206 Thoms and 
Donnelly argue that Coventry was economically beneficial for early manufacturers 
because there was access to a cycling-related engineering workforce and component 
sector, as well as a banking system used to the cycle and motor industry’s need for 
capital in the off season.207 However, Saul argues “it is questionable whether, apart 
from a desire to be near the centre of the grapevine, there were serious economic 
factors involved.”208  Apart from the initial draw of Coventry and its cycling heritage 
there have been few reasons suggested as to why firms might benefit from 
geographical proximity to one another. In this section we will show that firms might 
benefit from being away from engineering hubs, thus escaping the stronger 
engineering trade union organisation in cities such as Manchester and Coventry. The 
movement out of industrial centres is reflected particularly in the interwar period 
when Morris and Austin, relatively isolated in Oxford and Longbridge, dominated the 
motorcar market. Beaven notes how the component industry tended to also locate 
outside of traditional industrial centres during this period.209 Similarly Marr’s 
exploration of motorcycle manufacturing highlights how many marques were 
successful outside of manufacturing clusters,  and identifies a general shift beginning in 
the 1930s and increasing in the post-Second World War period away from 
manufacturing centres such as the Midlands.210 In terms of regional factors influencing 
the rise and decline of regional industry there have also been few explanations. As we 
have seen in our initial statistical analysis the North-West’s industry generally followed 
national trends for entry and exits, as well as the longevity of firms. This was also the 
conclusion made by Beaven and Thoms and Donnelly in their studies of Coventry, 
namely that production was generally influenced by performance of the industry as a 
whole.211 Although Thoms and Donnelly argue that Coventry’s “powerful craft 
traditions… helped to direct the pioneer motor firms toward the construction of 
limited numbers of high quality vehicles”.212 Beaven suggests that the concentration of 
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a large number of firms in Coventry created a business community, in which a network 
of business contacts and knowledge was important. This included social participation 
in middle-class clubs where deals could be discussed and struck. However, the 
influence of these informal contacts is inevitably hard to quantify.213 Despite this, a 
similar business community existed in the North-West. We have seen in our 
investigation of the origins of the industry that motoring clubs such as the LSPTA and 
MAC offered social environments for businessmen interested in the industry and could 
form a source of technological and financial support. Similarly Manchester, in the pre-
1914 period had a particularly active motoring trade organisation. 
This section therefore will examine whether regional factors and a regional base were 
important in the development of manufacturing businesses. So far during this thesis it 
has been found that customer, dealer and manufacturer relationships were important 
for the success of business. These relationships were formed at a local level as regional 
dealers were almost always the point of contact between consumer and product. It 
has been found that connections with regional consumers were important but as 
agents and dealer networks expanded and evolved this nullified the importance of 
particular regional locations for manufacturers. 
Locality was important as many early manufacturers that produced on a small scale 
had few or no dealers, and thus they themselves served as both manufacturers and 
agents. The proximity of customers to manufacturers can be seen when examining 
sales and local ownership. The Cheshire registrations show 21 Eagle vehicles registered 
between 1904 and 1905 when mandatory registration became law.214 Figure 50 shows 
the distribution of registered Eagle vehicles, based in Altrincham, and vehicles made by 
Robinson and Price, Liverpool based motorcycle manufacturers between 1904 and 
1907. Both firms produced modestly priced motorcycles and motor tricycles. There is a 
clear concentration of Eagle owners in North East Cheshire, compared with the 
concentration of Robinson and Price owners on the Wirral, with a lower concentration 
and mixture in mid-Cheshire, offering evidence that customer proximity was important 
in the early period of the industry. 
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Figure 30 - Showing Eagle owners in Red and Robinson and Price owners in blue - 
Source - Horner (forthcoming publication, 2019) 
Locality was also important largely due to the unreliability of vehicles. This is 
particularly the case for commercial vehicles, which in order to be economical needed 
to be fixed quickly. Foden sales records demonstrate just how frequently spare parts 
were needed. The Foden “Pioneer” wagon was supplied to the Winnington Co-
operative Society in November 1902. The specification notes show spare parts were 
supplied over the years. Wheels and spokes, new cylinders and a new level pinion 
were supplied in 1903, new wheels, a new front axle and a chain puller shaft in 1904, 
with the list going on for several years.215 Buying local made it easier for consumers to 
obtain repairs, but also gave consumers the confidence that repairs , spares and 
assistance, could, in theory be more easily obtained.  
The early importance of local manufacturing is noted in the contemporary press. The 
Manchester Guardian reported in 1905 that:  
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Most of the wagons seen in Manchester district can fairly be described as of local 
manufacture. Amongst them are the Leyland, the Hercules, the Yorkshire, the Foden, 
and the Coulthard, all manufactured within a fifty-mile radius of the city.216 
It is hard to verify the claim made by the local press, as they give no statistical analysis 
to back up this claim and Manchester vehicle registration records have been 
destroyed. However, examining data from the Cheshire registration records shows that 
between 1903 and 1907 the dominant sales area for Foden was the North-West, but 
between 1908 and 1911 it was eclipsed by the South-East and London, followed by the 
North-West, with a much more even spread among other areas of the country. This 
reflects the initial importance of the local market but also its lessening importance 
after firms had established themselves, both in terms of reputation and with regional 
agents acting as consumer contact points.217  
The movements, entries and exits of firms  
Examining the movement, entry and exits of firms can also provide an insight into the 
importance of location in the motor trade. There are two particularly important firms 
that provide insightful case studies: Rolls-Royce, founded in Manchester, moved to 
Derby in 1907; and Ford who moved to Manchester from London in 1911, and then 
moved to Dagenham in 1931.  
Rolls-Royce was formed in 1904 after a partnership agreement between manufacturer 
Royce Ltd based in Hulme, Manchester, and Charles Rolls, a motorcar agent based in 
London. Rolls gained an agreement for the sole selling rights of the car. The name 
Rolls-Royce itself represents the importance of the designer-seller/user relationship in 
the development of the product. This relationship is highlighted by Rolls in a speech 
given in 1905: 
arrangements were made whereby he [Royce] commenced the manufacture of various 
types to suit my special requirements…In addition to carrying out the general ideas 
and designs that come from my side… his extraordinary genius has enabled him to 
                                                          
216
 Manchester Guardian 30/12/1905 
217
 Cheshire registration analysis by Horner (forthcoming publication, 2019) - Foden’s registered their 
vehicles in Cheshire when they sold them, so there is a full record of Foden’s customer’s addresses 
herein 
 
248 
 
effect clever improvements in general and in detail which have been possessed in no 
other make of car.218 
Features highlighted by Rolls at the time, and emphasised by Rolls-Royce historians, 
include the minimising of vibrations; the placing of the engine under the seat, hidden 
to emulate electric cars; and the minimising of sound and smell, presumably for town 
use.219 The agreement between the two firms was a yearly order for cars. However it 
included some interesting clauses. Clause 4 gave Rolls 30 days to road test and 
dismantle a model of each type manufactured in order that it might be approved. 
Clause 5 gave Rolls the option to disapprove of the car and thus get out of the 
contractual agreement to sell.220 Fundamental, therefore in the design and 
manufacture of the car, was the approval of Rolls, the experienced motorist and car 
salesman.  
Rolls-Royce, and Royce in particular, had many ties with Manchester, having been 
based in the city for several decades as a manufacturer and seller specialising in 
electrical goods, specifically electric cranes. Their workforce was made up of a number 
of skilled engineers based in the area. Despite these local ties the firm moved to Derby 
in 1907 in a move that demonstrated that neither staying local nor moving to another 
engineering centre, such as Coventry, was important for the firm. Their basic need was 
an increase in factory space, in order to increase output, having orders that they could 
not fulfil. Commentators note that although a number of sites was considered, 
including Leicester and Stretford, the move to Derby was taken after a late approach 
by Derby city council who offered a suitable site and favourable electricity rates.221 The 
move involved the transference of most of the Manchester-based staff. Rolls-Royce 
were famous for manufacturing nearly all components themselves so they were not 
reliant on a local supply chain. And because they had established dealerships in 
different regions there is no evidence that a lack of manufacturing presence in the 
North-West caused any adverse business in the region. Cockshoot, their dealer in East 
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Lancashire and Cheshire, continued to sell and model motorcar bodies for Rolls-
Royce’s existing and prospective customers in the region.   
Ford and the move to Dagenham  
Ford cars up to 1911 were imported, assembled and distributed from small premises in 
London. Ford moved to Manchester for a number of reasons, some of which are 
outlined by the Ford Times, which noted the proximity to the Manchester Ship Canal 
for ease of import, good rail links and unrivalled access to labour, with the North-West 
as the centre of the cotton trade.222 A D George argues that Ford may have been 
attracted by proximity to established Manchester-based firms Crossley and Belsize, 
although there is no evidence for this, or the benefits proximity to these firms might 
have had. 
Parts were imported from America, and motorcar bodies were built in Manchester for 
the British market. After 20 years in Manchester Ford moved production to a new site 
at Dagenham. Ford historians argue that the move to Dagenham meant easy access to 
the European export market.223 This was important as Ford suffered in the mid-1920s 
from adverse home market conditions with the detrimental horse-power tax. Evidence 
of the emphasis on Europe can be seen in the creation of the European holding 
company in 1928, which united management of Ford in Europe under Percival Perry 
and included the proposal for the Dagenham plant.224 On top of this the need for 
imports became redundant during the 1920s as by 1926 nearly all components were 
manufactured at Trafford Park due to the “McKenna” duties which placed a 33 percent 
tariff on the import of parts from 1926.225   
However the move away from Manchester began earlier than the late 1920s. Indeed 
even before 1914 Perry was exploring options of an additional manufacturing site that 
could serve the European market. A site in Southampton was bought with the aim of 
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supplying parts and cars to Europe.226 Similarly Cork was used in 1917 as a site for the 
production of Fordson Tractors. However the direction of European operations was to 
change so that Detroit would manage European exports, which conflicted with Perry’s 
plans and led to his resignation in 1919.227 The reemployment of Perry in 1928 
coincided with Henry Ford’s visit to the UK and the commencement of the 
development of the Dagenham site.  
It is clear that expanding European operations was important to the move; however 
McIntosh also explores some other factors. Contrary to the free market portrayal of 
Trafford Estates, it seems that Ford was denied room for expansion although McIntosh 
does not give evidence for this denial. He argues, though, that a move was inevitable, 
as Ford’s medium to long term multi-national planning was at odds with the 
unplanned, anarchic nature of Trafford Park. He further argues that the move to 
Dagenham mirrored the move in the US from Highland Park to River Rouge: “as 
industrial capital moved into a ’new’ phase involving new levels of technology and 
work organisation.” The move was also a sign of “the increasing mobility of capital”.228 
Indeed the move demonstrated this, including the removal of much of the factory’s 
physical capital including production line, raw materials and machine tools, and the 
move of 2,000 of the workforce funded by the company.229 The firm ended production 
at Trafford Park and 3 days later started production at Dagenham. This meant almost 
no disruption to the distribution network, which remained unchanged, serving their 
regional customers. 
 
The move of Ford to Dagenham marked the virtual end of Manchester’s involvement 
in the motorcar industry. While Crossley Motors continued to produce cars until 1938, 
their main focus was on commercial vehicles. The North-West still had some significant 
commercial vehicle manufacturers such as Leyland, Pagefield and Fodens, and indeed 
commercial vehicle custom was particularly high in the North-West. The mobility of 
Ford and their focus on the European and global market demonstrates how different 
the motor industry of the 1930s was from the localised industry of the embryonic 
                                                          
226
 Riley, Lilleker and Tuckett, The English Model T Ford p.249 
227
 Riley, Lilleker and Tuckett, The English Model T Ford p.249 
228
 McIntosh, Ford at Trafford Park pp.340-344 
229
 Riley, Lilleker and Tuckett, The English Model T Ford p.213 
 
251 
 
period where manufacturers like Eagle, and Robinson and Price, were producing and 
selling from the same location and supplying local consumers.  
 
Local and national motor shows  
Beaven highlights the importance of the Coventry business community’s informal 
networking.230 In Manchester a working business community is demonstrated in 
Manchester’s local motor trade organisation, who organised an annual motor show. 
This organisation began as the Manchester and District Cycle Trades’ Association 
(MDCTA), before becoming the Manchester and District Motor Trades Association 
(MDMTA). The annual show took place in February every year and became the 
Manchester Cycle and Motor Show in 1899, mirroring a national trend for cycle shows 
also including motor vehicles. In the early years these shows offered the large number 
of experimental local manufacturers, and potential users a chance to see a wide 
variety of motor vehicles and to inspect various designs. At these shows design and 
innovation trends were recognised, offering an opportunity to explore how 
technological innovation and the direction of design was perceived by the general 
public. The Manchester Guardian’s report of the 1900 show highlights this:  
there is an increasing number of motors on three wheels. The quadricycle, driven by a 
motor and provided with two seats, appears also to come more into favour...There is 
great diversity in the arrangement of these vehicles, but the tendency is towards 
compactness and comfort.231  
The Manchester Motor Show expanded and by 1907 it was housed at Belle Vue which 
offered 20,000 square feet of show space along with a trial track outside.232 However, 
as the MDMTA and the Manchester Motor Show developed it became less for local 
manufacturers and more for local agents, showing the products of their agreed 
national and international agencies. This can be seen in the stand holders at later 
exhibitions, most of which were taken by local agents. For example at the 1913 show 
Stockport dealers Hollingdrake were showing La Buire cars; Joe Richardson of 
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Altrincham was showing Arrol-Johnston and Wolseley; Lookers, agents in Manchester 
were showing Swift motorcars; and S.P.A motorcars manufactured in Italy were being 
shown by an agent based in Leeds.233 
From 1907 the Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders sought to control and limit 
the number of motor shows to a national one based at Olympia in the autumn. This 
created serious problems for the local interest group, the MDMTA, which battled hard 
with the SMMT to gain approval to hold the 1907 annual Manchester Motor Show.234 
However, by 1908 the special dispensation to hold an official Manchester show was 
revoked, although the MDMTA carried on organising annual shows anyway, showing 
how strong the local trades association was.235 Even the agencies that were barred 
from display tried to get their shops in order for the dates of the Manchester Show:  
Many of the big firms and agents in the neighbourhood of Deansgate are 
unfortunately debarred by the anathematised Olympia Show bond of the Society of 
Motor Manufacturers and Traders, from exhibiting, and naturally these have set their 
houses in order, or rather shops, by displaying out stocks of latest 1910 models.236 
The dispute lasted until 1911 when the SMMT reconciled with the MDMTA and 
recognised the show, labelling it the “North of England Motor Show”, one of four 
annual UK motor shows.237 The MDMTA became part of the SMMT as the Lancashire 
and Cheshire district. Part of this allowance was the different season that the shows 
occupied, Olympia in the autumn and the Northern show in late Winter. Olympia 
became more of an “agents’ show”, while the northern show provided an opportunity 
for motorists and prospective motorists to view potential purchases shortly before the 
start of the motoring season, thus it was labelled a “buyers’ show”.238 The 1911 
edition, under the auspices of the SMMT, was large and featured 140 exhibits. 
However in 1914 the SMMT organised a referendum for those involved in the 1914 
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show to see whether more shows were desirable. This referendum proved 
contentious: Liverpool traders only wanted a Northern show if it was held in 
Liverpool.239 Thus there was a prospect of the SMMT stepping in again to withdraw 
support for a regional show.  
However debate was not limited to the importance of local shows, but over the 
relevance of the national exhibition. Herbert Austin argued that it was a waste of time, 
effort and resources; and no longer necessary as a primary way of securing orders 
from agents.240 This seems not to apply in Manchester where the local show continued 
with high attendances. In December 1913 the venue of the January 1914 Manchester 
Motor Show Rusholme Exhibition building was destroyed by arson. The committee of 
the District SMMT had to hastily rearrange. With talks of calling the show off, the 
journalist reporting speculated a loss of £50,000 to £100,000 in trade.241 The show did 
however go ahead at St. James’ Hall, in Manchester.   
Meanwhile, one of the important factors of the Northern shows was the dominance of 
the motorcar section of the trade. A motorcyclist wrote to the Motor Cycle on the 
subject after the 1906 show: 
There are a great number of motor cyclists besides myself who cannot afford time to 
go to London to see such shows as the Stanley Show. In my opinion Manchester is a 
capital centre for an exhibition…  I think the last show was very unrepresentative of 
motor cycles, considering the number of firms now manufacturing these machines. 
Perhaps when competition increases a little we shall have a larger variety from which 
to choose.242 
This opinion was echoed by J.T. Ward who noted “The show [1907] is indeed for the 
rich.”243 The early shows also did not cater for the growing interest in commercial 
vehicles, the Commercial Motor noting that the 1907 show was of little interest to 
commercial motorists.244 A correspondent wrote:  
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I looked in at the Manchester Motor Car Show in St. James's Hall on Friday—that being 
the opening day— but I saw few people interested in the business vehicle, and it 
accentuated the regret I already felt that two separate shows should be held in 
Manchester.245   
Things improved however and the show became more diverse as time went on. By 
1912 the commercial vehicle section of the show included 45 petrol and four steam 
commercial vehicles.246 By 1914 the show had split into a commercial show and a 
private car show.247 
The Manchester shows demonstrate the strong regional identity that motor traders 
and manufacturers maintained from the first motor and cycle show in 1897 through to 
1914. However, these shows became less about manufacturing and more about local 
agents and dealers advertising national products at a local level. Despite this the 
MDMTA represented the strong regional independence of these agents, who defied 
the pressure put on them by the SMMT for a single national motor show at Olympia. 
Manchester represented a centre for the North of England, with visitors from 
Yorkshire, Northumberland, Derbyshire, Cheshire, North Wales and Lancashire. Initially 
it was used to show experimental machines. As it developed it was beneficial for motor 
car body builders and agents, who used the show to exhibit examples of their work, 
while offering local manufacturers a cheaper and nearer option for a show venue than 
Olympia. By the end of the period, the number of dealerships of private vehicles was 
growing, and the need for a show was lessening. As well, the motor dealer had an 
increasing presence on the high street;248 however commercial vehicles did not have 
the same infrastructure, so the shows became more important for businessmen to 
compare the growing number of commercial vehicle manufacturers that were looking 
for lucrative business in Cottonopolis. The changes in the show therefore represent the 
changing nature of motor consumerism during this period. Shows used to represent 
the only way in which a potential consumer, or potential agent could see or try a 
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motor vehicle. By 1914 however, the club infrastructure and the dealership networks, 
and the number of motoring publications meant that there was much more help, both 
for the consumer and motor dealers in choosing the right vehicle. The evolving nature 
of the shows demonstrates how the local market and local publicity was only initially 
important for manufacturers, before the nationwide dealership network dealt with 
and managed regional interest. 
 
Conclusion 
We have seen how regional factors were important in the emergence of local motor 
manufacturing firms. This is particularly so with the ability to interact with other 
experimental manufacturers through the early trade organisations and at regional 
shows, but also reacting to users, or proactively encouraging their cycling clients on a 
local level before serious levels of production could be contemplated. However the 
importance of regional factors in the location, rise and decline of motor manufacturers 
quickly lessened. We have seen in our analysis of the movement of firms such as Rolls-
Royce and Ford, and in the success of geographically isolated firms such as Morris and 
Austin, how proximity to component manufacturers or other motor manufacturers 
was not an important consideration as the industry developed. This reflects the 
national and international nature of the manufacturing trade, and the mobility that 
could be achieved both in moving assets such as large machine tools and labour. 
Above all the development and establishment of automobile sales, conducted by 
regional independent agents, meant that the crucial regional factor was in choosing 
and maintaining these agents, who would then provide the manufacturer access to 
their clientele or the regional consumer market which varied from region to region. 
The next section will engage with labour organisation, one of the more tangible 
aspects that influenced regional manufacturing. 
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3.6 - Labour and the Manchester motor industry from 1914 
There are relatively few instances in the UK of disputes between the motor car 
industry, workers and trade unions prior to the First World War. The notable exception 
was a strike by workers at the Ford motorcar company between 1912 and 1913. The 
confrontation between workers and management came about due to a disagreement 
over the dilution of labour.  This was significant because Ford achieved an almost un-
unionised workforce, something that other manufacturers, especially in Manchester, 
did not. The period during, and just after, the First World War was one of much more 
significance for organised labour in the motor industry. This was particularly the case 
in the North-West where, with the exception of Ford and commercial vehicle 
manufacturers, and to some extent Crossley, the passenger car industry had collapsed. 
It will be highlighted in this section that Manchester’s motor manufacturers, with the 
exception of Ford, were in an almost constant power struggle with trade unions both 
during the First World War and in the years just after this had an impact on the decline 
of the North-West’s motor industry, especially when we compare the fortunes of 
Manchester’s manufacturers with other centres of the industry, especially in Oxford, 
the home of Morris, and Longbridge, the site of the Austin Motor Company. 
At a national level scholars have tended to include any disruption in the industry 
during the interwar period as a precursor to the narrative of industrial relations after 
the Second World War which was generally a much more problematic period.249 
Lewchuck sparked much debate in automobile historiography when he argued that 
labour seriously impeded the British industry in adopting Fordist mass production 
techniques during the period immediately after the First World War.250 This was soon 
refuted by Tolliday whose study is one of the most focused works on the early period, 
and has influenced subsequent general histories on the automobile industry. Tolliday 
concludes that between 1896 and 1939 unlike the USA and France, British labour 
“failed to make much of an impact”.251 This he argues was largely down to the post-
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war slump period between 1920 and 1922, which badly hit the organisation of both 
semi-skilled unions like the Workers Union (WU) and skilled unions such as the 
Amalgamated Engineers Union (AEU) and the National Union of Vehicle Builders 
(NUVB) as firms outside of the traditional centres of organisation, like Austin and 
Morris, started to dominate the interwar market.252 Turner in his analysis of post-
Second World War strikes in the industry noted that all pre-Second World War strikes 
counted for well under 10 percent of total strikes to 1964.253 Subsequent automobile 
historiography has accepted Tolliday’s conclusion, that there was comparatively little 
trouble for employers, especially after 1922 and therefore have generally rejected 
Lewchuck’s position,254 although Lyddon argues that while the WU and AEU’s position 
collapsed after 1922 the NUVB maintained its membership and was successful in 
actions taken well into the 1930s.255 
One of the key themes identified by scholars is the gradual change from the use of 
skilled to semi-skilled workers during the period up to the early 1920s; Church argues 
this was stimulated by dilution and practices during and immediately after the First 
World War.256 Tolliday extends this period with his regional examination of Coventry, 
showing that dilution was happening on a large scale in this region before the First 
World War, where 45 percent of Coventry’s engineers were classed as semi-skilled by 
1913 and many bigger Coventry firms had been successful in partly removing 
unionised workers from production activities. 
What were the regional variations and how did they impact on organised labour and 
the car manufacturers? Importantly Tolliday notes that firms were not so successful in 
the North, citing two Manchester examples, Belsize and Crossley, before 1914, where 
the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) were successful in challenging the firms’ 
attempts to dilute labour on machine tools. Tolliday notes the regional differences, 
with the ASE much less militant or effective, in actions in Coventry compared with 
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elsewhere.257 Despite this there is a general lack of evidence used by Tolliday outside 
of Coventry, the base of his source material, and this affects his overall analysis. 
Foreman-Peck, Bowden and McKinley go further and argue that “differential labour 
resistance might possibly explain the interwar success of the Oxford motor industry 
compared to that of Coventry”, which had a much longer labour tradition.258 However 
they fail to explore labour issues during the interwar period in much detail and give 
little evidence for this conclusion, in a section that covers just over two pages of their 
work. This conclusion though is supported by Thoms and Donnelly in their analysis of 
the impact of industrial action in Coventry during the war. They conclude that “the 
war... reinforced the city’s reputation as an area prone to industrial unrest”, which 
might partly explain why volume car producers chose not to assemble in Coventry. 259  
An examination of Manchester’s automobile industry and its relationship with labour 
during the period from 1914 onwards can help us to test the conclusions of 
automobile scholars and understand what impact unionisation of the workforce had 
on the British automobile industry as a whole. This section will explore relations during 
the war, the period of boom to 1921 and the subsequent slump. It will use sources 
from the point of view of the employees, the main source being the Manchester and 
District ASE and AEU minute books which start in 1915. This approach should help 
balance some of the bias towards employer-based sources used by automobile 
scholars such as Tolliday.260  
The First World War, dilution and disputes 
Thoms and Donnelly argue that during the First World War the increase in female 
labour in semi-skilled roles in the motor industry caused relatively little trouble. The 
main problem instead was representation in the workplace and maintaining living 
standards which in 1917 brought about a series of strikes.261 However, in Manchester 
the dilution of labour was to be an ongoing issue for important local firms Belsize and 
Crossley. There were relatively few problems at the beginning of the war. In 1915 
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there were issues over dilution as Belgian refugees working at Crossley refused to join 
the ASE.262 However 1916 marked the start of friction between employers and the 
unions at both firms. This was both in relation to dilution by female labour and in 
response to working conditions and pay. Tension increased into 1917 and 1918 causing 
problems for both the firms and their workforce, unionised and non-unionised alike. 
Increasingly large munitions contracts dominated production at Belsize from 1916, 
leading to massive upheaval at the works. This started with the firm moving to three 
shifts to cover every hour of the week, which was agreed to only after the firm had 
accepted to pay overtime rates for work over 7 and a half hours a day.263 This deal by 
the ASE was in cooperation with the United Machine Workers’ Association (UMWA). 
The firm then attempted dilution of labour by using semi-skilled men as supervisors 
and setters-up of munitions-making machines. This also met with opposition from the 
ASE and UMWA.264 A shortage of skilled men eventually necessitated the acceptance 
of dilution. However the unions successfully managed to avoid diluted pay by getting 
Belsize to agree to pay all instructors the same rate, skilled or semi-skilled. This was 
constantly contested as the firm tried to reduce rates when they introduced more 
machines used for the increasingly large munitions contracts. This was noted by the 
ASE District Committee in November 1916 when they agreed to withdraw their 
members from setting-up if the firm refused to pay the same rate for all setters-up.265 
This issue over pay and dilution came to a head at the end of 1916 when the firm 
received a massive contract that would entail the employment of 2,000 women 
workers and 450 unskilled men, 75 of whom would have to be trained to set up 
machines.266  After 4 months of protracted negotiations involving the Ministry of 
Munitions, the management at Belsize and the ASE, it was agreed that semi-skilled 
workers could be put on a lower rate, as assistants. This was only agreed as there was 
such a shortage of skilled labour that no skilled workers could be found by either the 
ASE or the Ministry of Munitions.267 Evidently the ASE recognised this shortage, as later 
in the year it emerged that a subsidiary company of Belsize was using women in skilled 
                                                          
262
 Working Class Movement Library - ASE minutes 23/7/1915 
263
 Working Class Movement Library - ASE Minutes 17/2/1916 
264
 Working Class Movement Library - ASE Minutes 7/7/1916 
265
 Working Class Movement Library - ASE Minutes 7/11/1916 
266
 Working Class Movement Library - ASE Minutes 21/11/1916 
267
 Working Class Movement Library - ASE Minutes 20/3/1917 
 
260 
 
positions. The ASE demanded that the women on the grinding machines be paid an 
equal rate to a unionised male counterpart, a demand that would have been unheard 
of before the war, but which was accepted by Belsize.268 
Relations between Belsize and the unions took a turn for the worse over the issue of 
dilution in 1918 with a threat of strike action by the ASE:  
We, the skilled men, consider that dilatory measures are being taken to bring this 
matter to a head, and, unless immediate steps are taken to bring this matter to a 
close, a down tools is threatened.269 
This conflict did not lead to strike action, but there are several instances of attempts to 
dilute that were curbed by the unions both before and immediately after the war. 
These examples at Belsize show the relative power of the ASE and UMWA during the 
war in a Manchester firm that was heavily reliant on union members, with the issues of 
dilution and pay being at the forefront of negotiated issues.  
The union disputes at Crossley Motors were similar to Belsize during the war although 
Crossley was engaged on aircraft and heavy vehicle production for the armed forces. 
Like at Belsize, the ASE had issues over lower payment of semi-skilled workers and 
attempts by Crossley to dilute pay and skilled labour.270 However matters escalated 
early at Crossley with the ASE District Committee threatening the firm with 
prosecution and the withdrawal of members if they continued to employ women on 
machine tools at a lower rate than that set by the union.271 This dispute carried on for 
over a year, with the ASE gaining the co-operation of the Federation of Women 
Workers at the end of 1917. Eventually an agreement was reached with the 
Employers’ Federation, the ASE and Federation of Women Workers, with women 
working machines being paid only 10 percent less than their male counterparts.272 
Despite the agreement relations were so bad at Crossley that there was astrike in the 
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summer of 1918 involving around 1,000 ASE and UMWA members over a pay 
dispute.273 The threat of a Ministry of Munitions tribunal put an end to the strike. 
The analysis of union activity, then, at both Crossley and Belsize during the war shows 
that the issue of dilution was certainly important in the Manchester industry, and 
when dilution was accepted it was only done in conjunction with the protection of pay. 
Thus Manchester’s war-time experience showed more of an emphasis on dilution than 
Thoms and Donnelly’s analysis of Coventry. Despite this, evidence of union activity 
outside of Belsize and Crossley is sparse. Ford was an example of a motor firm, like 
Morris, that was relatively unimpeded by union activity during the war. There was only 
one instance of a dispute at Ford during the war, in 1918 itself very minor with the firm 
having very few union members.274 The high levels of union activity in Manchester had 
some negative effects. Belsize was delayed starting some munitions contracts because 
of negotiations, meaning that although they had a profitable war, it was not as 
profitable as Austin’s whose production levels were double those of Belsize. Despite 
this, profits at Crossley and Belsize were high during the war.  Wartime union activity 
had a more important impact on the post-war period because it was set up for 
antagonism after the war which was to have a much more profound effect in what was 
a very competitive post-war market. 
Post-War Problems 
The immediate post-First World War period was one of turbulence, both economically 
and for the labour movement. In terms of labour issues it was one of boom and then 
recession from almost 100 percent employment to rapidly increasing unemployment. 
It was also a period of immense competition for both new and established automobile 
manufacturers. The main instances of industrial unrest that affected the motor 
industry have been identified in previous scholarship as the iron moulders’ strike of the 
winter 1919-1920 and the EEF lockouts in the spring and summer of 1922. Therefore 
we will explore the impact of both of these events on Manchester firms.  
The iron moulders’ strike lasted 20 weeks from September 1919 to January 1920 and 
affected production in the motor industry during this period. Automobile scholars 
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argue over the extent of its impact. However it seems to have affected firms changing 
back from munitions work more prominently. For example, Adeney and Church argue 
that the strike was one of the reasons that Austin entered receivership, causing the 
loss of production of 3,000 cars.275 Belsize was in a very similar situation to Austin, also 
affected by the strike. At the Annual General Meeting of 1919, financial results for 
1918 and 1919 were not announced and the director noted: 
The labour troubles in various branches of the engineering trades are reacting upon us, 
and the shortage of raw material caused by the prolongation of the troubles is now 
assuming most serious proportions… our deliveries are being thrown back for the lack 
of raw materials…. It only remains for the strikes to be settled amicably to enable us to 
get into our full stride of production.276  
The iron moulders strike came at a terrible time for the company.  Munitions contracts 
were quickly wound up by February 1919 and the ASE Minute book shows that the 
company was attempting to get the works ready to start production by 31 August 
1919; however the ASE members reporting from inside were sceptical that this was 
possible.277 Therefore the strike occurred just as Belsize was readying for production 
and the subsequent lack of raw materials forced delays into the beginning of 1920. 
Indeed in 1919 the firm managed to produce only a few hundred cars, which was 
similar to Coventry firm Standard who also struggled to return to normal 
production.278 This performance is remarkable when compared with Ford, who had 
produced 12,175 vehicles and were clear market leaders in a period of unprecedented 
high demand.279 Ford still relied on imported parts in the immediate period after the 
First World War although they were moving towards native manufacture due to high 
import duties. They were therefore rather unaffected by the protracted iron moulders’ 
strike of 1919-1920. Despite this the industrial unrest of the post-war period did touch 
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the firm. A series of dock and shipping strikes in the USA in 1919 led to Trafford Park 
being shut down temporarily.280  
Overtime was a key issue during the early interwar period. The ASE and AEU generally 
denied overtime requests, arguing that the firms had laid-off members and could hire 
some more men if there was more work. This was particularly important in 1919 as 
firms such as Belsize were changing over to normal production from munitions in an 
effort to get working models to the 1919 Olympia Show. Belsize requested overtime in 
order to get cars finished for this, which was refused. This was also the case for the 
British Commercial Lorry and Engineering Company who aimed to produce a motorcar 
for the first time.281 Crossley requested overtime for extended road testers at the 
beginning of 1919, which was also refused, with the union arguing that road testing 
could be done inside normal hours. This meant Crossley could not conduct road tests 
over extended distances.282 However, a request by Belsize for overtime to work on a 
show model for the Scottish Automobile Show was accepted by the union and in 1921 
for the Olympia Show, as the unions realised the importance of the show for 
employment in the months following.283  
Control of overtime was to be the crux of the issue that led to the EEF’s lockout in 
1922, which lasted for several months before engineering unions agreed to the EEF 
terms. Automobile historians view this as a watershed moment for the interwar 
automobile industry. Victory for the EEF significantly weakened engineering unions’ 
power both through defeat, loss of funds and subsequent decrease of membership 
and the ability to effectively organise the shop floor in federated firms.284 While this 
might be the case, scholarship neglects to examine the immediate impact of the 1922 
lockout on individual motor firms. In Manchester, especially at Belsize, the lockout was 
a long way from being a victory for the employers and it served only to hasten the end 
of one of Manchester’s most prestigious pre-war motor manufacturers.  
                                                          
280
 Riley, Lilleker and Tuckett, The English Model T Ford p.121 
281
 Working Class Movement Library - ASE Minutes 10/10/1919 
282
 Working Class Movement Library - ASE Minutes 4/4/1919 
283
 Working Class Movement Library - ASE Minutes 16/1/1920; 6/10/1921 
284
 Tolliday, “Management and Labour in Britain 1896-1939” pp.46-47, Church, The rise and decline of 
the British motor industry p.25, Thoms and Donnelly, The motor car industry in Coventry p.108 
 
264 
 
The depression had hit the engineering unions hard, and by July 1921 there were 
114,684 AEU members unemployed, whilst the EEF by 1922 had 2,000 firms as 
members, including Belsize and Crossley.285 In 1921 the EEF had successful negotiated 
for a lowering of the piece-rate bonus which saved companies a combined 50 million 
pounds.286 The next attack by the EEF was on overtime, which many AEU Districts, 
including Manchester, had put an embargo on. The EEF threatened a lock-out unless 
overtime was brought under control of management. Negotiations between the AEU, 
other engineering trade unions and the EEF broke down on 11 March 1921 and union 
members were locked out of all federated firms. Jefferys, in his history of the AEU, 
regards the time chosen as deliberate, so as to have little effect on EEF members’ 
profits.287 However this does not apply to motoring firms, whose peak period for 
deliveries were the spring and early summer months to coincide with the seasonal 
nature of pleasure motoring at the time. Belsize’s Managing Director Hoyle-Smith 
wrote later in the year that the lock-out was  
during 14 weeks of the best-selling period of the year, making a difference in turnover 
of approximately £400,000.288  
There is further evidence that Belsize suffered during the lock-out. In June, 12 weeks 
into the lockout, members employed at Belsize came to the District Committee, where 
it was stated: 
the Firm are desirous of the men returning with the other 47 Unions to work, 
promising that no new innovations, or improvements, shall take place regarding the 
points in dispute… They have to compete with other non-federated Firms in Coventry 
who are turning out cars wholesale and undermining the prestige of the Belsize. They 
have tried to get the Firm to break away from the Federation but without success.289 
Charles Nuttall, in a letter to the District Committee, confirms the firm’s position in 
writing, adding:  
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at the time the Dispute started, no changes were contemplated, nor has anything 
arisen to influence any changes.290  
There are several interesting points raised by these negotiations. It seems that many of 
the firm’s rivals were not members of the EEF and therefore would still be producing 
during this period, while Belsize had ceased entirely. The firm had an almost fully 
unionised shop-floor, contrary to most rival firms who were attempting volume car 
production, most notably Ford, Austin, Morris and several Coventry-based firms where 
the AEU had less influence post First World War.291 The “prestige of the Belsize” was 
likely a reference to a failure to deliver orders during this 14-week period, which would 
have certainly led to the defection of agents and customers. Considering the 
management’s unenthusiastic support for the lock-out’s principles and the damage to 
revenue and reputation, one wonders why Belsize stayed in the EEF and kept the lock-
out notices up at the works. 
It must be remembered that these negotiations between the firm and the AEU District 
Committee came near the end of the lockout, and thus the District Committee was 
open to talks given that the union funds were exhausted at the end of May, and all 
benefits were suspended apart from to the sick and superannuated.292 Also a ballot to 
accept the EEF terms was arranged for 13 June. In March the union’s position changed. 
The District Committee pushed for a walkout on 14 March of all AEU members, 
including those in non-federation firms.293 It also passed a resolution that no members 
should handle any work passed on to other firms. Both Belsize and Crossley tried to get 
back-axles and gearboxes made by the Buffoline Engineering Co. and the Lancashire 
Gearing Co. respectively, which was countered by this resolution.294 With this strong 
resistance in place it is perhaps understandable that the firm would remain part of the 
EEF. To leave might make little difference, with members leaving firms not federated. 
For Belsize therefore the lock-out was disastrous, and was to be a big blow to the firm 
looking to recover from a difficult previous three years. This examination, then, has 
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shown that more research is needed into the impact of the 1922 EEF lockout in the 
motor industry, with scholars having focused on the union weakening after-effects 
rather than the potential negative consequences of a 14-week lockout in a period of 
recession.  
Post-Lockout union activity: Ford, Willys Overland Crossley and non-unionised 
workforces 
Lyddon argues that scholars have been preoccupied with AEU activity and the motor 
industry, especially regarding their rapid decline in membership and influence after the 
1922 EEF lockout. Lyddon’s thesis focuses on the NUVB which he shows continued to 
exert its influence in the latter half of the 1920s.295 Thus we must explore evidence of 
post-1922 lockout union activity in Manchester to see if we can contribute to this 
debate. Willys-Overland-Crossley (WOC) make an interesting case study in this regard, 
as they attempted to compete with the likes of Ford in the light, cheap car market.  
Examining WOC shows that even after 1922 finding skilled, non-unionised labour was 
difficult in the Manchester area. Trade union membership at the firm was clearly high 
as members of eight unions in the Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades 
of the United Kingdom (FESTUK) were represented on the shop floor.  WOC attempted 
to break union membership among its skilled workers by bringing in non-unionised 
workers from Birmingham during a strike by the Amalgamated Woodworkers and the 
Sheet Metal Workers over pay in 1922, leading to all unions affiliated to FESTUK 
accepting a resolution not to work with imported labour at WOC.296 However, this 
show of solidarity had mixed results with several members being expelled from the 
unions on declining to follow the resolution. This led to the firm being declared a 
“Black Shop” by FESTUK who also attempted to influence non-federated unions to 
declare the employer a “Black Shop”, intimating that several unions still had members 
and organisation at WOC post-1922.297 Despite this WOC was successful in breaking 
the position of skilled unions and replacing workers with semi-skilled in several key 
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areas mirroring the majority of firms elsewhere. This has been noted by scholars and 
reflects the general weakened position of engineering unions at the time. 
This action must have been in part influenced by the success of Ford during the years 
immediately after the Second World War, with Ford actively welcoming visitors from 
other firms all around the country.  Indeed a worker at Ford recounted the visits:  
We had entertained parties from most of our British competitors, providing them with 
guides and lunch while they “pinched” our secrets.298 
The attitude of Ford to organisation on the shop floor is epitomised in the memoirs of 
Ruth Frow, writing about her husband Eddie Frow, an avid labour activist, who joined 
Ford at Trafford Park in the 1920s: 
This was an immediate challenge to Eddie and he started to organise the tool room 
into the AEU. In a very short time he found himself outside the gate.299 
This is a clear example of the stance that Ford took with unions. Indeed the imitation 
of Ford went further. According to Eyre, Heaps and Townsin WOC recruited workers 
from the Ford plant, although they provide no source for this information.300 After the 
1922 lockout Belsize’s position as a significant motor manufacturer was effectively 
ended and they quickly slipped into receivership before being wound up in 1925. 
Crossley continued in the luxury car market, but no longer had the prominent role in 
this sector that they enjoyed before the First World War. With mass car producers 
WOC and Ford effectively breaking the unions, major agitation in the Manchester 
motor industry from the engineering unions was at an end, with only minor disputes 
being recorded for Manchester motor firms in the AEU minute books from 1923. 
Unfortunately it is more problematic to make conclusions that include the NUVB 
because source material is scarce for the Manchester area. 
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Conclusion 
Examination of organised labour in the Manchester motor industry shows some 
similarities and differences compared to other areas and manufacturers around the 
country. Within Manchester significant producers such as Belsize and Crossley had 
high levels of union membership, whereas firms such as Ford and WOC succeeded 
largely in having a union free workforce, which helped avoid disputes and allowed for 
more flexible decision making by management. We also see in both the number and 
scale of incidents at Crossley and Belsize that union disputes caused considerable 
delays and problems for the firm both in optimising wartime production and in the 
intense competition in the post-war period. While these issues were not the only 
factor that saw these firms facing mixed fortunes in the post-war years, they certainly 
played a significant part, especially in the demise of Belsize, one of Manchester’s 
oldest and most prestigious firms. Indeed as Percival Perry, Ford’s managing director, 
moaned in 1912, “Manchester is... the hot bed of trade unionism,”301 even though 
Ford had broken up shop-floor organisation after the strike of 1912-1913. As McIntosh 
argues, they had to combat this by paying very high wages.302 Manchester’s long union 
traditions contrasted to Coventry where a lack of similar tradition led to the virtual 
collapse of AEU and WU membership in the district. Whether firms were like a closed 
shop like Ford or heavily unionised like Belsize, union organisation in Manchester 
certainly played its part in company fortunes and decision making. 
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3.7 – Chapter 3 Conclusion  
Exploring the Manchester motor industry has highlighted gaps in knowledge. This 
chapter has shown the importance of studying the boom in experimental, small-scale 
manufacturers during the emergence of the automobile; which from an economic 
point of view were insignificant, explaining the scant reference to this brief period in 
national histories. However, examining the origins, actions and exits of these firms has 
shown that they played an important part locally in both promoting and facilitating the 
emergence of motoring as an activity. This can also be seen in Chapter 1 when it was 
found that men in the trade formed a large number of members of the local 
automobile clubs that sprang up around the region; and in Chapter 2 when 
manufacturers competed in heavy traffic trials to improve goods haulage by road. This 
local significance continued, and we see this through the role played by agents and 
dealers who acted as local centres for particular manufacturers of the automobile. The 
way in which the industry developed, with national and international manufacturers’ 
vehicles sold at a local level by independent sellers, meant that the location of 
manufacturers was not particularly important in terms of connecting with the user. 
More important was the economy of factory space, location for transporting products 
and the regional level of engineering union organisation. Coventry and indeed, 
Manchester, developed as a centre for automobile production, but there was no real 
benefit for proximity. Indeed, we have demonstrated that labour organisation often 
made it disadvantageous. It has been found that national events such as the iron 
moulder’s strike of 1919-1920 and the EEF Lockout of 1922 affected firms in radically 
different ways and a closer analysis of other firms’ experience during these two events 
would certainly benefit our understanding of the automobile industry during this 
period and could lead to a re-evaluation of these events’ overall impact of the UK’s 
motor industry. Most striking is the contrast between Belsize, massively affected by 
both the iron moulders’ strike and the EEF Lockout, and Ford, who were almost 
unaffected.  
We have also shown how automobile manufacturing emerged from a variety of 
different backgrounds. While bicycle manufacturing was similar, and therefore lent 
itself to automobile manufacturing, we have seen how manufacturers were influenced 
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by customers, and by use: the most famous example being Royce, turning to 
manufacturing after experiencing motoring. These enthusiastic small to medium sized 
businesses were the first to begin manufacture before larger firms sought to produce 
in volume and develop widespread dealership networks that saw small manufacturers 
cease manufacturing, with many using their expertise either to work for larger firms or 
become agents and repairers in their local area.  
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Conclusion 
Today the automobile is a dominant economic and political force in the UK. Production 
and jobs in the industry are important factors in national economic performance, with 
an estimated 800,000 jobs in the sector. The political importance of the industry is 
demonstrated as the UK grapples with its vision for Brexit. The pressure on 
government by the SMMT and many MPs whose constituents benefit from the 
industry is for a close customs arrangement with the European Union that will best 
safeguard the industry, in which the unfettered import of components and export of 
finished cars is of great importance.1 The automobile also dominates visions of the 
future of mobility: electric rather than the combustion engine or driverless automated 
automobiles. These visions are reflected both in the actions of policy makers, the 
experiments of technology companies and general media discourse on the subject. 
How this change happens, when and even if, is widely debated.  
This thesis, a historical investigation of an emerging technology, can contribute 
towards current debates surrounding technological substitution and directional 
change. There are striking similarities between the visions, imaginaries, policy-making 
decisions and resistances explored in this study and the present, and future of 
potential automobile technologies. We noted how favourable policies and legislative 
changes came about in 1896 when the horseless carriage was a novel experimental 
product used and manufactured by very few people. This has been shown to be 
motivated by visions of technology improving society and with the aim of encouraging 
industry,2 an aspect of automobilism that has been a constant throughout the period 
of this research. Similarly in 2017 the Conservative government introduced legislation 
in favour of testing driverless cars with the “Automated and Electric Vehicle Bill” 
introduced by government minister John Hayes to encourage the potential industry in 
the UK. However, it was also, for Hayes, 
an opportunity to give access to cars to those who have never had them – the 
profoundly disabled, the elderly, the infirm, and the partially sighted and the blind. 
                                                          
1
 Anonymous, “Industry Topics Brexit, SMMT position” https://www.smmt.co.uk/industry-topics/brexit/ 
accessed 5/6/2018; Angela Monahan, “UK car industry must be at the heart of Brexit negotiations, say 
MPs” 1/3/2018 Guardian https://www/the guardian.com/business/2018/mar/01/uk-car-industry-must-
be-at-the-heart-of-brexit-negotiations-says-mps/ Accessed 6/6/2018 
2
 Plowden, The motor car and politics pp.21-22 
 
272 
 
They have not been able to drive, and they have relied on others to drive them, but 
they will suddenly have the opportunity of car ownership, which has been denied 
them for so long by the nature of their disability or their need. That is the sort of 
future I envisage.3 
These sociotechnical imaginaries of societal benefit directly mirrored Sir David 
Salomon’s vision at the opening meeting of the LSPTA in 1896.  We also see how 
Mom’s argument surrounding the emergence of automobilism is true for modern 
emerging automobile technologies: 
the car enjoyed greater importance in societal discourse than its quantitative or 
economic presence would suggest… Expectations played a crucial role in the history of 
individual motorized mobility.4 
Expectations preceded technological development. Businessmen connected with the 
LSPTA believed in the future business opportunities that the automobile represented 
and thus looked to encourage manufacture and use through trials and tenders. Similar 
themes can be seen today, as firms such as Uber indicate their belief in the future 
direction of technology by trialling driverless technology, and ordering thousands of 
driverless cars that have yet to be developed.5 
Conversely, there are also very similar concerns surrounding the potential of the new 
technology. In 1896 debate on legislation raised concerns over the impact of 
motorised vehicles on the horse industry, the cost to the potential user and the 
dangers to the public.6 These concerns are mirrored today, surrounding the 
employment of drivers and the dangers of driverless software, including tampering 
and delegating emergency moral decision making to software.7 
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A recent Nissan-made video envisages a utopian vision of 2040 built around driverless 
car technology with lines such as “IMAGINE a world with zero auto fatalities and zero 
emissions” and “IMAGINE a vehicle that’s in harmony with its surroundings” in a 
similar way to the drawn imaginings of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
which provided visions for the way in which the automobile would revolutionise cities 
and our individual travel.8 “Progress” and “modernity” have been identified by this 
thesis as integral to the development of automobilism in middle-class aspiration and 
the image of cities and the visions of town planners. However, the reality of the 
ubiquity of the car has often been at odds with these visions. As described by mobility 
historian McShane:  
Americans made the car an idol; they relied on a machine to solve problems not 
reconcilable by a machine. The liberating effects have been powerful and important… 
but they also chained consumers to the jobs needed to pay for their cars… the overall 
urban environmental effects have been horrible… The modern American metropolis is 
a socially and politically fragmented, gas-guzzling environmental nightmare… traffic 
jams have gotten worse.9 
Overall, this study has explored a number of aspects or gaps in our understanding of 
the diffusion of the automobile, which can be summarised by the various section and 
chapter conclusions. The thesis has shown the value of the historical study of 
technology and its interaction with society, building on recent work by scholars such as 
Mom, McShane, Jasanoff, Kim and Pinch. Furthermore, it fits as a case study in the 
emerging interdisciplinary field of Science and Technology studies, which can benefit 
from the historicising of modern theoretical concepts such as the “social co-
construction of technology” or “socio-technical imaginaries”. 
In taking these relatively new theories from the field of science and technology studies 
this thesis has challenged existing conclusions about the automobile, as well opening 
up new avenues of exploration. For example, in this thesis we have shown the need to 
consider other explanations for the diffusion of both motoring and motor 
manufacturing. Similarly, alternative factors have been explored for some key aspects 
                                                          
8
 “Imagine a 2040 future” 7/1/2018 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fq0C6DF8bwE Accessed 
7/6/2018; Jeremiah, Representations of British motoring pp.15-16 and pp.128-133 
9
 McShane, Down the asphalt path p.228 
 
274 
 
of motoring that have previously been explained by economic arguments. These 
include the rise and decline in fortunes of Manchester-based firms such as Ford and 
Belsize, the notion that diffusion was based largely on pricings, explaining the entry 
and exits of early firms, explaining the emergence of commercial motoring, and 
exploring the replacement of trams with buses. In this regard it is suggested that there 
is a need to re-evaluate the economic scholarship, as its conclusions have been 
challenged, or at least complicated, following the development of scholarship on 
mobilities and the interaction between technology and society. 
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Appendix 1 – List of Automobile Manufacturers in the North-West 
Name Date of operation Location(s) 
Previous 
association Vehicle Type References and notes 
Anderson J. 1906 at least 
Lower Broughton Road, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
Armstrong-
Whitworth 
1906-1913 Then In 
Manchester (1911-
1913) 
Openshaw, Manchester body 
works (1911) and showroom 
in Clayton 
Engineering 
(hydraulics, 
armaments, 
ships) Motorcars 
Georgano (2000) p.? ; A.D George ( The DECLINE OF 
THE Motor Industry between the wars - Some Case 
Studies 1991.333/2/2 
Autocar 
Contruction Co. 
Ltd.  1902 to at least 1906 Openshaw, Manchester ?? 
Motorcars 
and light 
commercial 
vehicles 
Clarke (2000); Ad for a Clerk in Manchester Guardian 
1902; Article on 1903 Crystal Palace show - "Hermes" 
Car; Slater’s Manchester and Salford Trade 
directory,1903; Motor and Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
AVRO - A. V. Roe 
& Co 1919-1924 Newton Heath 
Aircraft 
engineering Cyclecars Georgano (2000) p.?; Eyre et al. (2002) pp.105-107 
W. W.Batty and 
Co.  1906 at least Eccles New Road, Salford Bicycles Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
Baxendale and 
Company 1899-1906 at least Miller Street, Manchester 
A variety of 
consumer goods Motorcycles 
Manchester Central Library Archives - Manchester Cycle 
and Motor Show Catalogue 1899 p.22; also Motor and 
Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
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Bell Brothers? 1905-1919 
Stretford Road, Hulme; Later 
Ravensthorpe and 41 
Corporation Street, 
Manchester 
General 
Engineering Motorcars 
 A.D.George (1989) p.18; MEN 22 Feb 1907; MG 25 Feb 
1905; Sold business to the CWS in 1919 
Belsize Motor 
Company; before 
1906 the Belsize 
Motor and 
Engineering 
Company; from 
1896-1903 
Marshall and 
Company 1896-1925 
Clayton Lane, Openshaw, 
Manchester; Showrooms on 
Wilson street. 
General 
Engineering; 
scientific 
equipment 
Motorcars, 
tricycles, light 
and heavy 
commercial 
vehicles 
Multiple sources, too numerous to list. Including 
archive material at HSBC archive for the firms 
receivership period 
Bennett and 
Carlisle (later 
Newton and 
Bennett, see 
below entry) 1901-1903 
239 and 241 Deansgate, 
Manchester Cycle agents Motorcars 
Slater’s Manchester and Salford Trade directory 1903; 
advert in The Autocar 2/3/1901; 27/4/1901 
Beswick Cycle and 
Motor Company 1902 at least Beswick, Manchester ?? Motorcycles The Motorcar Journal 28/6/1902 p.367 
Beyer, Peacock 
and Company 
 
 1903-c.1906 Gorton, Manchester 
 Locomotive 
manufacturers 
Heavy 
Commercial 
vehicles Commercial Motor 8/2/1906; Clark (1962) p.82  
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J.B. Bindloss 
Junior and Co. 1901 Egerton St. Salford ?? Motorcars Slater’s Manchester and Salford Trade directory 1901 
Bolton Motor 
Wagon Co. 
(Before James 
Bradshaw and 
Sons.) c.1901-1916 Turk Street, , Bolton Machine tools 
Heavy 
commercial 
vehicles Clark (1962) p.11 
Bracegirdle Cycle 
Co. 1899- c.1906 
Mercury Cycle Works, 56 
Alexandra Road Manchester 
Bicycle 
Manufacturers Motorcycles 
Manchester Central Library Archives - Manchester Cycle 
and Motor Show Catalogue 1899 p.43; Motor and Cycle 
Trade Directory, 1906 
Bradbury and Co. 1897-1925 
Oldham, Wellington Road 
"Wellington Works"; Also 
showrooms 7 Deansgate, 
Manchester 
Sewing Machine, 
machine tools 
and bicycles 
Motorcycles 
and 
motorcars 
Numerous including: Norris and Lomax (1949) p.38; 
Museum of Science and Inudstry - YMS1999/74 ; Clarke 
(2000); The Autocar 29/10/1898 p.690; Motor and 
Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
British 
Commercial Lorry 
and Engineering 
Co.  1915-1922 
Ashburton Road Trafford 
Park, Whalley Range body 
works then 66-68 Bridge 
street (sales room?); County 
Motor Works, Salford 
Manager 
previously 
worked at 
another 
commercial 
vehicle company 
Motorcars, 
light and 
heavy 
commercial 
vehicles 
Numerous entries in the Commercial Motor; Working 
Class Movement Library - AEC minutes WCML 
Broadbent, S. 1906 at least 1177 Chester Road ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
 
297 
 
Brock Cycle and 
Motor Depot 1906 at least 
Stockport Road, Longsite, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
Brooks and 
Spencer 1913 Levenshulme ?? Cyclecars 
 
Georgano (2001) 
Brown G. W. 1906 at least 
Burgon’s Buildings, 
Fallowfield Station, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
Bullock, F. 1899-at least 1903 
23 Bury New Road, 
Strangeways 
Bike parts and 
cycle 
manufacturer Motorcars?  
Slater’s Manchester and Salford Trade directory 1903 
p.32 Manchester Central Library Archives - Manchester 
Cycle and Motor Show Catalogue 1899 
Bunting, E. 1899 at least Market Street, Hyde ?? Motorcycles 
Manchester Central Library Archives - Manchester Cycle 
and Motor Show Catalogue 1899 
Butterworth, T. 1906 
187 Jackson Street, Hulme, 
Manchester  Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
Carter Brothers 
Ltd.  1906-several years Oakenrod, Rochdale 
General 
Engineering. 
Heavy 
commercial 
vehicles Clark (1962) p.12-13 
Century 
Engineering and 
Motor Co. Ltd. 
1899-1906 (left for 
London c.1900 
London & Manchester, 
Altrincham Bikes 
Tricycles and 
motorcars 
Georgano (2000); numerous The Autocar adverts and 
articles; also Bennett (2000) 
Clarke, F.  1895-1896 New Moston, Manchester  Motorcycles Clarke (2000)  
H. Cragg and Sons 1902 at least Altrincham Bicycles Motorcycles The Motorcar Journal 14/6/1902 p.334 
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Crossley motors 
1903-1938 (later for 
others) 
Gorton, Openshaw and 
Levenshulme Manchester 
Engineering (gas 
engines) 
Motorcars, 
light and 
heavy 
commercial 
vehicles 
Multiple sources, too numerous to list; Dedicated 
publications by Eyre, Heaps and Townsin (2002); 
Montagu (1966); Archive material at Museum of 
Science and Industry and Warwick Modern Records 
Centre 
Mr Cunningham 
Dates unknown, one 
source 1905 Clitheroe ?? motorcars MG 27 Feb 1905 – a vehicle called the “little Midland” 
Dale Brothers, 
previous to 1904, 
Dale Brothers and 
Co. 1904-1909? 
Great Western St. Rusholme, 
Manchester Bicycle dealers Motorcars 
Several Manchester Guardian adverts, Slater’s 
Manchester and Salford Trade directory, 1903 and 1909 
Davy Engineering 
Ltd 1909-1911 Blake St. Hulme 
General 
engineering Motorcars 
Letter written to A.D. George by Arthur Lomas in 1982 
– Museum of Science and Industry archive - 
Correspondence file A1991.333\2\8; Article on 1910 
Olympia Show in Manchester Guardian 7 Nov 1910; 
Observer Nov 1909 
DOT Cycle and 
Motor 
Manufacturing 
Company 1903-2017 
Ellesmere Street, Hulme, 
Manchester 
Bicycle 
manufacturer Motorcycles Multiple sources, too numerous to list 
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Eagle Cycle and 
Motor Company 1901-1905 
Oakfield Road; Manchester 
Road, West Timperley;  
Bicycle 
manufacture and 
repair 
Motor 
tricycles and 
motorcars 
Georgano (2000); Wyatt  (1963); Museum of Science 
and Industry Archive - YMS1991.444/3/2/10 A.D. 
Collection 
Elton F., 1906 at least 
181 Chester Road, 
Manchester ?? Motocycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
Empress Motor 
Company 1907-1910 
Longsite, Stockport Road, 
Manchester ?? Motorcars 
Georgano (2000); Museum of Science and Industry - 
1991.444/3/2/10 A.D. Collection also Empress Motor 
Company File Collections centre; multiple newspaper 
sources including Manchester Guardian 23/3/1908; 
Manchester Guardian 15/2/1907 
Etesian Cycle and 
Motor Company  1903-1906 at least 
206-212 Bury New Road 
Manchester  ?? Motorcycles 
The Automotor Journal 14/2/1903 p.188  and Motor 
and Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
Express Motor 
and Vehicle 
Manufacturing 
Company 
Only source 
liquidated in 1904 180 Stockport Road ?? Motorcars Manchester Guardian 3/5/1904 
Fildes, H. 
 
 1906 at least 
Mangnall St., Bury New Road, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory, 1906 
 
300 
 
Ford 
In Manchester from 
1911-1931 Trafford Park 
American Car 
Company 
Motorcars 
and Light 
Commercial 
vehicles 
Multiple sources, too numerous to list, includes a 
number of dedicated publications 
Frank Smith 1905? Oxford Road ?? 
Commercial 
vehicles 
Museum of Science and Industry - Empress Motor 
Company File - Collections centre. Frank Smith later 
worked for the Empress Motor Company 
Gresham and 
Craven crane 
makers 1901-1903 Ordshall, Salford 
Crane 
manufacturers motorcars 
Museum of Science and Industry – YMS???? - 
Cockshoot built the bodies 
Harper 1921-1929 
Cavendish Road, Gorse Hill, 
Stretford, Manchester 
 Aircraft 
manufacturing Cyclecars Georgano (2000); Worthingtom-Williams (1996) 
Lancashire and 
Yorkshire Railway 
Company 1901-?? Horwich Railway Company 
Heavy 
commercial 
vehicles  Clark (1962)  p.41 
L. F. Harvey and 
Co. 
One source showing 
car manufactured 
in1907 Salford ?? Motorcar Motor Car Journal 16/2/1907 
Haynes Economy 
Motors 1912-1932 Hulme, Manchester ??   George  (1989) 
 
 
Haynes, F. 1906 at least 
95 Medlock Street, Hulme, 
Manchester  Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
 
301 
 
Herbert Brady and 
Co 
One source showing 
manufacturing in 
1909 Deansgate   Cyclecar MC 20/2/1909 
Holland Bros 1895 Beswick, Manchester ?? Motorcar 
Dubious claim to be the earliest motorcar made in 
Manchester from Manchester Evening News 14/5/1968  
Horsfall and 
Bickham 1902-1909 Orchard Street, Pendleton Textile Machinery 
Motorcars 
and light 
commercial 
vehicles 
Numerous scholarly and primary sources including: 
Georgano (2000); George (2004); Norris and Lomax 
(1949) 
Howell, G. G.  1906 at least 
84 Great Ancoats Street, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Hercules Motor 
Co. or Atlas 
Engineering 
Company 1903-c.1907 
Atlas Works, Chapel Street, 
Levenshulme, Manchester Machine tools 
Heavy 
commercial 
vehicles 
Museum of Science and Industry archive - Letter to J. 
Norris 1958 - 0197/9/6; also Clarke (1962) pp.110-113; 
Also Manchester Guardian 31 Dec 1904; Advert first 
appears in 1903, possible sale at auction of Atlas Works 
Levenshulme in 1907 ; Several Commercial Motor 
adverts.  
Imperial  motor 
Company / 
Imperial Autocar 
Manufacturing 
Company 1900-1912 
Started Turners cycle shop on 
291 Stretford Road, Hulme, 
Manchester, then 
Rusholme; also listed in 1903 
TD as  58 Erskine St. Hulme 
Bicycles, Check 
out Turners.  Motorcars 
Georgano (2000); Slater’s Manchester and Salford 
Trade directory 1903; The Autocar 11/5/1901; 
10/8/1901 
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Jackson and 
Edwards 1910-1914 
Altrincham, Timperley, 106 
Manchester Road 
Previous cycle 
and motor 
manufacturers Motorcars 
Museum of Science and Industry archive - A. D. George 
Collection - "In search of the Eagle" unpublished paper  
Jones, A. 1906 at least 
214 Moss Lane East, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Kitchine  
Ceased manufacture 
in 1906 Radcliffe ?? Motorcars 
Museum of Science and Industry - Letter to J. Norris - 
YMS0197/9/6 
Ladas / J. Bowen 1905-1906 
Didsbury; Albert St., James 
Bowen Cycle works address 
Birch Avenue, Heaton Moor.  Bicycles,  Cyclecars Georgano (2000)  Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Lancashire Electric 
Vehicle Company 1898-1899? No address given  ?? Motorcar 
The Autocar 11/6/1898 p.370 Set up with the intention 
to manufacturer electric vehicles but no evidence that 
they completed a vehicle 
Levenshulme 
Cycle and Motor 
Depot 1905-1906? 
Farmside Place, Levenshulme 
and 114 Stockport Road, 
Ardwick  ??  Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Lowcock 
Commercial 
Motor Co. 
One source – 
manufacturing in 
1910  Manchester ?? 
Commercial 
vehicles 
Manchester Courier 18/2/1910 - report on Manchester 
motor show 
James Robertson 
and Son 1900s Dock Road, Fleetwood   
Heavy 
commercial 
vehicles Clark (1962) pp.57-58 
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Robertson 
(possibly the 
same as above) 1914-1916 Sale ?? Cyclecars Georgano (2000)  
Major, F. 1906 at least 310 Hyde Road, Manchester ?? Motorcycles  Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Manchester 
Motor Car 
Corporation  1900-1903 1 Victoria Bridge St. S ?? Motorcars 
Slater’s Manchester and Salford Trade directory 1903; 
Manchester Guardian advert 14/6/1902 and 
Manchester Guardian 29/12/1900  
Massey Brothers 1906 at least 
132 Burton Road, West 
Didsbury, Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Meadows, J. H.  1906 at least 
Preston Street, Hulme, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Metropolitan  
Vickers 1933-1935 Manchester 
Electrical 
engineer 
Electric 
commercial 
vehicles 
Museum of Science and Industry, Archive – 
Metropolitan Vickers collection  
Moxon, D. 1906 at least 
167, Lower Broughton Road, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles  Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Nawell Fred D. At least c.1899-c.1906 
219 and 240 Stretford Road, 
Hulme 
Cycle Factor and 
Importer, 
manufacturer, 
previously iron 
monger (1882) Motorcycles 
Manchester Cycle and Motor Show Catalogue (1899) 
p.32; Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
National Motor 
Company 1905-1906? 23 Bury new Road ?? Motorcars Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
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Newton-Bennett 
Manufacturing 1907-
1916, continued as 
agents 
Showrooms -King Street, 
Manchester. Works - William 
St. Salford 
Bicycle sale and 
manufacture Motorcars 
Numerous sources including: Norris and Lomax (1949) 
pp.25-26;  George (1989); a large range of primary 
sources 
Newton-Ceirano 1924-1929? Same as above 
Bicycle sale and 
manufacture, and 
previous motor 
manufacturers Motorcars 
Museum of Science and Inudstry archives - A.D. George 
collection A1991.333\2\8 Letter to George from A. 
Lomas in Jan 1983 
Newton Pierce 
and Co. 1902-1905? Hulme (Britannia works?) Engineering Motorcars 
Norris and Lomax (1949) ;  George (1989); Museum of 
Science and Inudstry archives - A.D. George collection - 
An ABC of Manchester Motor Cars 1991.444/3/2/10; 
The Autocar 30/8/1902 
Owen and 
Thompson 1906 at least 
8 Rochdale Road, Blackley, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Payne and 
Company 1906 at least 
Princes Street, Moss Side, 
Manchester ??  Motorcycles  Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Pennington and 
Baines 1898-1900 
Victoria Hotel Buildings, 
Manchester (probably a sales 
office) 
Inventor / 
Engineer / 
Swindler Motorcars Georgano (2000); Several extracts from The Autocar 
Petrie and 
Simister 1906 at least 
916 Stockport Road, Longsite, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Pilkington 
Brothers Early Accrington 
Pneumatic 
Hammers Motorcars 
Museum of Science and Industry Archives - Letter 
written by J. Norris 1948 - 0197/9/6; Clarke (2000) 
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Pollock 
Engineering Co. or 
Pollock and 
Macnab Ltd 1900- at least 1901 
Stockport Road, Ashton-
Under-Lyne, or Brown Street 
Manchester ?? Motorcars 
Museum of Science and Industry Archives - Letter 
written by J. Norris 1948 - 0197/9/6; Ad for staff in The 
Autocar 12/1/1901; 30/11/1901; 
http://www.gracesguide.co.uk/Pollock_Engineering_Co 
and http://www.gracesguide.co.uk/Accles-Turrell ; The 
Motorcar Journal 8/6/1901 p.281 
Prince, W. M. 1906 at least 
198 Stretford Road, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Protector Lamp 
Company 1899-1906 Monton, Salford Protector Lamps 
Motorcars 
and light 
commercial 
vehicles Norris and Lomax (1949); MG 27/2/1905 
Ratcliffe, S. 1906 at least 130 Oldham Road  ?? 
Motorcars 
and 
motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Rolls-Royce 1904-1909 Hulme 
Engineering, 
cranes, electricals 
etc.  Motorcars 
Multiple sources, too numerous to list, includes a 
number of dedicated publications 
Ruby Cycle 
Company  1909-1932 
Ancoats, Manchester, later 
Moss Street, Altrincham Bicycles  Motorcycles Multiple sources, too numerous to list 
 
 
Runbaken 
Electrical Products 1919 280 Deansgate Manchester 
Electrical 
engineering Motorcycles 
https://www.gracesguide.co.uk/Runbaken_Products 
Last accessed 3/9/2018 
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Simpson and 
Bibby 1901-1904 
Pomona Engine Works, Lund 
St. Cornbrook 
Previously 
Simpson and 
Bodman; Bibby an 
engineering 
background 
Heavy 
commercial 
vehicles 
Slaters Trade Directory 1903; The Autocar 16/3/1901; 
http://www.gracesguide.co.uk/Simpson_and_Bibby ; 
The Engineer 8/6/1901; Commercial Motor 10/1/1907 
Simpson and 
Bodman  1896-1901 
Didsbury, then Pomona 
Engine Works, Lund St. 
Cornbrook 
Coachbuilder and 
Engineer 
Heavy 
commercial 
vehicles 
The Autocar 2/6/1900; 25/8/1900; ad 6/10/1900; The 
Engineer 18/6/1897 
Short Brothers 1919-1924 
Barlow Moor Road, Chorlton-
c-Hardy ?? Motorcars 
MOSI file on car manufacture in Manchester -ADG 
notes on Ashby light car - source Baldwin, N., The 
Automobile A-Z of Cars of the 1920s (1994) p.27-28 
Smith, H. 1906 at least 1 Burton Road, Withington ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Swallow Cycle 
Company 1906 at least 
349 Eccles New Road, 
Manchester Bicycles Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Tallent and Co 1897 Manchester  ??  
The Automotor and Horseless Vehicle Journal July 1897 
p.419 
J. S. Taylor and 
Company 1906 at least 
9 Ridgefield Road, 
Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
 
 
 
Thornton Motor 
Co. 1897-1903 
Worsley Mills, off Egerton St. 
Hulme Cameras Motorcars 
Georgano (2000); See also Clark, T., 'From Cameras to 
Cars', in Veteran Car, January 1999. 
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Trafford Motor 
Manufacturing 
Company 
(formally F. 
W.Hatton) 1902 at least Christ Church Square, Hulme Coachbuilding Motorcars The Motor Car Journal  26/7/1902 p.441 
Tumblety 
Brothers 1906 at least West Craven Street, Salford ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
W. Turner 1900 at least 291 Streford Road, Hulme ?? Motorcars The Motor Car Journal 23 Feb 1900 p.818 
Turner, Atherton 
and Co.; 
previously Turner 
and Sons. 1905-1906? 
Corner of Turner Street and 
Ashton Road, Denton 
link to Hat 
industry and 
electrical industry 
Commercial 
vehicles 
Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906; AHVJ Dec 1896 
p.107; also http://www.pittdixon.go-
plus.net/denton/turner-atherton.htm  Last Accessed 
3/9/2016 
Waters, J. 1906 at least 79a Hyde Road, Manchester ?? Motorcycles Motor and Cycle Trade Directory 1906 
Willys Overland 
Crossley 1919-1933 Heaton Chapel 
American Car 
Company and 
Crossley Motors 
Motorcars 
and 
commercial 
vehicles  Multiple Sources too numerous to list 
Wilkinson and Co. 1897/1898 Wigan    
The Automotor and Horseless Vehicle Journal December 
1897 p.106 
Wilkinson, F. 1902-1908 at least 
Cornbrook Road, Cornbrook, 
Manchester 
Steam 
engineering motorcars 
Slaters Trade Directory 1903; The Autocar 26/4/1902; 
MCLGA 10/2/1908  
Woodrow  1913-1915 Stockport Hatters??? Cyclecars Georgano (2000) 
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Other North-West 
manufacturers          
Atkinson and Co, 1916 Frenchwood Works, Preston   
Commercial 
vehicles Clark (1962) pp.5-8 
James Buchanan 
and Son 1906 at least Caedonian Foundry, Liverpool 
Machine Tool 
Makers 
Commercial 
vehicles  Clark (1962) p.152 
Cooper & Co. 1898?-1900? 
109 Bradshaw gate and 6 
Great Moor Street, Bolton Cycle makers  
Cooper (2009) History of the Bolton motor trade p.4; 
The Motor Car Journal 23/2/1900 p.818 
T. Coulthard and 
Co. 1895-1907 Cooper Road, Preston ?? 
Commercial 
vehicles Numerous sources, including entry in Clark (1962) p.23 
Chase Motor 
Truck Co. 1910 at least Liverpool ?? 
Commercial 
vehicles Manchester Courier 18/2/1910  
J & G Dykes 1906-1909? 24 Tenterden Street Bury,  ??  
Registration records at Bury Archives and Local Studies 
- GB126.ABU/2/2/2/2 
Eclipse Machine 
Co 1899-1914 
Viscount street Oldham; 
Possible premise 23 Bury 
New Road 
Variety of 
products 
including bikes, 
sewing machines 
and ticket 
punches Motorcars 
Numerous Sources including Georgano (2000); The 
Autocar 1/12/1900; The Autocar 24/11/1900; 
Manchester Central Library Archives - Manchester Cycle 
and Motor Show Catalogue 1899 p.40;  
 
 
Gastall, A. 1900-1903 Blackburn   
Museum of Science and Industry Archives - Letter 
written by J. Norris 1948 
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Hay Motor Co. 1905-1907 at least South John Street, Liverpool ?? 
Commercial 
vehicles Clark (1962) p. 34 
Hitchlow Gear and 
Automobile Co. 1904(?)- at least 1907 Accrington Gearboxes Motorcars 
Museum of Science and Industry Archives - Letter 
written by J. Norris 1948 - 0197/9/6; Manchester 
Guardian 9 Feb 1907; Manchester Courier 16/11/1906 
Liver Motor Car - 
William Lea 1901-1902 
Birkenhead Park, Birkenhead 
; Also Berry St. Liverpool 
(garages) ?? Motorcars 
The Autocar 1/6/1901 article; 16/3/1901 note; also 
several adverts in The Autocar and surviving model at 
the Museum of Liverpool – MMM.1998.25 
Liverpool and 
Manchester 
Manufacturing 
Company 1902 at least 
Lytton Street and 45 Everton 
Road, Liverpool Also agents Motorcar The Autocar 14/2/1902  
Merral-Brown 
(Premier Motor 
Works)  1919-1921 St. Georges Road Bolton Car Dealers Motorcars 
Georgano (2000); Also see M. Worthington-Williams 
'Four into Three, The Automobile, October 1997; 
Dennis, Bolton Motor Industry, p.25 and p.30 
Moveo Cars Ltd. 1932-1933 India Mills, Preston  ?? Motorcars Ball, K., Motor Car Index 1928-1939 
Musker 1899 -1905 Bootle, Liverpool 
electrical and 
hydraulic 
Engineers (dock 
equipment) 
Commercial 
vehicles Several Autocar articles; Clark (1962) p.52 
North Western 
Motors 1928-1929 35 Norton Street Liverpool ??  Ball, K., Motor Car Index 1928-1939 
Petromobile Co. 1901-1902 
Colne, Lancs; Clitheroe; office 
in manchester 24 York Street ?? Motorcars The Autocar article 27/4/1901 and 18/5/1901 
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John Rae At least 1910-1911 
Mirfield Motor Works, 
Huddersfield 
Belhaven, 
previous steam 
waggon 
manufacturers 
Heavy 
Commercial 
vehicles  Clark (1962)p.55 
Rice and Wise 1905(?) Blackburn ?? Motorcars 
Museum of Science and Industry Archives - Letter 
written by J. Norris 1948 - 0197/9/6 
Robinson and 
Price Ltd. 1901-1906 at least 
38 Chatham Street and 39 
Whitechapel , Liverpool Bicycle makers Motorcycles 
Autocar 8/2/1902; Manchester Guardian 5/12/1896; 
Motor Car Journal 19/10/1901 p.606   
Rothwell Machine 
Co. 1899-1900 Market Street Bolton 
Cycle makers and 
cycle parts 
Motorcars 
and 
motorcycles 
Catalogue for the 1899 Manchester cycle and Motor 
Show ; Motor Car Journal 23/2/1900 p.818 
Southport Motor 
Agency 1903 at least 
7 Mornington Road 
Southport, Showroom 6 
Hawside Street Southport ?? Motorcars Autocar advert 7/2/1903 
Souvestre  1899-1900     Motorcars 
Several Autocar Articles; Motor Car Journal 21/7/1900 
p.350 
Wade Engineering 
Co.  1910 at least Liverpool, Forrest Street ??  
Manchester Courier 18/2/1910 - report on Manchester 
motor show 
Walker Brothers 
(Pagefield) 1907-1951 Wigan ?? 
Heavy 
Commercial 
vehicles Multiple sources, too numerous to list. 
 
Walmsley J., and 
Co.  1902 at least Preston Carriage Builders Motorcars The Autocar Advert 4/1/1902 
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Watson and 
Company 1901 at least Falkner Street, Liverpool ?? Motorcycles The Motorcar Journal 2/3/1901 
Westwood 
Engineering 1919-1925(1927?) 
Britannia Works,Lower Ince, 
Wigan ?? Motorcars Georgano (2000); M. Worthington-Williams (1998) 
Winson 1920 Rochdale ??  Georgano (2000) 
Vulcan 1902-1928 
Bolton then Southport Hawes 
Sstreet 
Wood and Metal 
engineers 
Motorcars 
and light 
commercial 
vehicles Multiple sources, too numerous to list. 
Lancashire Steam 
Motor Company 
(forerunner of 
Leyland Motors) 1896 Preston Lawnmowers 
Heavy 
commercial 
vehicles and 
motorcars Multiple sources, too numerous to list. 
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Appendix 2 – The Graphic advert data 
The below table shows the analysis of Crossley Motors’ adverts in The Graphic from 1920-1929. 
  Country Just car Urban Society 
generic 
driving Misc 
No 
illustration  Total 
1920 6 0 1 1 1 2 0 11 
1921 6 4 0 0 0 1 1 12 
1922 5 3 0 0 0 0 0 8 
1923 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 6 
1924 4 2 0 0 0 1 0 7 
1925 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 4 
1926 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 2 
1927 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 
1928 2 2 0 1 0 0 0 5 
1929 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Total 29 16 2 2 3 4 1 57 
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Appendix 3a – Relevant material published prior to submission of thesis 
Butt, J., “Cycling and the Origins of the Manchester Motor Industry” in Hive: the 
postgraduate journal of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities at Manchester 
Metropolitan University, Vol.1 (2017) 
Automobile scholarship has long established the importance of the cycle industry in 
the origins of motor manufacturing in the UK. This has been clearly demonstrated in 
the cycle industry’s heartland of Coventry and the Midlands, where by 1913 75% of 
Coventry’s motor vehicle output came from firms that had a cycle background.1 
Scholars emphasise the obvious technical link, reasoning that all the Coventry cycle 
firms that expanded into automobile production were successful.2 Scholars have also 
stressed the economic link as many cycle firms entered the motor industry for reasons 
of alternative income following the end of the cycle boom in the late 19th century.3 
More recent scholarship has emphasised the cultural link between cycling and 
motoring. The established ‘bicycle craze’ created a ready culture that embraced the 
experience of speed, tinkering and touring that formed the basis of automobile 
culture.4 
This article will add to this historiography by connecting these two approaches, 
considering the impact of the developing bicycle and automobile culture on the early 
development of the motor industry. This article will argue that cycle culture created a 
ready consumer group for early automobiles, which local cycle manufacturers and 
agents very quickly identified. This article will also demonstrate the importance of local 
influences on the early development of both motoring and motor manufacture, 
including the actions of local cycle clubs, local trade organisations, social networks and 
small cycle producers. These small localised clubs and the firms that served them have 
                                                          
1
 D. Thoms and T. Donnelly, The Motor Car Industry in Coventry Since the 1890’s (London & Sydney: 
Croom Helm, 1985) p.14 
2
 Thoms and Donnelly (1985) p.24; S. B. Saul, ‘The Motor Industry in Britain to 1914’, Business History, 6 
(1962) p.26; J. Foreman-Peck, S. Bowden and A. McKinlay, The British Motor Industry, (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1995) p.9 (argues that the bicycle industry was an incubator for motor 
vehicles) 
3
 Thoms and Donnelly (1985) p.26; A. Milward, Factors Contributing to the Sustained Success of the UK 
Cycle Industry 1870-1939 (Birmingham University: PhD Thesis, 1999) p.124 
4
 G. Mom, Atlantic Automobilism Emergence and Persistence of the Car, 1895-1940, (New York: 
Berghahn, 2015) p.63; C. Reid, Roads Were Not Built For Cars, (Washington: Island Press, 2015) 
 
314 
 
not previously been explored in scholarship which instead focuses on large 
manufacturers and national clubs.  
An exploration of a local area such as Manchester and its suburbs offers a case study 
to test these arguments. Manchester’s cycle industry shows a small, but growing, 
locally significant industry which served the needs of local cyclists in what became a 
popular local pastime. This paper will begin with an overview of Manchester’s cycle 
industry before examining the links between cycling and motoring in Manchester.  
Manchester’s Cycle Industry 
Apart from work by Nick Clayton, scholarship on the cycle industry tends to focus on 
the Midlands, the industry’s centre. Clayton’s article on the Manchester cycle industry 
from 1870-1900 provides a history of some of the important Manchester cycle firms 
and offers an overview of cycling interest in Manchester. However, the emphasis on 
large manufacturers in previous research led Clayton to conclude: “lacking major cycle 
makers at the end of the century, the region consequently spawned relatively few local 
motorcar companies.”5 While Manchester certainly lacked major cycle makers, it 
actually spawned dozens of automobile manufacturers, which had a prior or parallel 
relationship with the local cycle trade.  
McLeay showed that in 1891 88% of cycle firms were situated in Wolverhampton, 
Birmingham and Coventry.6 Millward examined data from national trade directories 
and compiled a database for the number of firms engaged in the cycle industry from 
every year until 1939. This data is useful for comparative research on a local level. For 
example in 1900, there were 3,329 companies listed as manufacturers and agents 
nationally.7 The Manchester and Salford trade directory shows 191 firms in 
Manchester for the same year, 5% of the national figure, a small but significant 
percentage. Sources for Manchester’s cycle industry include trade directories, trade 
periodicals, show catalogues, advertising material and local newspaper reports. Trade 
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directories provide the names, locations and numbers of companies every year which 
allows for a certain amount of statistical analysis. While the number of firms is a useful 
indicator of the size of an industry, there are no volume statistics available; therefore, 
firms producing radically different volumes carry the same weight. This is particularly 
important when comparing Manchester’s cycle industry to the Midlands.  The 
Manchester Cycle Manufacturing Company, Manchester’s biggest bicycle 
manufacturers, had a capital of £50,000, significantly less than many Midland 
producers.8 Also the Manchester and Salford trade directories do not give adequate 
coverage to surrounding areas such as Oldham, Altrincham or Stockport, although 
significant producers such as Bradbury, in Oldham, had a salesroom in the city centre.9  
Trade directory research shows that the cycle trade in Manchester developed on 
similar lines to the national industry. While it was small, it was healthy, and had a 
regional identity. Figure 1 shows the number of firms started to increase rapidly from 
1896 to 1900 reflecting the cycle boom of the 1890s. Numbers also appear to be 
relatively unaffected by the end of the cycling boom at the turn of the century. This is 
perhaps a reflection of the small size of the Manchester firms. Larger firms struggled 
due to increasing competition in the export market.10 This saw the demise of 
Manchester’s biggest firm the Manchester Cycle Manufacturing Company, who relied 
on their overseas market. It is no coincidence that several surviving models are located 
abroad in the USA and France.11  
Trade directories also show the areas in which the cycle industry was operating in 
Manchester. Although the majority of businesses were in the city centre, there were 
significant pockets of firms in Hulme and Salford, and to a lesser extent Ardwick, 
Chorlton-on-Medlock and Moss Side (Figure 2). The number of firms in ‘other’ 
locations shows the large dispersal around Manchester, reflecting the wide number of 
suburban cycle clubs and cyclists, as discussed later. The component and accessory 
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industry was much smaller but numbers increased at the same time as the number of 
cycle agents and manufacturers (Figure 3).  
 
 
Figure 4 - Sources: Slater's Manchester and Salford Trade Directories 1881-1900 
(trade directory for 1898 missing)  
 
Figure 5 - Slater's Manchester and Salford Trade Directory 1900 
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Figure 6 -Sources: Slater's Manchester and Salford Trade Directories 1883-1900 
(trade directory for 1898 missing).  
The Manchester cycle industry was small, but significant enough that in 1896 the 
Manchester and District Cycle Trades’ Association (MDCTA) was established to protect 
local interests. The Association organised the Manchester Cycle Show from 1897, 
which became the Manchester Cycle and Motor Show (MCMS) in 1899. The show was 
increasingly popular and a catalogue for the 1899 show proudly states that it was: 
“over applied for before a single advertisement appeared in any journal”.12 Further 
demonstrating the health of the industry was a report in the Manchester Guardian 
during the 1898 show:   
“One thing the exhibition makes very clear is the extent to which the manufacture of 
cycles is becoming a Lancashire industry. A large number of Manchester firms are 
represented, and machines have been sent in from almost every town in the district – 
in particular from Oldham, Bolton, Bury, Rochdale and Blackburn. The quality of the 
Lancashire work is extremely good.”13 
Despite the northern bias, analysis of the exhibitors at the 1899 show demonstrates 
the strength of local manufacturing, 50 of the 67 stands for cycles taken by Lancashire 
manufacturers.  
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Manchester’s Cycling and Motoring Links 
Early links are in evidence when we examine the MCMS and the organisation of the 
MDCTA. Of the 8 companies that had motorised vehicles on show at the MCMS of 
1899 (2 motorcars, 6 motorcycles), 7 were also exhibiting a variety of cycles.14 Frank 
Bullock, one such exhibitor, was the owner of the Strangeways Cycle Company, also a 
committee member of the MDCTA. He showed a very early interest in entering the 
motor industry, advertising several times in The Autocar during 1896 and 1897, 
including: 
“All kinds of light autocar and motor work undertaken – F. Bullock, Strangeways Cycle 
Works”15 
“Advertiser with workshops situated in Manchester is open to undertake experimental 
autocar and motor work, or would manufacturer any specialty under contract”16 
Several other individuals involved in 1899 show were also prominent in both the cycle 
and motor industries. For example, John Newton, committee member of the MDCTA, 
was an agent for Enfield Cycles, before partnering and becoming motor car agents and 
then manufacturers. There was also Fredrick Nawell of Hulme who went from 
ironmonger, to cycle maker and dealer, to motor manufacturer and back again finally 
to ironmonger. Ralph Jackson, cycle maker from Altrincham, went from making 
bicycles to manufacturing the Century tandem, which took part in the famous 1900 
1,000 mile trial. 
There were also firms far less committed to either industries. Baxendale and Co. 
exhibited both “Beanco” cycles and motorcycles at the 1899 show, which must have 
been a brief venture from a company whose “Beanco” trademark covered products 
from toilet seats to golf balls. The number of firms at the 1899 show exhibiting both 
motorised and non-motorised cycles was relatively small, under 10% of exhibitors. 
Despite this by 1906 about 30 small firms in Manchester were making both bicycles 
and motorcycles, most of which would have been based on the same basic cycle 
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frame, with both bicycle and motorcycle having the same name.17 There are several 
examples of this in the 1906 trade directory, see Figures 4 and 5. The clear technical 
crossover between cycle and motor manufacturing in these earlier years made it easy 
for the small Manchester firms to experiment. The customers of these firms probably 
fuelled this experimentation; local cyclists who wanted to try this new form of 
mobility. These potential customers were exposed to motoring through the showing of 
machines at local events such as the MCMS. 
 
Figure 7 – Source: 1906 Motor and Cycle Trade Directory p.144 
 
Figure 8 - Source: 1906 Motor and Cycle Trade Directory p.144 
Cycling culture has made a big mark on Manchester in the surviving cycling clubs, 
active velodrome and notable sports personalities like Chris Boardman (Manchester 
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Wheelers), Adam Yates (Bury Clarion) and Jason Kenny. In the late Victorian period 
cycling was probably even more popular than it is today. One of the most popular 
forms was weekend touring with friends or family. Suddenly it became possible to 
leave the city’s suburbs and go many miles and back in an afternoon. This weekend 
exodus was observed by the Manchester Guardian ‘Cycle Notes’ journalist in May 
1896. In one hour around 1500 riders left Manchester on Chester and Wilmslow Road, 
most in social groups or attached to clubs.18 By 1899 Manchester had 49 cycling clubs, 
representing Manchester and its suburbs, the 3rd highest number nationally after 
London and Birmingham.19 It is worth noting that cycling during this period was an 
upper and middle-class activity, largely dominated by men. It wasn’t until the inter-war 
period that cycling became associated as a working-class activity.20 It is this market 
that was also particularly susceptible to the arrival of the automobile, although not all 
could afford it. We shall see in the evidence below how these thousands of cycling 
enthusiasts interacted with the arrival of the automobile. By exploring the early 
motoring and cycling culture we can begin to understand why local manufacturers 
might adapt to the motor industry. 
From 1896 cyclists were gradually exposed to automobiles through friends and clubs. 
The Manchester Wheelers tested out a very early motorcycle in 1896.21 In 1899 a 
prominent member of the Anfield Bicycle Club who turned up with a motor tricycle 
“was an object of much envy.”22 This ‘motor envy’ was often created by the novelty 
value of early automobiles, but it also manifested itself in the relative protection from 
the elements that a high driving position provided in slushy winter conditions: “Motor 
cars were to be seen, and drivers were envied by many a cyclist as he laboured 
through the mud.,”23 and “had the weather been better I should have envied the two 
men on a motor quadricycle whom I met on the Holmes Chapel road on Tuesday. 
Indeed as it was, I am a little sorry that I was not one of them.”24 
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Both cycling and motoring was a weekend, touring activity and thus cyclists were very 
susceptible to exposure to automobiles through both friends, clubs and random 
encounters on country roads. The great source for this exposure is the ‘Cycling Notes’ 
weekly column in the Manchester Guardian began in 1893 and continued until 1904. 
This column kept cyclists up to date with race results, cycle gossip and shared touring 
routes around the nearby countryside. The ‘Cycling Notes’ columns regular nature 
allows us to track the journalist’s gradual exposure. From conversations with friends 
who have bought a machine, to taking a ride as a passenger. In a column in November 
1898 the author notes: 
“at first a cyclist who mounts a motor cycle is fascinated and enthusiastic... the 
pastime soon palls. A friend of mine who was motor-bitten now tells me he has learnt 
all there is to on his machine, and is bored by having no work to do.”25 
The author use of the phrase “motor-bitten” to describe his friend, and is himself 
“bitten” a year later when he acknowledges the pastime is not such a fad: 
“my most regular riding chum has lately gone in for motoring, I have so far had only 
one ride – about forty miles – on a motor car; and then I was simply a passenger, not a 
driver. But the sport was so exciting that I have a positive longing for more.”26 
The experience of this cyclist is evidence of how cycling merged with motoring, 
through indirect and then direct exposure as more and more club mates and “riding 
chums” had a go on a motorcycle or motorcar. This exposure manifested itself officially 
in the creation of motoring sections of cycling clubs, such as the Manchester Wheelers’ 
Motoring Section which began in 1899 and held join runs for several years afterwards, 
such as a run to Over Peover in 1904 attended by 37 bicycles, 3 motor cars and two 
motor bicycles.27 
It was not just through touring that motor vehicles were introduced to cyclists, but at 
racing events too. In Manchester the most popular venue was the Fallowfield Track. 
Cycle racing was incredibly popular with large crowds recorded over several years 
during the period, and slowly motoring was introduced. One such example was a 
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Manchester Wheelers race meeting at the Fallowfield Track which included a 
combination of cycle and motorcycle races with a large crowd of 12,000 people.28 The 
popularity of cycling as a spectator sport also provided the foundations for the 
popularity of motor racing in the North West at places such as Blackpool and 
Southport. 
Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated the need to look beyond national businesses and 
organisations when exploring a technology’s emergence.  The ready acceptance and 
enthusiasm of local individuals and firms to experiment with motor vehicle 
manufacture demonstrates the intrinsic link between the Manchester cycle industry 
and local cycling community and the development of the early motor industry;  
confirming the important influence of not just technology and finance in the cycle 
industry, but of the ‘bicycle craze’ on early motor manufacture. Evidence of this can be 
seen in the MDCTA which later became the Manchester District Motor Trades 
Association, providing a centre for both cycle and motor traders in the city. More 
importantly perhaps for the establishment of the motor industry in Manchester was 
the city’s cycling culture and its similarities with the fledgling automobile culture, both 
in its instruments: clubs, journals, and newspaper columns, and its appeal to 
individuals through touring and racing. This strong link, on a local level, where Mom 
professes a transnational level, perhaps more than anything can lead us to understand 
why a large number of Manchester cycle producers both persisted in the cycle trade 
and diversified into the motor trade so early during the Victorian era.29  
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Appendix 3b – Relevant material published prior to submission of thesis 
Butt, J., “Adapting to the emergence of the automobile: a case study of Manchester 
coachbuilder Joseph Cockshoot and Co. 1896-1939” in Science Museum Group 
Journal, Vol.8 (2017)  
Article DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.15180/170803 
Abstract 
Today motor vehicles are ubiquitous. Yet at the end of the 19th century motoring was a 
new pastime, and there were only a few hundred motorised vehicles on the road. Many 
believed motoring to be a fad and motorists faced opposition on many fronts, from 
local corporations, the police and rural residents. Coachbuilders also had an uneasy 
relationship with this new technology. Automobile manufacturers and customers 
required coachbuilder’s skills to build motor car bodies. Yet the growth of the 
automobile began to affect the use of horse-drawn transport during the first decade of 
the 20th century. This paper will analyse the relationship between the horse-drawn and 
the motorised vehicle in the UK during this transitional period before exploring the 
records of Manchester coachbuilder Joseph Cockshoot and Co. that survive at the 
Museum of Science and Industry Archive. This collection offers a rare insight into the 
dilemmas faced by coachbuilders in this era of transition. This paper argues that the 
emergence of the automobile was not a simple matter of technological progress, but 
involved complex relationships between manufacturers, coachbuilders and customers. 
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Introduction 
 ‘At the end of the century came the turning of the tide so far as traditional forms of 
transport went. It began as a tiny trickle but grew, as we all know, with fantastic 
speed.’ John Norris, former Cockshoot’s Director. 1 
‘The transition from carriages to automobiles was a messy, indistinct overlap of 
several decades, but to so many who lived through it, it seemed to happen so quickly. 
Then again, was this not in keeping with the automobile’s very nature?’ (Kinney, 
2004, p.298)2 
The first quote above describes the arrival of the automobile as an inexorable event. 
Slowly, and then more rapidly, sweeping away the horse-drawn vehicle into extinction. 
Traditional automobile scholars have also viewed the coming of the car as the 
inevitable replacement of the horse, debating only the speed of its rise to dominance 
(for example, Foreman-Peck, Bowden and McKinlay, 1995 and Church, 1995).3 
However, more recent automobile scholarship has shifting the focus away from 
automobile production and technological advancement by exploring the uses and 
users of the automobile (for example, Mom, 2015; Reid, 2015 and Merriman, 2012).4 
These scholars have highlighted the importance of cultural factors in the transition to 
the automobile, such as the social, sensory and emotional experience. Contradicting 
the first quote is the second, which highlights that the transition was neither clear, nor 
as quick as we might imagine. The focus on the ‘victor’ of this transitory period, has led 
to a lack of exploration of the horse-drawn vehicle and its supporting trades, such as 
the coachbuilder or the wheelwright. More recently, scholars such as Kinney (2004) for 
the USA, and Tjong Tjing Tai (2015) for the Netherlands, have sought to address the 
imbalance by exploring how coachbuilders adapted to the arrival of the automobile.5 
They highlight, the great disparity in the speed of coachbuilders to transition; the 
contradiction that coachbuilders were, on the on hand seen as natural builders on the 
new horseless-carriage with their woodworking skills, yet unsuited to the new 
demands of metalworking and mechanical engineering; and the varied impact of the 
automobile depending on the types of coachwork, high-class coachbuilders were 
effected much quicker than wagonbuilders. The aim of this study is to show how the 
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transition of coachbuilders in this country generally fit with these findings from 
abroad.   
This paper examines the archives of a Manchester coachbuilder, Joseph Cockshoot and 
Co. housed at Manchester’s Museum of Science and Industry. The firm’s extensive 
collection offers a unique perspective on the advent of the motor car. To establish the 
context of the transition period this paper will start with a brief analysis of the use of 
horse-drawn and motorised transport in the UK from 1901 to 1921, before using the 
Cockshoot archives as a case study. 
The transitional period in context 
Georgano (2001, pp.3-41) provides an overview of the transitional period in the UK.6 
However, Georgano’s focus is on motor car body building, thus the work neglects the 
rest of the coachbuilding industry which included wagonbuilders, cartbuilders, 
wheelwrights and carriage component manufacturers. It therefore fails to provide an 
overall perspective on the impact of the automobile industry on coachbuilding, 
because its focus is on the private vehicle and not on public vehicles such as buses, taxi 
cabs, or commercial vehicles such as lorries. Because there is no authoritative work on 
the UK’s carriage industry it is necessary to explore some national trends during the 
period of transition.  
Diffusion of the motorised vehicle varied between private, public and commercial 
vehicles. This difference is noted by Barker and Gerhold (1993, pp.56-61), who argue 
that private and public motoring rapidly replaced horse-drawn vehicles, whilst 
commercial motor vehicles were much slower to diffuse. 7  However, this conclusion is 
reached by comparing motor vehicle statistics and generally lacks a comparison with 
horse-drawn vehicle statistics.8 Mom (2015, p.65) in an analysis of transport usage in 
France between 1863-1921 shows a much more balanced picture, taking into account 
both horse-drawn and motorised transport use, which shows that whilst private horse-
drawn travel was on a steady decline it still accounted for more overall passenger 
kilometres than both bicycles and motor vehicles, even after the First World War. The 
speed in which coachbuilders adapted to the rise of the automobile also depended 
both on the location, urban or rural, and the type of coachbuilder, high-class 
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carriagebuilder or wagonbuilder (Tjong Tjin Tai, 2015, p.191 and Kinney, 2004, p.298). 
The variety of the coachbuilding trade is important as the arrival of motorised vehicles 
affected different areas of the horse trade in radically different ways. For example, 
high quality carriagebuilders like Cockshoot’s noticed that their upper-class customers 
were buying automobiles as early as 1902, while wagonbuilders would probably have 
seen little difference in trade until well after the first decade of the 20th century, and 
motorised commercial vehicle sales were very modest before the First World War, 
especially when compared to passenger vehicles (Barker and Gerhold, 1993, p.60).  
Diffusion of the automobile started slowly, but rapidly increased into the 1920s. One 
would expect this to be mirrored by the decline in horse-drawn transport; however 
there were subtle but significant variations. Changes can be tracked in the analysis of 
occupational data from the censuses of England and Wales in 1901, 1911 and 1921. In 
1901 there were only 623 people employed as either, chauffeurs, commercial drivers, 
or motorised cab drivers; this had increased to 43,094 by 1911.9 Despite this rise there 
was an increase in the level of horse-drawn transport employment, from 347,655 in 
1901 to 374,587 by 1911.10 Motorised employment represented only about 10% of 
road transport employment in 1911, a relatively modest amount. If we explore these 
statistics further we can see some other interesting trends. While the number of 
chauffeurs grew to 23,151 in 1911 the number of coachmen and grooms employed 
only fell by 8,127, to 67,228 in 1911, suggesting that new automobile owners were not 
necessarily replacing their coach staff when hiring chauffeurs.11 Numbers involved in 
horse-drawn commercial haulage had increased. This is mirrored by the coinciding 
increase in the number of horses being used for freight purposes (Barker and Gerhold, 
1993, p.60). There was a marked decline in public horse-drawn transport, as cabmen, 
grooms and stablemen numbers declined by a third by 1911.12 However this decline 
was also affected by improved electric tram systems in the cities (Lyddon, 1987, p.180 
and Barker and Gerhold, 1993, p.54).13 Statistical analysis is not as detailed for 1921, 
but by this point the ratio of horse-drivers to motor drivers in the road transport 
industry was virtually 50:50. However the census report noted that this ratio varied 
significantly by area. For example while the South had many counties with a majority 
of motor employment, the North only had one.14   
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Business listings in local trade directories allows for an analysis of the regional motor 
and carriage trade in the first few decades of the 20th century. Figure 1 shows 
relatively little difference between 1901 and 1911, notable only for a small number of 
motorcar garages and agencies emerging, with only a small drop in associated horse 
and carriage trade businesses; however between 1911 and 1931 there is an 
appreciable difference, especially in the rise of motorcar garages and the decline in 
wheelwrights. However, the number of carriage and coachbuilders stayed roughly the 
same throughout the period as they often became carriage and motor body builders, 
showing that coachbuilders were able to adapt and survive in the motor age. Many like 
Cockshoot became motor body builders, agents and garage proprietors. 
 
Figure 9 - Data collected from the Slater's Manchester and Salford Trade Directory, 
1901, 1911, 1921 and 1931 
This statistical analysis has been brief, but serves to demonstrate changes over  three 
decades, from a gradual increase in motor transport before the First World War to an 
ever quicker increase afterwards, which eventually saw the decline of horse-drawn 
transport in all areas in the inter-war period. Although the increase of motorised 
transport employment did not see a mirrored decrease in horse-drawn. This analysis 
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has also demonstrated the varied speed of diffusion of private, public and commercial 
vehicles, which would have affected different coachbuilders in different ways.  
Attitudes towards early motoring 
In the late 19th century many believed motoring to be a fad and motorists faced 
opposition on many fronts, from local corporations, the police and rural residents and 
those with a vested interest in the horse trade. At the advent of the industry many 
coachbuilders were also sceptical. However this attitude was not necessarily due to 
the threat posed to the established horse trade, but more to do with the unreliability, 
smell and noise created by the automobile. Simpson and Bodman, an early motor 
manufacturer founded in Manchester, focused on commercial vehicles because they 
believed the passenger vehicle to be unviable:  
‘when as a carriage builder one of us has pointed out the defects of noise, clumsiness, 
and complication that he knew would never be tolerated... We do not think there is a 
village wheelwright even who would risk his reputation to say that any of the French or 
Franco-Coventry productions possessed the running – or standing – merits of a private 
carriage, in the sense that English carriage owners would accept it.’15  
This view was also held by coachbuilders across the world. A Dutch trade journal noted 
that the automobile missed the grace of horse-drawn transport, an opinion also 
echoed in by American coachbuilders (Tjong Tjing Tai, 2015, p.191 and Kinney, 2004, 
p.267). A few British coachbuilders, such as Arthur Mulliner, involved themselves in the 
motor trade in the 19th century; however these were exceptions (Georgano, 2001, 
p.246). Despite this the popularity of motoring soon defied the automobiles inherent 
flaws as the experience of speed, and the adventure of touring became a powerful 
driving force in the establishment of automobile culture (Mom, 2015, Chapter One: 
‘Racing, Touring Tinkering Constructing the Adventure Machine (1895-1914/1917)’, 
pp.59-113).  
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Introducing Joseph Cockshoot and Company 
 
Figure 10 – Drawing of the High Sherriff of Lancashire’s coach built by Cockshoot – 
YMS 0197/1/1/9 
Joseph Cockshoot set up as an independent coachbuilder in 1844, before forming a 
partnership with William Norris in 1851. By the 20th century the firm had a long history 
of building quality carriages for Lancashire and Cheshire’s upper-classes, as well as 
selling second-hand carriages. Examples of the firm’s elegant and high quality work can 
be found in abundance in the company archives including the carriage in Figure 2 
which was commissioned by the High Sherriff of Lancashire. The firm also won 
numerous awards such as the Premier Gold Medal at the Paris Exhibition of 1878. 
Cockshoot entered the motor industry between 1901 and 1902 by building a few 
motorcar bodies for clients, before opening a motor department in 1903. By 1907 they 
had auctioned off their remaining stock of horse-drawn carriages and accessories and 
were wholly committed to the motor trade which brought them good business for the 
rest of their history. The firm became a private limited company in 1895 and public 
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limited in 1959. For Cockshoot, as motor body custom declined they expanded 
motorcar sales and repairs for which they were successful well into the latter half of 
the 20th century. The business was bought in 1968 by Lex Garages Ltd. and by 1970, 
after 119 years, the Norris family ceased involvement in the management of the firm.   
Cockshoot are an example of a coachbuilder successfully and rapidly adapting to the 
rise of the automobile and the decline of the horse-drawn vehicle, although as we 
have seen in the analysis above many other coachbuilders survived the period as 
agents and motor body builders.  In the following analysis we will explore the firm’s 
relationship with both customers and early motor manufacturers; the decision to set 
up the motor department; and set the firms actions in context, both regionally and 
nationally.  
Cockshoot’s entry into the motor industry 
A special letter addressed to shareholders on 23 December 1902 announced the 
decision that J. Cockshoot and Co. was creating a Motor Department, with the 
purchase of new premises to support the operation. In the letter they reasoned: 
‘It has been evident for some time past that customers of the firm have been 
purchasing motorcars in addition to their carriages, and it requires no great amount of 
argument to show that if that be the case their carriages, used alternatively with 
motorcars, will last much longer than if they used carriages solely.’ 16   
They then noted that although there was no change at the moment, there would be if 
the fortune of the motor industry continued to improve. Their research involved 
visiting coachbuilders in London, Paris and the provinces to see how they had been 
adapting to the new motor industry. The letter suggests that ownership of an 
automobile without a carriage was unlikely in the period up until 1902. Indeed the 
carriage and the motorcar could easily serve separate functions. Many coach-owners 
had several different carriages for different uses, with two and four wheelers, gigs, 
broughams, carrying a variety of different passengers and cargoes. Similarly there 
were open top carriages for summer, such as figure 3, and closed cabs for winter 
(Watney, 1961, p.17).17 More recent automobile scholarship has emphasised both the 
unreliability and the adventuring qualities of the automobile during this period, used 
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for touring and racing (Mom, 2015, pp.59-113). Carriages therefore might still be used 
to provide practical transportation, to the railway station, the church, or to visit 
friends. Indeed as late as 1907 Rolls-Royce proudly advertised in The Autocar that: ‘A 
private owner of a R.R. writes: “I may say my car is a perfect dream. It is so reliable 
that I have done away with my carriages and horses.”’18 The implication being that 
carriage owners were not replacing entirely with motorcars.  
 
 
Figure 11 – Drawing of a Cabriolet Victoria Phaeton made in 1902. Carriage 
nomenclature was used for automobile bodies - YMS 0197/1/1/20  
 
The decision therefore shows bold leadership from the Norris family, whose second 
generation were largely responsible for running the business during this period. 
Despite this, the decision was challenged within the company; two of the six directors, 
John Ainsworth and Ezra Miller, voted against entering the motoring industry.19 
Ainsworth was a large shareholder, and Miller was a harness maker for the firm, 
representing a specific skill that was unique to horse-drawn transport. This highlights 
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that coachbuilding firms were a collection of many different crafts. Trimmers, 
coachbuilders, carpenters and painters would still have a role, whereas harness makers 
and wheelwrights might feel threatened by the new department.20 This split is 
highlighted in the United Kingdom Society of Coachbuilders membership (Lyddon, 
1987, p.73). Roughly 33% of the workforce might be affected negatively, which would 
certainly explain the opposition within Cockshoot and more widely among other 
coachbuilders.  
The venture was one vote from not starting. The internal loggerhead is remembered in 
a note on the subject written in the 1950s, by former director John Norris, working for 
the company at the time, ‘There was, in fact, a sharp difference of opinion between 
the Directors, which persisted for many years.’21  He expands on this in other memoirs: 
‘And again there was a tremendous amount of prejudice surrounding the motorcar 
and a serious maker found he not only had to break down this but also fight the vested 
interest.’ ‘I remember my brother’s own tough fight with his co-directors on 
Cockshoot’s board to persuade them to take the trade seriously.’22 Interestingly, but 
not perhaps unsurprisingly this decision was viewed very differently by the company in 
later decades. The company’s catalogue for 1924 announced ‘it was but a natural 
development that the firm should take its place with the pioneers of the motor 
industry in this country.’23 This insight into the firm’s dilemma is a rare opportunity to 
challenge the assumption that coachbuilders naturally adapted to the change brought 
about by the automobile. Indeed, while Cockshoot both entered early and negotiated 
this difficult period with relative success, one wonders what the situation was at other 
coachbuilders. This entry period also highlights the problem with considering 
coachbuilders as a single trade, when in fact there were several that made up the 
industry, each with quite different roles and prejudices.  
Early dealings (1902-10) 
Ainsworth and Miller might have been justified in their objections. Cockshoot leased a 
garage on Deansgate, known as ‘The Arches’ and negotiated the agency for the Velox, 
the Rex, the Northern Runabout and the Stanley Steam Car, all of which were initially 
unsuccessful for Cockshoot and led to a loss for the new department in 1903, which 
had to be offset by carriage trade profits.24 The opening of the motor department in 
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1903, might have been viewed as visionary in hindsight, however it demonstrates how 
difficult and unnatural it was for a coachbuilder to open a garage and begin with 
motorcar agencies. Cockshoot lacked expertise among the staff already employed at 
the firm and relied on those in Manchester who did. Fred Settle was employed as chief 
mechanic. Settle had been involved in one of Manchester’s first garage ventures the 
Manchester Motor Car Corporation and had at least three years’ experience as a 
motorcar mechanic.25 With a good reputation as a coachbuilder Cockshoot were well 
placed to sell motorcars to their clientele, however in the UK dealerships were almost 
always agreed with a territory arrangement, so picking the right car agency could be a 
tricky, especially with no experience. In this respect the firm bought the business and 
the rights to the agency agreements of Manchester dealer F. Wilkinson and Co., who 
had agencies for the American Stanley Steam Car and the petrol driven Northern 
Runabout.26 Like Settle, Wilkinson also had a history in the local industry, for several 
years previously he sold steam engine components and steam powered automobiles.27 
To demonstrate the difficulty of selecting agencies we only need to examine the 
number of motorcar manufacturers at the time. The North-West alone had 20 
automobile manufacturers, while estimates show there were around 200 automobile 
manufacturers in the UK, not counting all the foreign manufacturers (Beaven, 1994, 
p.46).28 Adapting to engineering and agency sales was not straightforward, a step that 
is often neglected. Automobile scholars such as Georgano (2001, p.3) and Foreman-
Peck, Bowden and McKinley (1995, p.7) focus instead on coachbuiders’ more natural 
transition to motorcar body production. For example, Cockshoot had already been 
approach by several clients to fit motorcar bodies prior to 1903 (Brooks, 1979, 
09002).29  
The initial poor performance did not deter the firm who soon established themselves 
with some more successful agencies and some regular motor body building work for 
local and international firms, including Renault, Rolls-Royce and Panhard.  Despite the 
controversial and rocky entry into the motoring industry, Cockshoot ceased all 
involvement in the carriage trade when in October 1909 the remaining stock, including 
harnesses, whips etc. were put up for auction.30 Although coachbuilders by tradition 
from then onwards, Cockshoot were solely engaged in the motor trade. 
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Despite Cockshoot’s bold decision to enter the motor trade in late 1902, economically 
it was a difficult road to success. Indeed John Norris in his memoirs put a large 
emphasis on the firm’s crucial relationship with Renault, both as agent and motorcar 
body builder.31 To demonstrate how complex and contradictory this period was for 
coachbuilders we only have to explore Manchester’s other coachbuilders. Anne 
Cowburn was also a high-class, long established coachbuilder. Yet they did not enter 
the industry until 1909 when they announced in an advert: ‘Finding that there is an 
inclination amongst our numerous clients to replace their Carriages with Motor Cars, 
we have opened and equipped... an engineering department and garage.’32 However, 
there were also new firms like Hollingdrake of Stockport that set up business as early 
as 1902 specifically to manufacture motorcar bodies (Clarke, 2002).33 Going back to 
the opening quote from Kinney, it was both messy and indistinct. 
Relationships with customers  
As seen above, Cockshoot was motivated to enter the industry after noticing the 
changing trends in vehicle ownership amongst their customers. Coachbuilders with 
upper-class clientele were more likely to take this step early (Tai Tjong Tjing, 2015, 
p.191 and Kinney, 2004, pp.271-2). Examining Cockshoot customers and their early 
business in the motor industry has highlighted the importance of the relationship 
between the customer and the coachbuilder in the early motor industry. It is clear that 
Cockshoot’s customers were upper-class. We can tell this from the types of cars they 
were buying, their titles and the number of motorcar bodies bought with crests. 
Between 1903 and 1906 motorcar bodies were commissioned by four knights, a Lord, 
several high ranking military officer and many prominent Manchester businessmen. 28 
of the first 55 bodies photographed by the firm had crests emblazoned on the side; 
many of these were also pictured with chauffeurs at the wheel. The use of crests was 
inherited from carriage ownership and the surviving Cockshoot book of customer’s 
heraldry shows hundreds of examples including figures 4 and 5. Further demonstration 
of the class of customers was the facilities to ‘stable’ vehicles at the firm’s Deansgate 
garage, which included sleeping quarters and a billiard table for chauffeurs.34 
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Figure 12 - The Crest of John Carlisle, who bought a motor car body from Cockshoot 
in 1905 with the latin motto that translates ‘Humility’ YMS 0196/5/1/9 
 
Figure 13 - The Crest of the Ashworth family used on several carriages and cars 
bought from Cockshoot. The motto translates ‘Love of country conquers’- YMS 
0196/5/1/9 
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Carriages tended to last a long time and required very little maintenance especially 
compared to early automobiles (Georgano, 2011, p.3). The rate of progress of the 
automobile and its capacity to breakdown led to frequent new purchases for those 
who could afford it. Among Cockshoot’s customers were several repeating 
commissions, the most frequent of which were Mr and Mrs Ashworth, who returned 
four times to Cockshoot for new motorcar bodies between 1903 and 1912.35 The 
relationship between the coachbuilder and the customer was important in the making 
of custom motor car bodies, which could include several visits to the works, and 
lengthy correspondence over the specifications of design (Brooks, 1979, 08025-
080059). This could span several months, as often chassis were made after receipt of 
an order and coachbuilders would work with each customer to build their specific 
body; included choosing the interior decoration, the colour, the style of the body, 
whether closed or open, how many seats, as well as any other number of customer 
demands such as luggage space, or items like additional horns, as seen in figure 6. 
What is also noticeable is the number of customers that bought both carriages and 
motor cars from the firm. For example the Rice family used Cockshoot either to buy 
carriages or getting carriages re-painted in 1892, 1896 and 1897 and then 
commissioned motor car bodies in 1906 and 1908. Similarly G. S. Ball had work 
commissioned on carriages in 1889, 1890, 1893 and 1895 before purchasing motor car 
bodies in 1905 and 1906.36  There are many more examples, but they serve to confirm 
that the customer base of high quality coachbuilder’s gave them potential to move 
into motorcar body building during the Edwardian period.  
Brooks’ list of all the motor car bodies manufactured by Cockshoot shows that 
between 1908 and 1912 women made up over 10% of total motor body customers 
(Brooks, 1979, 08005). This was particularly high especially compared to Cheshire 
registration data which shows that between 1903 and 1911 only 41 out of 3658 
vehicles were registered by women, a proportion of just over 1%.37 While further afield 
in Arizona, 1915, only 5.5% of automobile registrations were by women.38 The 
customer records at Cockshoot therefore support Scharff’s suggestion that there were 
more women drivers and buyers than registration statistics suggest, with the habit 
being for vehicles to be registered in the male name.39 The range of female customers 
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and the types of cars they were purchasing shows an interesting variety. While many 
women motorists were challenging gender assumptions by racing or driving large 
powerful cars other upper-class women positioned motoring as a suitable past-time as 
chauffeur driven passenger-owners (Merriman, 2012, p.99). This complexity is 
certainly evident in Cockshoot’s female customers of the Edwardian period. For 
example, racing driver Miss Daisy Hampson purchased a 60 horse power Mercedes in 
1904 and a powerful 120 horsepower FIAT race car that had finished second in the 
Gordon Bennett race of 1905.40 At the other end of the spectrum was Miss Ella Ross 
Cordingly Shaw’s more sedate 12 horsepower Velux, bodied by Cockshoot in 1903. 
While somewhere in between was Miss Parry’s 20/30 horsepower Renault bought in 
1905, as seen in Figure6, with a horn for the rear passenger, presumably so Miss Parry 
could do some backseat driving, behind her chauffeur (Brooks, 1979, 08011). 
 
Figure 14 - Mrs Parry's 20/30 Horsepower Renault with horn attached to the back 
seat and chauffeur at the wheel - YMS Cockshoot Photograph Box 1, 1905 
Relationship with manufacturers  
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The relationship between automobile manufacturer, coachbuilder and customer was 
complex, the coachbuilder acting as an intermediary between the manufacturer and 
the prospective customer. Cockshoot’s large established clientele of rich and upper-
class carriage owners, wanting to purchase a motorcar, would be an attractive 
proposition to a manufacturer looking for new customers. Cockshoot, as the provider 
of the car body and as the agent for the manufacturer, would have been the first point 
of contact when there was a problem with the vehicle. Therefore it was not just the 
relationship between Cockshoot and its’ customers that had to be maintained, but also 
the relationship between the newly emerging car manufacturers and Cockshoot as the 
agent that had to be established and built upon in order for both the growth and 
future survival of the new partnerships. 
This becomes clear in the case of Mr R. P Richards who was sold a Rolls-Royce chassis 
and custom body by Cockshoot in 1911. Full correspondence survives between 
Cockshoot and Mr Richards and shows the level of customer support that Cockshoot 
gave, dealing with problems with the coachwork, creating bespoke solutions to 
mechanical issues, as well as offering to acquire new parts (Brooks, 1979, 08025-
08059). Mr Richards motorcar body came with 36 personal specifications including: a 
small folding table in the rear, a portable luggage grid at back with strappings, silk 
curtains with tassels, tool boxes under the steps, a generally light body, well sprung, 
with seats not too upright. Cockshoot also provided him with spares for his Renault, 
which was being taken by Cockshoot in exchange for his new Rolls-Royce. Richards 
thanked Cockshoot for writing to Rolls-Royce to press them for quick delivery of the 
chassis, for which Rolls-Royce could not guarantee delivery before Easter 1911. The car 
was finally ready for Mr Richard’s touring holiday on July 1911, the whole process 
lasting around 6 months. After delivery, a rattle developed which Cockshoot promised 
to rectify ‘we shall… either send out a man to do what is necessary, or better still to 
correct the fault here if you will drive it in some day.”41 Clear in the correspondence is 
the complexity of the work and the difficulty of dealing not only with bespoke orders 
but mechanical issues, after the sale.    
After the short-lived agencies for American steam cars in 1903 Cockshoot struck up a 
good relationship with Renault that lasted several years. This relationship developed 
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through personal contacts, the former Motor Department Manager Mr P. Dobson left 
to work for Renault in London. It was this agency, and the custom body orders that 
came with it that helped guarantee Cockshoot’s success before 1914. Brook’s analysis 
of motorcar bodies built shows that 36 of 52 bodies built in 1906 were Renaults and 78 
out of 118 in 1907 (Brooks, 1979, 05008). However this relationship ended around the 
time of the First World War, perhaps because Dobson left Renault to manufacture his 
own cars. A more lasting relationship was formed with Rolls-Royce, for whom 
Cockshoot would be local agents well into the middle of the century. While Rolls-Royce 
and Renault agencies fit with Cockshoot’s upper-class clientele, after the First World 
War their relationship with mass car producer Morris was to be of more importance in 
a period that saw the rapid growth of automobile sales in the UK.  
Once Cockshoot had decided to open the Motor Department in 1903 they were very 
quick to advertise their involvement in the automobile industry both in local 
newspapers and in automobile trade journals such as The Autocar.42 Apart from J. 
Walmsley of Preston, advertising as early as 1902, they were the first North-West 
coachbuilder to advertise in motoring journals.43 Interestingly the firm continued to 
boldly associate with their carriage building history long after they had anything to do 
with carriages. For example Figure 7, an advert from 1909, was printed after the final 
sale of carriage stock.  
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Figure 15 - Advert from the Manchester Courier 28/12/1909 
Cockshoot in the interwar period: agency and sales  
During the First World War Cockshoot produced bodies for Royal Flying Corps Crossley 
Tenders, a local motor manufacturer for whom Cockshoot had worked before.44 
However, in the interwar period the firm moved further away from coachwork and 
enhanced their role as motorcar agents. Up until 1914 Cockshoot produced 717 
motorcar bodies, between 1920 and 1929 242, and between 1930 and 1939 as few as 
68.45 This follows a general trend in the coachbuilding industry as custom coachwork 
became less common with the majority of customers purchasing already finished 
motor cars. In the 1920s motor car bodies were made as part of the production 
processes or outsourced to local coachbuilders, however in the 1930s bodies began to 
be made from pressed steel which saw a decline in coachbuilding skills (Lyddon, 1987, 
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pp.585-6). There were a few exceptions. Firms like Hooper’s in London built nearly as 
many motor car bodies in the 1930s as the 1920s; however after the Second World 
War they too saw a decline in custom body orders (Brooks, 1979, 09009).  
Cockshoot continued their association with Rolls-Royce into the interwar period 
making the occasional body and acting as regional agent. However key to their survival 
and prosperity was their relationship with Morris, one of the three successful mass 
producers of the era. The first agency agreement with Morris was signed in September 
1919 for a modest 50 cars.46 However, as Figure 8 shows the number of cars being 
supplied to Cockshoot was as high as 2,200 by 1925. This boom in sales coincided with 
the rapid rise in fortune for Morris, who became Britain’s market leader in 1923. It also 
shows the importance of gaining an agency for a popular car. A rise in car sales 
necessitated the opening new showroom in St. Anne’s Square in 1927, increasing their 
potential. The first Morris Minor was delivered to the show room, advertised as the 
first £100 car in 1930.  John Norris remarked from memory that ‘within minutes the 
showroom was almost besieged by people wanting to see this new, cheap car’ (Brooks, 
1979, 09009).  
 
  
Figure 16 - Data from Cockshoot surviving dealership agreements YMS 0197/1/2 
By 1924 with the number of cars taken by Cockshoot rapidly increasing the agreement 
changed to include much more detail for sub-dealers, including rates of commission 
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and rules of appointment. Whilst Cockshoot had the agency for East Lancashire and 
Cheshire, they were based solely in the city centre until after the Second World War. 
So they relied on sub-dealers in the towns outside of Manchester. The agreement for 
the 1939 season described Cockshoot as ‘distributors’, overseeing the appointment of 
‘dealers’ and ‘retail dealers’. There was a small fleet of nine demonstration models 
available and Cockshoot and its partnered dealers were selling 4000 of the various 
Morris vehicles a year. The contract also included increased advertising stipulation. No 
longer was it good enough to put up a sign outside, as per the 1919 agreement; 10 
shillings per vehicle sold had to be spent on advertising by various means, reflecting an 
increased control over dealer operations from the start of the interwar period.47  
At the back of each completed agreement, there was a schedule or ‘estimate of 
distributor’s monthly requirements of vehicles’. What is most striking, when these are 
filled in, is the difference between the schedules of the 1920s and those of the late 
1930s. In the 1920s there is clear seasonal variation, with Cockshoot estimating higher 
sales of vehicles in the spring and early summer, with a big drop off in the autumn and 
winter months. For example, in the schedule for the 1923 season 43 cars were ordered 
for autumn and 102 for the summer. 48 By 1939 there is very little seasonal variation in 
Cockshoot’s estimate of requirements with the biggest variation being 304 in August, 
compared to 355 to May.49 This shows how Cockshoot catered for a changing car 
culture, as motoring became all year round activity. The Oxford and Cowley models 
sold in the 1920s were seen as summer touring cars, whereas the Morris cars of 1939 
were designed for comfort in all weathers, also reflecting the change from open 
coachbuilding to mass produced pressed steel enclosed bodies. 
So quick was the decline in Cockshoot’s motor car bodybuilding that Brian Norris 
remarked of the 1930s that ‘We just kept on the coachbuilding side of the business to 
keep the old men happy. If ever it had been subject to cost analysis, we would have 
had a fit.’ (Brooks, 1979, 09015).  However the success of motor car sales and the 
relationship with Morris secured the survival of the coachbuilding firm. Figure 9 shows 
the profit made throughout the interwar period, with the exception of the period 
around 1930. Notable also is the larger interwar profits compared to those of 1903-
1914.  
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Figure 17 - Data gathered from profit and loss accounts YMS 0196/3/1-46. Data from 
1905-6 and 1909 are missing 
Conclusion 
This paper has challenged to idea that the move from the carriage to the car was one 
of simple technological progression, or that the carriage trade and use of horse-drawn 
transport rapidly declined soon after the arrival of the automobile in a predictable 
uniform fashion. The case study of a Manchester coachbuilder Joseph Cockshoot and 
Company has highlighted aspects of this transitional period, including some rather 
stark contradictions. Most striking of which was the end of Cockshoot’s involvement in 
the carriage trade in 1907, two years before local rival Anne Cowburn had even 
opened a motor department to sell motor cars. While building motor car bodies might 
be more natural for coachbuilding firms as demand increased for motor cars, the 
decisions over agencies, and the entry into mechanical engineering was much more 
alien, and included substantial risk. A study of the firm has also shown the importance 
of relationships both with the customer, and with the automobile manufacturer that 
went beyond the building of a motor car body; included the ordering of spare parts, 
dealing with all kinds of customer requests, the arrangement of sub-dealerships, 
advertising, repairing and demonstrating the manufacturers products.  
Above all I hope this paper has impressed the need for a detailed study of the 
transitional period between the horse-drawn vehicle and the automobile in the UK 
that would complement those that exist from other countries. While this paper has 
looked at an upper-class coachbuilder due the survival of particular archive material, 
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similar case studies of wagonbuilders, cartbuilders and wheelwrights would almost 
certainly provide an interesting and insightful contrast which would further highlight 
the complexities of the era. 
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